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Summary
FinTech typically describes the application of novel technologies in the financial ser-
vices sector. These technological innovations aim to compete with traditional financial
technologies and improve user experience on a broad range of financial applications.
Examples range from peer-to-peer investing services and new settlement procedures
to the use of smartphones for mobile banking. Each chapter of this dissertation deals
with one of these examples with the goal to draw conclusions for broader economic
questions.
In the first chapter, Crowdfunding and Demand Uncertainty, I analyze the potential of
reward-based crowdfunding to elicit demand information and improve the screening
of viable projects vis-à-vis traditional external financing. Crowdfunding allows en-
trepreneurs to sell claims on future products directly to consumers to finance their in-
vestments. At the same time, this peer-to-peer sale of claims generates demand infor-
mation that benefits the screening process for viable projects. I provide a characteriza-
tion of the profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanismwhen an entrepreneur knows
neither the number of consumers who positively value the product nor their reserva-
tion prices. Using mechanism design theory, I show that the entrepreneur can finance
all viable projects by committing to prices that decrease as the number of pledgers in-
creases. This pricing strategy grants ex-post information rents to consumers with high
reservation prices. However, if these information rents are large, then the entrepreneur
prefers fixed high prices that lead to underinvestment since consumers with low val-
uations never participate.
The second chapter, Building Trust Takes Time: Limits to Arbitrage in Blockchain-Based
Markets, is a joint project with Nikolaus Hautsch and Stefan Voigt. We analyze the po-
tential implications of distributed ledger technologies, such as blockchain, for cross-
market trading. Distributed ledgers replace trusted clearing counterparties and secu-
rity depositories with time-consuming consensus protocols to record the transfer of
ownership. We argue that this settlement latency exposes cross-market arbitrageurs
to price risk and theoretically derive arbitrage bounds that increase with expected
vii
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latency, latency uncertainty, volatility in the underlying asset, and arbitrageurs’ risk
aversion. We then use Bitcoin order book and network data to estimate arbitrage
bounds of, on average, 121 basis points, which in fact explain 91% of the observed
cross-market price differences in our sample period. Consistent with our theoretical
framework, we also find that periods of high latency-implied price risk exhibit large
price differences, while asset flows across exchanges chase arbitrage opportunities.
Our main conclusion is that blockchain-based settlement introduces a non-trivial fric-
tion that impedes arbitrageurs’ activity.
The third chapter, Perceived Precautionary Savings Motives: Evidence from FinTech, is
coauthored with Francesco D’Acunto, Thomas Rauter, and Michael Weber. We use
data from a European FinTech banking app provider to study the consumption re-
sponse to the introduction of a mobile overdraft facility. In addition, we use the bank-
ing app to elicit consumers’ preferences, beliefs, and motives. We find that users in-
crease their spending permanently, lower their savings rate, and reallocate spending
from non-discretionary to discretionary goods. Interestingly, users with a lot of de-
posits relative to their income react more than others but do not tap into negative
deposits. We demonstrate that these results are not fully consistent with conventional
models of financial constraints, buffer stock models, or present-bias preferences. We
hence label this channel “perceived precautionary savings motives”: users with a lot
of liquidity behave as if they had strong precautionary savings motives even though
no observables, including the elicited preferences and beliefs, suggest they should.
viii
German Abstracts
Crowdfunding and Demand Uncertainty
Belohnungsbasiertes Crowdfunding ermöglicht Unternehmern, Forderungen auf zu-
künftige Produkte zu verkaufen, um Investitionen zu finanzieren und gleichzeitig In-
formation über die Nachfrage zu generieren, die die Suche nach rentablen Projekte er-
leichtert. Ich charakterisiere den gewinnmaximierendenCrowdfunding-Mechanismus,
wenn der Unternehmer weder die Anzahl der Konsumenten, die das Produkt positiv
bewerten, noch deren Reservationspreis kennt. Der Unternehmer kann alle rentablen
Projekte finanzieren, indem er sich zu Preisen verpflichtet, die mit einer wachsenden
Anzahl an Unterstützern sinken. Diese Preisstrategie gewährt Konsumenten mit ho-
hen Reservationspreisen Informationsrenten. Wenn diese Informationsrenten jedoch
groß sind, dann bevorzugt der Unternehmer hohe Festpreise, die zu Unterinvestition
führen.
Building Trust Takes Time: Limits to Arbitrage in Blockchain-Based Markets
Distributed-Ledger-Technologien ersetzen vertrauenswürdige Clearing-Gegenparteien
und Sicherheitsdepots durch zeitaufwändige Konsensprotokolle, um die Eigentums-
übertragung aufzuzeichnen. Diese Abwicklungslatenz setzt marktübergreifende Ar-
bitrageure einem Preisrisiko aus. Wir leiten theoretische Arbitragegrenzen ab, die mit
der erwarteten Latenz, der Latenzunsicherheit, der Volatilität und der Risikoaversion
steigen. Auf Basis von Bitcoin-Orderbuch- und Netzwerkdaten schätzen wir Arbi-
tragegrenzen von durchschnittlich 121 Basispunkten, welche 91% der beobachteten
marktübergreifenden Preisunterschiede erklären. Im Einklang mit unserer Theorie
weisen Periodenmit hohem latenzinduzierten Preisrisiko große Preisunterschiede auf,
während Transfers von Assets Arbitragemöglichkeiten folgen. Blockchain-basierte
Abwicklungen führen somit eine nicht-triviale Friktion ein, die Arbitrageaktivitäten
behindert.
ix
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Perceived Precautionary Savings Motives: Evidence from FinTech
Wir untersuchen die Konsumreaktion von Erstkreditnehmern auf einenÜberziehungs-
rahmen und erheben ihre Präferenzen, Überzeugungen undMotive durch eine FinTech-
App. DieNutzer erhöhen ihre Ausgaben dauerhaft, senken ihre Sparquote und schich-
ten ihre Ausgaben von nicht-diskretionären auf diskretionäre Güter um. Interessanter-
weise reagieren liquide Nutzer mehr als andere, aber sie überziehen ihr Konto nicht.
Der Überziehungsrahmen dient als eine Art Absicherung. Unsere Ergebnisse sind
nicht vollständig konsistent mit Modellen der finanziellen Zwänge, Pufferbestand-
modellen oder Präferenzen, die gegenwärtige Ereignisse stärker gewichten. Wir be-
zeichnen diesen Kanal als vermeintlich vorsorgliche Sparmotive: liquide Nutzer ver-
halten sich so, als hätten sie starke vorsorgliche Sparmotive, auch wenn keine Charak-
teristiken, einschließlich der erhobenen Präferenzen und Überzeugungen, darauf hin-
deuten, dass sie dies tun sollten.
x
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1 Crowdfunding and Demand
Uncertainty
Reward-based crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to sell claims on future products to
finance investments and, at the same time, to generate demand information that bene-
fits screening for viable projects. I provide a characterization of the profit-maximizing
crowdfundingmechanism in a settingwhere the entrepreneur knows neither the num-
ber of consumers who positively value the product nor their reservation prices. The
entrepreneur can finance all viable projects by committing to prices that decrease as
the number of pledgers increase. This pricing strategy grants information rents to
consumers with high reservation prices. However, if these information rents are large,
then the entrepreneur prefers fixed high prices that lead to underinvestment.
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs can nowadays exploit a new set of financing tools brought forth by
technological innovation. Through the internet, entrepreneurs can directly contract
with many individuals—the crowd—before they bear any investment costs. Reward-
based crowdfunding constitutes one of the most popular types of interactions with
the crowd and involves the sale of claims that holders can exchange for products after
development (e.g., Kickstarter, Indiegogo). If the sale of these claims raises a pre-
specified amount of funds, entrepreneurs proceed to develop the product advertised
in the corresponding crowdfunding campaign. In addition to serving as a financ-
ing tool, reward-based crowdfunding provides entrepreneurs with the opportunity
to elicit information about product demand and to assess the viability of their projects
before they enter the production phase. By committing to a price for the future prod-
uct through the crowdfunding campaign, entrepreneurs may learn about the number
of consumers who are willing to buy at this price.
1
1 Crowdfunding and Demand Uncertainty
The starting point of this paper is Strausz (2017) whomodels demand uncertainty as
an asymmetric information problem between an entrepreneur and a group of poten-
tial consumers. In his setting, consumers either have a zero valuation of the product
or a known common positive valuation, but the entrepreneur does not observe con-
sumers’ type. The entrepreneur hence faces uncertainty about how many consumers
positively value the product, which I call the market size in this paper. Offering con-
sumers a claim on the future product at the known common positive valuation then
allows the entrepreneur to effectively learn the market size. This learning may help
entrepreneurs to screen for viable projects. However, setting the right price in a crowd-
funding campaign can be a challenging problem (e.g., in the case of funding a one-of-
a-kind product), as consumers might possess more complex private information about
their individual demand.1
I extend the framework of Strausz (2017) by considering uncertainty in the con-
sumers’ common private positive valuation—which I denote as the reservation price—
in addition to uncertainty about the market size. While neither the entrepreneur nor
the consumers observe the market size, consumers with a positive valuation have pri-
vate information about the reservation price. This extension of demand uncertainty
into market size and reservation price turns out to make a difference for the profit-
maximizing crowdfunding mechanism and the potential of reward-based crowdfund-
ing to implement first-best financing outcomes. In particular, the separation into these
two components makes it necessary for the entrepreneur to condition his pricing of
the crowdfunding claim on the realization of market size and thus to incentivize con-
sumers’ participation regardless of their reservation price.
I set up a parsimonious contracting game as a simple one-shot sale of a claim on the
future product to privately informed consumers but abstract from any issues related to
moral hazard.2 The entrepreneur is penniless and aims to raise funds for the idea she
wishes to implement at some fixed investment cost. Due to the asymmetric informa-
tion problem vis-à-vis consumers, contracting with uninformed outside investors to
raise the investment cost leads to underinvestment, since some ex-post viable projects
do not receive funding, or overinvestment, as ex-post unprofitable projects get funded.
However, direct contracting with informed consumers generates valuable information
1For instance, The Economist (2010) reports the example of a book publisher who finances the republi-
cation of a sold-out book via crowdfunding and his efforts to tease out consumers’ price sensitivity.
2See Strausz (2017) and Chemla and Tinn (2019) for papers that study the interaction of crowdfunding
and entrepreneurial moral hazard.
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for the screening process of the entrepreneur.3 I first illustrate the key tensions that
arise in this setting using an intuitive structure of a crowdfunding campaign and then
corroborate the findings with mechanism design.
The intuitive reward-based crowdfunding campaign comprises a price for a claim
on the future product and a funding target that the entrepreneur posts on a public plat-
form. Based on the information provided in the campaign, consumers decide whether
to pledge funds in exchange for a claim on the future product or not. The entrepreneur
only enters production if the total pledges exceed a pre-specified target level.4 As a re-
sult, the funding target serves as a tool to condition the entrepreneur’s participation
on the viability of the venture, given the observed demand at the posted price. This
scheme successfully elicits the number of consumers who are willing to buy a claim
on the product at a given price.
I consider four demand states which are the result of combinations of large and
small market sizes and high and low reservation prices, respectively. If the project is
only viable for the high reservation price, then the entrepreneur effectively faces un-
certainty about whether the market size at this price is sufficiently large, as shown in
Strausz (2017). Setting the price to the high reservation price (and the funding target
to cover all production costs at this price) allows the entrepreneur to learn the market
size for this price and finance all viable projects. If the project is only viable at a spe-
cific market size but for different reservation prices, then the entrepreneur optimally
chooses the price that maximizes expected profits. Even if setting the price to the low
reservation price implements first-best financing outcomes (given that production at
the low price is feasible), the entrepreneur might find it optimal to choose the high
price that yields higher expected profits but does not lead to financing if consumers
have low reservation prices.
If demand states with different combinations of reservation prices and market sizes
yield positive profits, then the choice of a fixed price does not lead to financing in one
demand state with positive profits. Suppose the demand states with (i) a high reser-
3I abstract from any private information that the entrepreneur may have. For instance, Chakraborty
and Swinney (2019) consider an entrepreneur who is privately informed about product quality and
may use the crowdfunding campaign as a signal vis-à-vis potential backers. Similarly, Nan et al.
(2019) consider an entrepreneur who is privately informed about her implementation costs.
4Platforms that focus on for-profit projects (e.g., Kickstarter) commonly use all-or-nothing crowd-
funding schemes, while other platforms allow entrepreneurs to keep what they raise, even if the
campaign does not reach the target. Other crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Indiegogo) allow en-
trepreneurs to choose between using the all-or-nothing or the keep-what-you-raise model (Cum-
ming et al., 2019). In this paper, only all-or-nothing schemes emerge as the entrepreneur’s preferred
choice and I refer to Chang (2019) for a comparison to the keep-what-you-raise scheme.
3
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vation price and a small market size, (ii) a low reservation price and a large market
size and (iii) a high reservation price and a large market size all yield positive profits.
Setting the price to the low reservation price does not lead to successful financing in
state (i), while setting the price to the high reservation price does not finance state (ii),
even though both demand states are profitable. To finance both demand states using
the same crowdfunding campaign, the entrepreneur has to commit to a price schedule
that depends on the number of consumers who participate in the campaign, that is,
charge a low price if there are many pledgers and charge a high price if there are only
few pledgers. The entrepreneur has to take the strategic behavior of consumers who
maximize their expected utility into account. In particular, consumers with high reser-
vation prices want to buy the product at a low price. However, the entrepreneur may
exploit the uncertainty about the market size to incentivize consumers’ truthful behav-
ior and thus finance all viable projects. This pricing scheme requires that consumers
with low reservation prices always pay the low price, while consumers with high
reservation prices are expected to pay the high price if the market size is small but the
low price if the market size is large. In this way, the entrepreneur promises consumers
with high reservation prices an information rent in the demand state where market
size is large but extracts all surplus from consumers with low reservation prices. This
state-contingent price commitment is incentive-compatible and leads to financing in
all three demand states (i), (ii) and (iii).
Even though a price commitment that implements first-best financing outcomes al-
ways exists in my model, the entrepreneur might prefer another strategy. Instead of
giving up some surplus in state (iii) (where both reservation prices and market size
are high), the entrepreneur may just choose the high price for her campaign and ex-
tract the full surplus in states (i) and (iii). This strategy may yield higher expected
profits than the state-contingent price commitment under some parameter constella-
tions. Just as in traditional models of monopolistic competition, profit maximization
might hence interfere with the provision of first-best financing outcomes.
To corroborate the findings of the intuitive crowdfunding campaign, I employ a
mechanism design approach. Mechanism design allows me to characterize the profit-
maximizing reward-based crowdfundingmechanism and necessary conditions for the
existence of a mechanism that implements first-best allocations. The resulting profit-
maximizing mechanism explicitly takes the incentive compatibility and participation
constraints of individual consumers into account. I first demonstrate that there ex-
ists a direct mechanism which implements an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur
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extracts the full surplus—a common result in settings where consumers have quasi-
linear preferences and correlated valuations (e.g., Myerson, 1981; Crémer andMcLean,
1985). However, depending on consumers’ beliefs, there is a large number of other
equilibria in which either consumers collectively misreport their valuation or some
consumers misreport and no production takes place under the full-surplus extraction
mechanism. Collective misreporting in fact yields higher expected utility for con-
sumers with high valuations. Following the robust implementation refinement (e.g.,
Bergemann and Morris, 2009, 2011), I thus require a mechanism to be belief-robust in
the sense that it only implements equilibria in which it is optimal for consumers to
report truthfully, regardless of their beliefs about other consumers’ behavior.
The belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanism does in general not
extract the full surplus for the entrepreneur, since there are parameter constellations
where the entrepreneur either has to grant consumers with high valuations an infor-
mation rent (to guarantee their truthful behavior) or she decides not to produce for
consumers with low valuations and extracts only the surplus of consumers with high
valuations. Intuitively, the entrepreneur faces a trade-off and has to decide whether to
only produce for consumers with high valuations, which leads to forgone profits when
consumers have low valuations, and to grant consumers with high valuations an in-
formation rent, which leads to forgone profits when consumers have high valuations.
Moreover, the belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanism implements
first-best allocations only if the demand state that the entrepreneur is able to finance by
setting a low price compensates her for the forgone expected profits of setting a high
price. These results hence exactly mirror the findings of the intuitive crowdfunding
campaign.
My theoretical results echo Harris and Raviv (1981) who analyze the problem of a
monopolist facing asymmetric information about consumer valuations. In their frame-
work, the monopolist chooses some form of priority pricing scheme if she faces ca-
pacity constraints. Just as in any (multi-unit) auction setting, the supply restriction
helps to incentivize consumers’ information revelation (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1989).
However, if the production capacity exceeds potential demand, then the absence of
scarcity does not allow the monopolist to discriminate across consumers based on the
probability of receiving the product. Harris and Raviv (1981) show that the monop-
olist optimally prefers to sell products at a fixed price in this case. The crowdfund-
ing game of my paper is similar to a setting with monopolists facing demand un-
certainty (e.g., Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972; Weitzmann, 1974; Klemperer and Meyer,
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1986), since the implicit assumption is that the entrepreneur has an idea for an innova-
tive product which grants (at least local) monopoly power. However, the crowdfund-
ing entrepreneur faces a temporal separation between the sale of claims on the future
product and the corresponding production decisions. In addition to her participation,
the crowdfunding entrepreneur may hence also condition the pricing of the product
on the outcome of the crowdfunding campaign and share some rents with consumers
to finance projects in different demand states.
The derivation of the profit-maximizing mechanism rests on the assumption that
the entrepreneur can commit to a pricing strategy. Upon observing consumers’ reser-
vation prices, the entrepreneur might have an incentive to charge the maximum possi-
ble price ex-post. However, consumers with high valuations anticipate this deviation
and might refrain from sending truthful reports altogether, which in turn hampers
the entrepreneur’s incentives to change the initially proposed pricing. Similarly, if the
entrepreneur does not commit to deliver the product to consumers after a success-
ful crowdfunding campaign and rather seeks bank financing with the newly acquired
demand information, she reduces the consumers’ incentives to truthfully report their
valuation. Moreover, just as in the durable goods literature (e.g., Coase, 1972; Stokey,
1981; Bulow, 1982; Gul et al., 1986), the entrepreneur might also have an incentive to
charge different prices to consumers on the market after crowdfunding than to con-
sumers who participate in the crowdfunding campaign. Albeit outside of my frame-
work, charging lower prices on the secondary market might incentivize consumers
with high valuations to wait for the market after crowdfunding rather than reporting
high valuations. This type of time-consistency problem of the entrepreneur might thus
hamper the screening benefits of crowdfunding.
In practice, crowdfunding platforms act as intermediaries between entrepreneurs
and consumers. These platforms collect the funds of consumers at the time they de-
cide to contribute to a campaign, rather than collecting reported valuations or commit-
ments to buy at a state-contingent price that unravels in the future. Entrepreneurs, on
the other hand, may typically either specify the full menu of rewards and correspond-
ing fixed prices at the campaign launch or add new rewards at different fixed prices at
a later stage. The crowdfunding platform transfers the funds to entrepreneurs only if
the funding goal is achieved and hence effectively serves as a commitment device for
the entrepreneurs’ pricing strategy. These restrictions also imply that a direct replica-
tion of the state-contingent pricing rule where each consumer’s contribution decreases
as the number of pledgers increase cannot be found in practice. However, the prices
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of each reward are typically minimum pledge amounts which allows consumers to
voluntarily contribute funds in excess of the posted prices. Moreover, by design of
the crowdfunding platform, consumers typically may change their pledge amount or
choose a different reward during the lifetime of a campaign. Although dynamic con-
siderations are outside of my model, these tools allow me to sketch an indirect repli-
cation of the state-contingent pricing mechanism. For instance, an entrepreneur may
launch the campaign with low prices and contact consumers directly to ask for higher
contributions in case of a small number of pledgers towards the campaign end. The
entrepreneur may also add an additional reward where she offers essentially the same
product but at a higher price.5 Consumers may then increase their pledge amount or
upgrade to a new reward category, thereby ensuring the campaign’s viability. If con-
sumers refuse to do so, they effectively reveal that they do not value the product high
enough.
Lastly, I briefly discuss the relation between the profit-maximizing reward-based
mechanism to security-based crowdfunding (e.g., Li, 2016; Brown and Davies, 2018;
Terovitis, 2019). Although an explicit modeling of the security design problem is also
outside of my framework, I can interpret reward-based crowdfunding as a debt-like
contract where the entrepreneur borrows a pre-specified amount from each consumer
in exchange for a fixed repayment promise (either in the form of the future product
or by returning the funds if the campaign is unsuccessful). The state-contingent pric-
ing rule then resembles a combination of a debt contract that all consumers buy and
a credit line that consumers with high reservation prices offer the entrepreneur. The
credit line contract specifies that the entrepreneur only draws on it if the campaign fea-
tures a small number of pledgers but may not do so in case of a large market size. To-
gether, these two securities replicate the utility and cash flows of the state-contingent
crowdfunding mechanism.
Overall, my paper contributes to the theoretical literature on crowdfunding by dis-
tinguishing between market size and reservation prices. For instance, Strausz (2017)
and Chemla and Tinn (2019) consider binary consumer valuations. In their setting, de-
mand uncertainty effectively boils down to uncertainty about the market size which
can be resolved by setting the price of the crowdfunding claim equal to the only pos-
sible positive reservation price. In my setting, the entrepreneur faces two possible
reservation prices and might exploit the uncertainty in the market size to incentivize
5In practice, entrepreneurs offer slightly differentiated products at different prices. However, I do not
explicitly consider product differentiation in my model.
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consumers’ truthful behavior. By contrast, Ellman and Hurkens (2019) consider pos-
itive private consumer valuations that are either high or low, but for a given market
size. Their main focus is price discrimination across consumers with different pos-
itive valuations, while in my setting consumers either have low or high valuations,
but there are never two consumers with a high and a low valuation at the same time.
I thus focus on consumer participation and information revelation rather than price
discrimination.
1.2 A Model of Crowdfunding
In this section, I build a model of investment with demand uncertainty in the spirit
of Strausz (2017). The model considers an entrepreneur who, prior to her investment
decision, directly interacts with an uncertain number of consumers who are privately
informed about their common reservation price, to elicit information about product
demand. The model has two stages: the entrepreneur raises funds to finance some
fixed investment costs in the first stage; production takes place and payoffs realize in
the second stage.
I consider a penniless entrepreneur with an idea for a product which requires a
fixed investment I > 0. I assume that the entrepreneur is crucial for the success of the
venture and cannot sell her idea to outsiders. After development, the entrepreneur
can produce the product at constant marginal cost c > 0. The entrepreneur maximizes
expected profits.
The economy is populated by n consumers who are privately informed about their
common reservation price of the product. Consumers have unit demand for the prod-
uct in the sense that they only get utility for exactly one unit of the product. I assume
that consumers have a private valuation v of one unit of the product. Consumers share
a common valuation, but they do not know how many other consumers also have the
same reservation price. Each consumer has additively separable utility, is risk neu-
tral and maximizes expected utility subject to her individual rationality constraint of
getting non-negative expected utility.
While consumers have private information about v, I assume that the entrepreneur
faces demand for the product that is uncertain in two dimensions: how many con-
sumers value the product—the market size n—and consumers’ willingness to pay for
the product if they value the product—the reservation price v. From the perspective of
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the entrepreneur, n˜ and v˜ denote the random variables associated with realizations n
and v, respectively.
The entrepreneur has subjective probability distributions over possible values of n˜
and v˜. Consumers also face uncertainty about n˜ and share the corresponding subjec-
tive probability distribution of the entrepreneur. In particular, the entrepreneur and
the consumers believe that n˜ is either nH with probability pin or nL < nH with proba-
bility 1− pin. Similarly, the entrepreneur believes that v˜ is either vH with probability piv
or vL < vH with probability 1− piv. Moreover, I assume that n˜ and v˜ are stochastically
independent, and I rule out cases where marginal costs exceed possible reservation
prices by assuming c < vL (since the entrepreneur would not find it worthwhile to
produce in this case anyway).
Therefore, the model features four possible states of aggregate demand (n˜, v˜): (i)
(nL, vL) with probability piLL ≡ (1 − pin)(1 − piv), (ii) (nL, vH) with probability piLH ≡
(1 − pin)piv, (iii) (nH , vL) with probability piHL ≡ pin(1 − piv), and (iv) (nH , vH) with
probability piHH ≡ pinpiv. Expected aggregate demand is hence given by
E[n˜v˜] =
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piijnivj. (1.1)
The timeline of the model is as follows: Before the game begins, the entrepreneur
announces her strategy—the crowdfunding mechanism—and can commit to it. Once
the entrepreneur has committed to a game and a strategy, consumers choose their
own strategy for the game. More specifically, consumers first privately observe their
valuations v (but they do not observe n) and then choose whether to participate in
the crowdfunding mechanism or not. If the entrepreneur successfully raises enough
funds to develop the product, she delivers it to the consumers at the price specified
in the crowdfunding mechanism in the next stage, while incurring marginal cost c for
each unit produced. After this stage, all payoffs realize and the game ends. Figure 1.1
summarizes the timeline of this game.
1.2.1 First-Best Benchmark
As a benchmark, I use the case of perfect information where the entrepreneur can ob-
serve the number of consumers n and their reservation prices v once the game begins.
Therefore, she can condition her investment decision on both demand parameters. In
9
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of the Crowdfunding Game
Entrepreneur
announces funding
mechanism and can
commit to it
n realizes and
consumers privately
observe v
Consumers choose
whether to partic-
ipate in funding
mechanism or not
If entrepreneur raises
enough funds, she
develops product
and delivers it to con-
sumers
Notes: This figure illustrates the timeline of the crowdfunding game. The entrepreneur announces a
funding mechanism at the beginning of the game to initialize the funding stage. Next, consumers pri-
vately observe their valuations and choose whether to participate in the funding mechanism proposed
by the entrepreneur. After the consumers’ participation decision, the funding stage concludes and the
entrepreneur evaluates the proceeds. If the entrepreneur raises sufficient funds, the production stage
begins where the entrepreneur delivers the product to consumers.
this full-information benchmark, the entrepreneur maximizes profits by producing a
total quantity n that she sells for v.
It is optimal for the entrepreneur to invest only if the project’s revenue covers the
total production costs, that is, if
nv ≥ I + nc, (1.2)
and to do nothing otherwise. With perfect information, the project generates an ex-
ante expected aggregate net surplus of
S∗ ≡
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij [ni(vj − c)− I] · 1{ni(vj−c)−I≥0}. (1.3)
The entrepreneur achieves the first-best funding outcome as all demand states with
positive profits are funded and no project with negative profits gets funding. A fund-
ing mechanism is hence efficient and implements first-best financing outcomes if it
finances all projects for which the realized demand state (n, v) satisfies Equation (1.2).
Throughout the paper, I only consider projects that are worthwhile with positive
probability, that is, I assume S∗ > 0. Put differently, at least one of the four demand
states yields positive profits. Given the four possible states of aggregate demand and
assuming that state (nL, vL) never yields positive profits, the aggregate net surplus can
exhibit four different scenarios:
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(a) Only state (nH , vH) yields positive profits, that is, the expected surplus is
S∗(a) = piHH [nH(vH − c)− I] . (1.4)
(b) Only states (nH , vH) and (nL, vH) yield positive profits, that is,
S∗(b) = piHH [nH(vH − c)− I] + piLH [nL(vH − c)− I] . (1.5)
(c) Only states (nH , vH) and (nH , vL) yield positive profits, that is,
S∗(c) = piHH [nH(vH − c)− I] + piHL [nH(vL − c)− I] . (1.6)
(d) The states (nH , vH), (nL, vH) and (nH , vL) yield positive profits, that is,
S∗(d) = piHH [nH(vH − c)− I] + piLH [nL(vH − c)− I] + piHL [nH(vL − c)− I] . (1.7)
Figure 1.2 visualizes the four different scenarios.
As shown in Strausz (2017), the availability of a competitive credit market that is
willing to provide I allows the entrepreneur to implement all viable projects and ex-
tract the full surplus. However, once the entrepreneur does not observe the demand
state, competitive lenders are not sufficient for a first-best funding outcome anymore.
1.2.2 Investing with Demand Uncertainty
Before I turn to crowdfunding, I demonstrate that financing through uninformed out-
side lenders might lead to over- or underinvestment and does not achieve the first-best
funding outcome in all possible demand states.
Consider the setting where the entrepreneur must decide to invest I without know-
ing n˜ or v˜, but she learns the realizations after investment. Moreover, suppose the
entrepreneur can raise I from competitive outside financiers (e.g., banks or venture
capitalists) and that these outside financiers do not possess any superior information
about demand vis-à-vis the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s expected profits from
11
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the First-Best Benchmark
Scenario (a)
v˜
n˜nL nH
vL
vH
Scenario (b)
v˜
n˜nL nH
vL
vH
Scenario (c)
v˜
n˜nL nH
vL
vH
Scenario (d)
v˜
n˜nL nH
vL
vH
Notes: This figure illustrates the different scenarios of first-best funding outcomes. The solid line cor-
responds to the curve where realized demand (n, v) exactly covers the total production costs, that is,
nv = I+nc. Demand states above the solid line yield positive profits, while states below yield negative
profits.
investing are in this case
Π¯ ≡
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij [ni(vj − c)]− I. (1.8)
It is only profitable for the entrepreneur to invest if Π¯ ≥ 0. However, the decision of
the entrepreneur to invest might lead to either under- or overinvestment. For viable
projects, the realizations of n and v have to satisfy Equation (1.2), but there might
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be parameter constellations such that Π¯ < 0 and the entrepreneur does not invest.
However, in this case, underinvestment relative to the first-best benchmark results
because the entrepreneur does not produce for any realization (n, v)where it would be
nonetheless efficient to produce. Similarly, for parameter constellations such that Π¯ ≥
0, the entrepreneur does invest I , but her decision implies overinvestment because she
produces even when aggregate demand turns out to be insufficient to cover total costs.
1.2.3 Reward-Based Crowdfunding
Strausz (2017) shows that the all-or-nothing, reward-based crowdfunding schemewith
a fixed price can elicit demand information such that the entrepreneur finances all vi-
able projects in a setting where reservation prices can take only one value. In this
scheme, the entrepreneur offers consumers the opportunity to pledge funds in ex-
change for the product in the future as a reward, but only if the entrepreneur raises
enough funds to finance overall production. If consumers do not pledge a sufficient
amount of funds, then the entrepreneur does not receive anything and the funding
stage fails.
Formally, the entrepreneur offers a contract that consists of a price p and a target
τp. I call the contract {p, τp} crowdfunding campaign, which states that the entrepreneur
only invests if the total number of pledgers n(p) for a given price p provide sufficient
funds to cover the target τp. If the total amount of pledges falls short of τp, then the
entrepreneur does not obtain any funds, and she neither invests nor produces. The
participation of consumers in the crowdfunding campaign is voluntary and yields the
expected utility
E [u(p, τp|v)] =
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij(v − p) · 1{n(p)p≥τp}, (1.9)
to a consumer with valuation v, where n(p) refers to the number of consumers who
pledge funds at price p. In fact, for any price p ∈ [0, v], exactly n consumers find it
optimal to pledge p, whereas no consumer pledges funds for p > v. The entrepreneur’s
expected profits of the crowdfunding campaign become
E [Π(p, τp)] =
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij [ni(p− c)− I] · 1{vj≥p} · 1{nip≥τp}. (1.10)
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The price commitment p serves as a tool to elicit information about the unknown num-
ber of consumers n˜ who are willing to participate at this price. The funding target τp,
on the other hand, serves as a tool to condition the entrepreneur’s investment decision
on the viability of the project. In that sense, the funding target grants the entrepreneur
a right to revoke the promise of delivering the product to consumers at the committed
price in case the project turns out to be unprofitable.
Since it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to produce if np ≥ nc + I , a funding
target of τp = pI/(p − c) ensures that the campaign raises enough funds to cover all
costs if the venture enters the production stage. The funding target hence reflects the
entrepreneur’s choice of p. In fact, the entrepreneur has no incentive to pick any other
funding goal than pI/(p− c). Expected profits of the entrepreneur simplify to
E [Π(p)] =
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij [ni(p− c)− I] · 1{vj≥p} · 1{ni(p−c)−I≥0}. (1.11)
If the campaign is successful, each consumer pays price p but might have a higher pri-
vate reservation price for the product. Given the funding mechanism and his private
reservation price, each consumer receives expected utility
E [u(p|v)] = pin(v − p) · 1{v≥p} · 1{nH(p−c)−I≥0}
+ (1− pin)(v − p) · 1{v≥p} · 1{nL(p−c)−I≥0}, (1.12)
Total ex-ante expected consumer surplus is thus given by
E [n˜u(p|v˜)] =
∑
i∈{L,H}
j∈{L,H}
piij [ni(vj − p)] · 1{vj≥p} · 1{ni(p−c)−I≥0}. (1.13)
If the entrepreneur knew consumers’ reservation price at the beginning of the game,
she would optimally set p = v in the crowdfunding campaign and leave the con-
sumers without any surplus. However, due to the uncertainty in v, this is in general
not possible.
If only one of the two possible reservation prices leads to positive profits, then the
entrepreneur effectively only faces uncertainty about the market size. Both in sce-
nario (a) (where (nH , vH) is the only profitable demand state) and scenario (b) (where
also (nL, vH) is profitable), the entrepreneur can optimally set the price p = vH to maxi-
mize expected profits and extract the full surplus. The entrepreneur thereby effectively
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avoids projects where consumers have a low reservation price vL since these demand
states are unprofitable anyway. Even though reservation prices are unknown, the vi-
ability constraint ensures that the entrepreneur discards the project for demand states
with the low reservation price.
If both high and low reservation prices are associated with positive profits, the en-
trepreneur may choose between setting the price to vL or vH . The uncertainty in reser-
vation prices might now lead to a discrepancy between profit and surplus maximiza-
tion. To see this, consider scenario (c)with total surplus S∗(c) = piHH [nH(vH − c)− I] +
piHL [nH(vL − c)− I]. Only a price p = vL ensures that all viable projects get funded
and the respective expected surpluses become
E(c) [Π(vL)] = (piHH + piHL) [nH(vL − c)− I] (1.14)
E(c) [n˜u(p|v˜)] = piHHnH(vH − vL), (1.15)
which together amount to S∗(c). In this case, consumers receive an information rent
as the entrepreneur cedes part of the high potential profits of demand state (nH , vH)
to consumers. For a price p = vH , the demand state (nH , vL) does not receive financ-
ing although it is profitable. Just as in standard models of monopolistic competition
where themonopolist does not charge the socially optimal price, the crowdfunding en-
trepreneur in my model might not find it optimal to choose the price that implements
first-best financing outcomes. Due to the specific valuation structure of my model, a
profit-maximizing entrepreneur would weigh whether to set p = vL or p = vH and
only set the first-best price p = vL if the corresponding expected profits are higher, that
is, if
E(c) [Π(vL)] > E(c) [Π(vH)] ⇔ (1− piv) [nH(vL − c)− I] > pivnH (vH − vL) . (1.16)
The above condition states that the expected profits in state (nH , vL) must exceed the
expected forgone profits of state (nH , vH). Therefore, depending on parameter constel-
lations, the entrepreneur optimally commits to the first-best funding outcome which
is characterized by profit maximization and positive consumer surplus such that the
total surplus is maximized. However, there also exists a scenario in which the en-
trepreneur’s choice of p leaves the consumers without any surplus and underinvest-
ment results.
However, uncertainty in reservation prices might also lead to a failure of the ex-
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istence of a fixed price that implements first-best financing outcomes. Consider sce-
nario (d) with profitable demand states (nH , vH), (nL, vH) and (nH , vL). Setting the
price p = vH does not lead to a successful campaign in state (nH , vL), while setting
the price p = vL does not lead to financing in state (nL, vH). Under unknown market
size and unknown reservation prices, there does not exist a fixed-price, all-or-nothing,
reward-based crowdfunding scheme that achieves the first-best funding outcome in
all demand states.
The only way to ensure that all viable projects get funded through a reward-based
crowdfunding campaign is to introduce state-contingent prices, that is, the entrepreneur
needs to charge vL if n = nH and vH if n = nL to finance all viable projects. However,
the entrepreneur has to take the strategic behavior of consumers, who might be re-
luctant to act according to their true valuation, into account. In particular, consumers
with high reservation prices vH might behave as if they have a low reservation price vL
and pocket the information rent vH − vL. Let pˆ = (pHH , pHL, pLH) be the vector of state-
contingent prices where pij denotes the price the entrepreneur charges if ni consumers
are willing to buy the product at vj .6 Consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints
to behave truthfully are for the consumers with valuation vL
pin(vL − pHL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
all vL-consumers behave truthfully
≥ pin(vL − pHH) + (1− pin)(vL − pLH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
all vL-consumers behave as vH -consumers
(1.17)
and for the consumers with valuation vH
pin(vH − pHH) + (1− pin)(vH − pLH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
all vH -consumers behave truthfully
≥ pin(vL − pLH).︸ ︷︷ ︸
all vH -consumers behave as vL-consumers
(1.18)
Solving these constraints yields pˆ = (vL, vL, vH) and ensures that all consumers behave
according to their true reservation price. To derive the corresponding pricing rule,
recall that n(p) denotes the number of consumers who are interested to buy at price
p, and suppose that the entrepreneur is able to collect consumers’ demand at different
prices. Due to unit demand, a consumer’s demand is either zero or one for vL and
either zero or one for vH . Clearly, if a consumer is willing to buy at the high price, then
he also wants to buy at the low price. Denote the market size at the high and low price
6The entrepreneur does not need to specify pLL since she does not produce in this demand state any-
way.
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as n(vH) and n(vL), respectively, with n(vL) ≥ n(vH). A pricing rule of the form
p∗ ≡
vL if n(vL) = nH or n(vH) = nHvH if n(vH) = nL (1.19)
achieves first-best funding outcomes with the respective surpluses
E(d) [Π(p∗)] = (piHH + piHL) [nH(vL − c)− I] + piLH [nL(vH − c)− I] (1.20)
E(d) [n˜u(p∗|v˜)] = piHHnH(vH − vL), (1.21)
and
E(d) [Π(p∗)] + E(d) [n˜u(p∗|v˜)] = S∗(d). (1.22)
Given the entrepreneur’s pricing in Equation (1.19), consumers find it optimal to par-
ticipate. A consumer with reservation price vL receives expected utility
E [u(p∗|vL)] = pin(vL − vL) = 0, (1.23)
while a consumer with reservation price vH gets expected utility
E [u(p∗|vH)] = pin(vH − vL) + (1− pin)(vH − vH) = pin(vH − vL), (1.24)
which ensures that he always behaves truthfully. As I demonstrate in the mechanism
design setup, consumers with a high reservation price require this information rent to
always truthfully report their valuation and allow the entrepreneur to implement the
first-best financing outcome.
However, the entrepreneur might again get higher expected profits from following
a strategy that deviates from the pricing scheme that implements first-best financing
outcomes. The entrepreneur only proposes the state-contingent pricing rule if
E(d) [Π(p∗)] > max
{
E(d) [Π(vL)] ,E(d) [Π(vH)]
}
, (1.25)
which is again the case whenever
(1− piv) [nH(vL − c)− I] > pivnH (vH − vL) . (1.26)
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If state (nH , nL) compensates for the forgone expected profits of state (nH , vH), then
the entrepreneur optimally chooses the first-best pricing strategywith state-contingent
prices. Otherwise, the entrepreneur optimally chooses the fixed-price scheme p = vH .
As the current setting follows a rather intuitive approach, I embed the above prob-
lem in a more general mechanism design setup in the following section. As it turns
out, the above considerations in fact constitute the entrepreneur’s profit-maximizing
strategy if she wants to ensure that consumers report truthfully, regardless of their
beliefs about other consumers’ behavior.
1.3 Optimal Crowdfunding Mechanism
In this section, I explicitly model individual consumers’ incentive and participation
constraints and show that the considerations from the previous section arise in a gen-
eral mechanism design setup. To cast the crowdfunding problem in a framework of
mechanism design, I closely follow Strausz (2017) (but abstract frommoral hazard and
private cost information on the entrepreneur’s side) and incorporate a more complex
valuation structure into his setting by considering valuations that are drawn from one
of two possible binary distributions. I first define the design problem and relevant con-
straints for potential mechanisms and then characterize the profit-maximizing crowd-
funding scheme.
1.3.1 Crowdfunding Design Problem
A crowdfunding mechanism seeks to implement an allocation between the penniless
entrepreneur and N consumers, where I denote a generic consumer by k ∈ N ≡
{1, ..., N}. An allocation involves monetary transfers from the consumers to the en-
trepreneur, an investment decision and consumer-specific production decisions of the
entrepreneur. I denote the transfer from consumer k to the entrepreneur by tk. The
allocation also describes whether the entrepreneur invests, x0 = 1, or not, x0 = 0, and
whether the entrepreneur produces for consumer k, xk = 1, or not, xk = 0. If the en-
trepreneur does not invest, then xk = 0 for all k ∈ N . Thus, an allocation is a vector
a = (t, x) where t = (t1, ..., tN) ∈ T ≡ RN are transfers and x = (x0, ..., xN) ∈ X ≡
{0, 1}N+1 are outputs. I denote the set of possible allocations as A ≡ T × X .
Since the entrepreneur does not have any funds, an allocation cannot involve any
net positive transfers to the consumers before investment and the transfers of con-
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sumers must be sufficient to cover the fixed investment costs I > 0 and the constant
marginal costs c > 0 associated with production decisions. An allocation is hence
feasible if the transfers from the consumers cover the total production costs, that is, if∑
k∈N
tk ≥ Ix0 + c
∑
k∈N
xk. (1.27)
Each consumer has quasilinear preferenceswith unit demand and private valuation vk.
The private valuation is either zero or v > 0. The entrepreneur neither observes the
magnitude of the positive valuation v nor the number of consumers with a positive
valuation n > 0, but she knows the set of possible realizations and has a subjective
probability distribution over these possible realizations. Nature draws individual con-
sumer valuations where n consumers get a positive valuation andN−n consumers get
a zero valuation. The number of consumers with a positive valuation is either n = nH
with probability pin or n = nL < nH with probability 1−pin. For these n consumers, the
positive valuation is either v = vH with probability piv or v = vL, where vL ∈ (c, vH),
with probability 1− piv. The remaining N − n consumers have a zero valuation of the
product. The vector of individual valuations v = (v1, ...vN) ∈ V ≡ {0, v}N therefore
contains N − n elements that are zero and n elements that are either vH or vL. Let pi(v)
be the corresponding probability of the state of valuations v.
Just as the entrepreneur does not know the realized state of valuations v, each con-
sumer is only informed about his own valuation. Thus, a consumer k knows vk but
does not know how many consumers have the same valuation as consumer k. Let
pik(v−k) ≡ pik(v−k|vk) be the conditional probability of valuations other than vk and
V−k ≡ {0, v}N−1 the corresponding set of valuations other than of consumer k.
A feasible allocation the utility
uk(a|vk) = vkxk − tk (1.28)
to a consumer k with valuation vk, and it yields the profit
Π(a) =
∑
k∈N
(tk − cxk)− Ix0 (1.29)
19
1 Crowdfunding and Demand Uncertainty
to the entrepreneur. The aggregate net surplus of allocation a in state v is therefore
S(a|v) ≡ Π(a) +
∑
k∈N
uk(a|vk) =
∑
k∈N
(vk − c)xk − Ix0. (1.30)
An allocation a ∈ A is Pareto efficient in state v if there is no other feasible allocation
a′ ∈ A such that Π(a′) ≥ Π(a), uk(a′|vk) ≥ uk(a|vk) for all k ∈ N and Π(a′) > Π(a) or
uk(a
′|vk) > uk(a|vk) for at least one k.
The first-best allocation a∗ corresponds to the allocation that maximizes the total ag-
gregate net surplus and is Pareto efficient in all possible states. Two types of decisions
matter for first-best efficiency: the investment decision x0 and the individual produc-
tion decisions xk. Given that the aggregate net surplus is non-negative, efficiency with
respect to individual allocations requires xk = 1 for all consumers with vk ≥ c, which
yields an aggregate surplus of
∑
k∈N (vk − c) · 1{vk≥c} − I where 1{·} is the indicator
function. Now let the set of all valuation profiles with positive aggregate net surplus
be V∗ ≡ {v ∈ V :∑k∈N (vk − c) · 1{vk≥c} − I ≥ 0}. For v ∈ V∗, the first-best allocation
exhibits x0 = 1 and xk = 1 if vk ≥ c. For v /∈ V∗, a∗ exhibits x0 = xk = tk = 0. The
first-best allocation therefore yields an ex-ante expected net surplus of
S∗ ≡
∑
v∈V∗
∑
k∈N
pi(v) [(vk − c)− I] . (1.31)
Put differently, an allocation is first-best only if it leads to financing in all demand
states that yield a positive surplus, regardless of how the surplus is shared between the
entrepreneur and the consumers, and no financing in all other demand states. Clearly,
if the entrepreneur extracts the full aggregate net surplus, that is, if a∗ exhibits tk = vk,
then the corresponding allocation is also first-best.
The entrepreneur searches for a crowdfunding mechanism to extract as much of
the ex-ante expected net surplus as possible. A mechanism Γ is a set of rules between
the entrepreneur and the N consumers that induces an arbitrary extensive-form game
between them. The entrepreneur assigns an outcome to each terminal history of the
game. The outcome of the mechanism is an allocation a ∈ A with corresponding ex-
pected profits Π(a) and expected utilities uk(a|vk). In principle, a mechanism can be
any highly complex scheme or game, including simple one-stage mechanisms as well
as more complicated sequential ones (of finite or infinite length). Moreover, to evalu-
ate a given scheme, the entrepreneur must take into account the strategic behavior of
consumers who participate in the scheme, that is, each consumer acts in his own in-
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terest given his expectations about the behavior of other consumers. Although the set
of all possible mechanisms is vast, the revelation principle of Myerson (1979, 1981) al-
lows me to focus on the well-structured sub-class of direct mechanisms where truthful
revelation is an equilibrium.
A direct mechanism is a function γ : V → A which induces a game in which all
consumers simultaneously and independently (i.e., without knowing what other con-
sumers are writing) send a report vrk about their valuations to the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur collects the reported valuations vr = (vr1, ..., vrN) and the funds which
amount to
∑
k∈N tk(v
r) from consumers and makes an investment decision x0(vr).
If the entrepreneur decides to invest, then she implements the production schedule
x(vr) = (x1(v
r), ..., xN(v
r)) as a function of the reports. A direct mechanism is thus a
set of functions γ(vr) = (x(vr), t(vr)).
A directmechanism is truthful if its induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
inwhich each consumer optimally reports his true valuation, that is, vrk = vk. Formally,
a direct mechanism is truthful if for all k ∈ N and vk, v′k ∈ {0, vL, vH} it satisfies the
Bayesian incentive compatibility condition∑
v−k∈V−k
pik(v−k) [vkxk(vk,v−k)− tk(vk,v−k)] ≥∑
v−k∈V−k
pik(v−k) [vkxk(v′k,v−k)− tk(v′k,v−k)] , (1.32)
where xk(vk,v−k) and tk(vk,v−k) denote the production decision and transfer pay-
ment, respectively, of consumer kwho reports vk, given that all other consumers report
v−k. The above condition states that if a consumer’s true valuation is vk, then he is bet-
ter off to report vk rather than any other valuation v′k, given that the other consumers
report truthfully.
Participation in the mechanism that the entrepreneur proposes is voluntary and
hence yields at least their outside options (which I assume to be zero) to the consumers
and the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur always participates because any feasible allo-
cation yields a non-negative expected profit. By contrast, each consumer has to receive
an expected utility of at least zero conditional on his own valuation. An incentive-
compatible direct mechanism is individually rational if for all k ∈ N and vk ∈ {0, vL, vH}
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it holds that ∑
v−k∈V−k
pik(v−k) [vkxk(vk,v−k)− tk(vk,v−k)] ≥ 0. (1.33)
Finally, a direct mechanism is feasible if it is incentive-compatible, individually ra-
tional for each consumer and if its induced allocations are feasible. A feasible direct
mechanism yields the expected utility
E [uk(γ(v)|vk)] =
∑
v−k∈V−k
pik(v−k)[vkxk(vk,v−k)− tk(vk,v−k)] (1.34)
to consumer k with valuation vk and an expected profit of
E [Π(γ(v))] =
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
[∑
k∈N
(tk(v)− cxk(v))− Ix0(v)
]
(1.35)
to the entrepreneur.
1.3.2 Profit-Maximizing Crowdfunding Mechanism
The entrepreneur chooses a feasible direct mechanism γ(v) = (x(v), t(v))which maxi-
mizes expected profits subject to the incentive compatibility conditions, the individual
rationality conditions and the feasibility condition. Formally, the entrepreneur solves
the following problem
max
x(v),t(v)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
[∑
k∈N
(tk(v)− cxk(v))− Ix0(v)
]
(1.36)
subject to (1.32), (1.33) and∑
k∈N
(tk(v)− cxk(v)) ≥ Ix0(v), ∀v ∈ V (1.37)
xk(v) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ N ,∀v ∈ V (1.38)
tk(v) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N ,∀v ∈ V . (1.39)
Following Harris and Raviv (1981), I first simplify the problem by noting that all
consumers only differ with respect to their valuations. Any two consumers who report
22
1.3 Optimal Crowdfunding Mechanism
the same valuation should also receive the same output. Although the overall output
depends on the other consumers’ valuations, it should only depend on the number of
consumers who have either a zero or a positive valuation but not explicitly on which
consumers have which valuation. Formally, this observation leads to the following
symmetry property.
Lemma 1. The problem of the entrepreneur has a symmetric solution, that is, there is a feasible
direct mechanism γ∗(v) = (x∗(v), t∗(v)) such that x∗k(vk,v−k) = x∗1(v′) and t∗k(vk,v−k) =
t∗1(v
′) for all k ∈ N and any rearrangements v′ of the elements of v in which vk appears in the
first place.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
It follows from Lemma 1 that the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints for consumers other than consumer 1 are redundant (even though the
profit-maximizing mechanism of course still targets all consumers).
To further simplify the problem, I observe that if consumer 1 does not value the
product, he also does not derive any utility from receiving the product and thus his
individual rationality condition constrains him from transferring any funds to the en-
trepreneur.
Lemma 2. The individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints of a consumer
with a zero valuation imply for the profit-maximizing mechanism γ∗(v):
(i) t∗1(0,v−1) = 0
(ii) x∗1(0,v−1) = 0
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for consumer 1with
a zero valuation now become redundant since he neither pays a transfer, nor receives
a product and hence also cannot gain anything from reporting a positive valuation.
I am left with finding transfers and production schedules that satisfy the individual
rationality and incentive constraints of consumer 1with a positive valuation.
The setting at hand has the peculiar feature that consumer valuations are perfectly
correlated conditional on receiving a positive valuation. It is well-established in vari-
ous environments that if agents have quasi-linear preferences and their types are cor-
related, then the entrepreneur can implement the same allocation as if she had perfect
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information (e.g., Myerson, 1981; Crémer andMcLean, 1985, 1988; McAfee et al., 1989).
Intuitively, the entrepreneur may organize the following ‘punish them all’ mechanism
in the current setting: all consumers report their valuations simultaneously (which
is in line with the concept of direct mechanisms outlined above). If all reports coin-
cide, then the entrepreneur implements the full-information allocation corresponding
to the reported valuations. If the reports do not coincide, the entrepreneur punishes
all agents by neither investing nor producing for any consumer. Clearly, it is in the in-
terest of a consumer to report his true valuation, if he believes that all other consumers
also announce their true valuation. Hence, the entrepreneur may obtain consumers’
information and extract the full surplus. The following proposition formally states the
corresponding full-surplus extraction result.
Proposition 1. There exists a feasible direct mechanism which implements full-surplus ex-
traction for the entrepreneur as an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
While the insight that the entrepreneur may exploit the correlation in consumers’ pos-
itive valuations to extract the full surplus is economically important, it is hard to grasp
in practice.
In particular, even though a full-surplus extraction equilibrium exists, there are
many more equilibria in the corresponding mechanism (with the number of equilibria
in fact increasing as the number of consumers increase). Specifically, the full-surplus
extraction equilibrium hinges on consumers’ beliefs that (other) high-valuation con-
sumers truthfully report a high valuation.7 However, there are several other equilibria
in which a high-valuation consumer believes that at least some of the consumers do
not truthfully report. In case some consumersmisreport, the entrepreneur does neither
produce nor make any profits in the ‘punish them all’ mechanism. There also exists
an equilibrium in which a high-valuation consumer believes that all other consumers
misreport their true valuation. In this equilibrium, all consumers with valuation vH
falsely report the valuation vL. This collective deception in fact yields higher expected
utility for consumers with high valuations. In particular, if all consumers with a val-
uation vH report vL, then each of them receives vH − vL in demand state (nH , vH),
7Several other crucial assumptions for the full-surplus extraction results have been identified in the
literature, for example, risk neutrality (Robert, 1991), absence of collusion among agents (Laffont
and Martimort, 2000), or absence of competition among sellers (Peters, 2001). Although the current
setting also features these simplifications, further extensions along these lines go beyond the scope
of this paper.
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whereas they get zero expected utility in this state under full rent extraction of the en-
trepreneur. The entrepreneur not only surrenders part of the profits of state (nH , vH)
in this deception equilibrium but also loses the profits of the (nL, vH) equilibrium. The
construction of the truth-telling equilibrium of the direct mechanism hence does not
exclude the possibility of other equilibria in which the consumers are not telling the
truth and the profit-maximizing outcome is not realized.
Therefore, I follow the robust implementation approach (e.g., Bergemann and Mor-
ris, 2009, 2011) and refine the search for a profit-maximizing mechanism to the set
of mechanisms with the property that, for any beliefs (and higher-order beliefs) that
the consumers may have, every equilibrium features truthful reporting. Instead of
supposing that other consumers report truthfully, robust implementation guarantees
that truthful behavior results. A feasible direct mechanism is hence belief-robust if con-
sumers report truthfully in every equilibrium that the mechanism can implement. In
particular, a direct mechanism is belief-robust if for all k ∈ N , vk, v′k ∈ {0, vL, vH},
and all valuations reported by other consumers vr−k ∈ V−k it satisfies the incentive
compatibility condition∑
vr−k∈V−k
pik(v
r
−k)
[
vkxk(vk,v
r
−k)− tk(vk,vr−k)
] ≥
∑
vr−k∈V−k
pik(v
r
−k)
[
vkxk(v
′
k,v
r
−k)− tk(v′k,vr−k)
]
. (1.40)
This additional requirement leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints of a consumer
with a positive valuation imply for the belief-robust profit-maximizing direct mechanism:
(i) t∗1(vL,vr−1) = vLx∗1(vL,vr−1)
(ii) t∗1(vH ,vr−1) = vHx∗1(vH ,vr−1)− (vH − vL)x∗1(vL,vr−1)
(iii) x∗1(vH ,vr−1) ≥ x∗1(vL,vr−1)
for all valuations reported by other consumers vr−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The first statement in Lemma 3 establishes that if the entrepreneur produces for a
consumer who reports a low valuation, then she may charge the transfer payment vL.
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The second part states that the entrepreneur may extract the full information rent from
consumers with valuation vL, but she may not do so for consumers with valuation vH
(who may prefer to report vL) at the same time. If the entrepreneur does not produce
for consumers who send a low valuation, then she may produce for consumers who
report a high valuation and charge them vH . The third part of the lemma corresponds
to the requirement that if the entrepreneur produces for consumers who send vL, then
she also has to produce for consumers who report vH .
Using the above lemmas, I now turn to the question whether the entrepreneur may
extract the full surplus of the crowdfunding game under a belief-robust mechanism.
The next proposition establishes a condition under which the entrepreneur is able to
implement first-best allocations under the belief-robust mechanism but at the same
time has to grant consumers an information rent.
Proposition 2. If the demand states satisfy
(1− piv) [nH(vL − c)− I] ≥ pivnH (vH − vL) , (1.41)
then the belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanism implements first-best allo-
cations where consumers with valuation vL do not receive any surplus and each consumer with
valuation vH receives the information rent vH − vL in state (nH , vH) and no information rent
in the other states.
Otherwise, the belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanism implements allo-
cations where the entrepreneur only produces for consumers with valuation vH who do not
receive any information rents. Moreover, the belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfunding
mechanism is in this case only first-best if states with vH are the only feasible states.
The proposition states that the entrepreneur only finds it optimal to implement first-
best allocations under the belief-robust mechanism if the expected profits in state
(nH , vL) exceed the expected surplus which the entrepreneur cedes to consumers in
state (nH , vH) where consumers with a high valuation receive the information rent
vH − vL. The first-best funding outcome may therefore only be achieved under par-
ticular circumstances for the belief-robust profit-maximizing mechanism. Consumers
with the high valuation require the prospect of receiving the low price in some demand
states to always truthfully reveal their valuation. Alternatively, if this information rent
is too large, the entrepreneur only produces for consumers with high valuations and
consumers with low valuations never receive a product.
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1.4 Discussion
This section interprets the insights of the previous sections and discusses potential
extensions and robustness of the results. First, both the intuitive crowdfunding cam-
paign and the belief-robust profit-maximizing mechanism rely on the entrepreneur’s
commitment to a pricing strategy and to deliver the product after a successful cam-
paign. I hence discuss the potential implications of the lack of such commitments.
Second, I sketch how crowdfunding platforms work in practice and how they might
implement the state-contingent mechanism. Lastly, I elaborate on the potential replica-
tion of the belief-robust profit-maximizing crowdfundingmechanism through security
contracts.
1.4.1 Lack of Commitment
Following Harris and Raviv (1981) and Strausz (2017), I assume that the entrepreneur
can commit to a price schedule in advance. In the absence of such price commitment,
crowdfunding consumers might be confronted with two types of time-consistency
problems of the entrepreneur: one with respect to the prices they pay and one related
to the prices potential future consumers pay.
The entrepreneur might have an incentive to change the price that she charges con-
sumers upon observing their valuations. In particular, if consumers report high valu-
ations, the entrepreneur might prefer to charge them a high price to reap the full con-
sumer surplus. The entrepreneur’s lack of commitment requires that the initially pro-
posed price schedule maximizes her profits even after observing the demand reported
by consumers. Intuitively, the entrepreneur’s inability to commit reduces her prof-
its since consumers anticipate the entrepreneur’s deviation from the promised pricing
scheme. High-valuation consumers might hence be more reluctant to communicate
their true valuation due to the fear of the entrepreneur reaping their information rent
ex-post. In the extreme case where the entrepreneur always charges consumers the
high price whenever they report high valuations, consumers with high valuation re-
frain from sending truthful reports altogether as it is not incentive compatible to do
so. Acknowledging these ramifications of her lack of commitment, the entrepreneur
has an incentive to avoid this type of time-consistency problem.
In addition, the entrepreneur faces a potential time-consistency problem analogous
to the one studied in the durable goods literature (e.g., Coase, 1972; Stokey, 1981; Bu-
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low, 1982; Gul et al., 1986). Namely, after having observed the reported valuations
of consumers, the entrepreneur might have an incentive to adjust the price that she
charges consumers on the market after crowdfunding, that is, the secondary market.
Suppose that, in addition to the crowdfunding consumers of the current framework,
there are secondary-market consumers who do not have access to the crowdfund-
ing mechanism (e.g., due to inattention). If the valuations on the secondary market
are perfectly correlated with those of the crowdfunding users, then the entrepreneur
charges the same price in both markets and no issues arise. However, if high valua-
tions in the crowdfunding market are consistent with low valuations in the secondary
market, then the entrepreneur has an incentive to charge the low price in the secondary
market. Absent any discounting, high-valuation consumers might be willing to wait
for the secondary market or prefer to report low valuations in this case. This type of
time-consistency problemmight thus hamper the screening benefits of crowdfunding.
Moreover, upon observing consumers’ valuations, the entrepreneur might decide
to cancel a successful crowdfunding campaign and seek external financing with the
newly acquired demand information. Given that the entrepreneur has elicited both
the market size and consumers’ reservation price, she might want to raise the invest-
ment costs from a competitive credit market. However, as the entrepreneur does not
maintain her promise to deliver the product, consumers do not receive any products
through crowdfunding and are left with the option to buy the product at a possibly
higher price on the secondary market. Again, anticipating the entrepreneur’s lack of
commitment to deliver the product hampers consumers’ incentives to truthfully report
their valuations.
1.4.2 Crowdfunding Mechanisms in Practice
The theoretical crowdfunding mechanisms discussed above come in two different
variants (depending on parameter constellations): the entrepreneur either specifies
a fixed price for her product or a state-contingent price schedule that depends on the
the number of pledgers.
In practice, a crowdfunding platform intermediates between the entrepreneur and
her crowdfunding consumers. On the one hand, crowdfunding platforms require con-
sumers to pay their bids in advance rather than committing to buy the product at the
pricing rule specified in the campaign (cf. the intuitive campaign of Section 1.2) or
sending their valuations (cf. the direct mechanism of Section 1.3). Entrepreneurs, on
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the other hand, are only allowed to set fixed prices at campaign launch, change the
price of a reward as long as it has not attracted any pledgers yet, or add a new reward
throughout the life of a campaign. Platforms collect consumers’ funds throughout
the campaign and transfer them to the entrepreneur only if the campaign reaches the
funding goal after it expired. A crowdfunding platform hence effectively serves as a
commitment device for the entrepreneur’s strategy based on fixed prices.
A direct replication of the state-contingent pricing rule where the entrepreneur spec-
ifies that the price for the reward decreases as the number of pledgers increases can
hence not be found in practice. However, while crowdfunding platforms feature pre-
specified menus of rewards at fixed prices, these prices usually serve as a minimum
pledge amount, that is, consumersmay voluntarily pledge funds in excess of the prices
specified in the campaign. Consumers may also change pledge amounts by either
increasing the money spent for a certain reward or switching to a different reward
throughout the whole campaign life. Although pledge dynamics during a campaign
are outside of my model, these notions still allow me to sketch potential implementa-
tions of the state-contingent mechanism.8
Initially, the entrepreneur may launch the campaign with low prices. Upon observ-
ing that only few consumers pledged funds at the low price and that the project is not
viable at this level of aggregate demand, the entrepreneur may contact consumers and
ask them for higher contributions, effectively proposing consumers to pay the high
price for the product to ensure the project’s viability. Alternatively, entrepreneurs may
add a new reward where they offer essentially the same product but at a higher price.
Consumers may then update their pledges to the new reward category and pay a
higher price. Crowdfunding campaigns typically do not feature exactly the same re-
ward at different prices. Rather, entrepreneurs offer slightly differentiated products at
different prices. While product differentiation is outside of my model, the overall idea
is that high-valuation consumers may select the high-price reward after they observed
that there are only few pledgers.
Naturally, if consumers are not willing to pay higher prices by either sending more
funds or upgrading to a new reward category, then the crowdfunding campaign is
deemed a failure. Both strategies also give rise to a free-riding problem where an
individual consumer wants the other consumers to pay higher prices but keeps his
own contribution low. However, my analysis abstains from free-riding by focusing on
8I refer to Cong and Xiao (2018) for a study of the dynamics of consumers’ pledging behavior within
a given campaign.
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mechanisms where truthful behavior is (weakly) optimal for all consumers.
1.4.3 Replication through Security Contracts
While reward-based crowdfunding allows the entrepreneur to elicit consumer pref-
erences, entrepreneurs may in principle also directly offer securities to consumers to
finance investment costs, which is typically called crowd-investing (e.g., Li, 2016; Brown
and Davies, 2018; Terovitis, 2019). An explicit modeling of security design is outside
of my framework, but I may still interpret reward-based crowdfunding as the sale of
financial contracts between the entrepreneur and consumers.
It may be tempting to relate reward-based crowdfunding to initial public offerings
(IPOs). In fact, one strand of the IPO literature follows the notion that outside in-
vestors may have superior information about the firm compared to insiders, for exam-
ple, soft information on management quality, the ability to outperform competitors,
or forecasts about future developments in the company, industry, or economy (e.g.,
Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Sherman, 2005). In this literature, IPO selling
mechanisms are designed to maximize IPO proceeds and elicit information from pri-
vately informed investors. The key tension in IPO selling mechanisms arises between
selling securities at fixed prices, which allows for underpricing to attract informed in-
vestors, and auctioning off shares, which maximizes proceeds but deters information
production.
In the context of my model, three crucial differences to said IPO literature emerge.
First, the valuation problem underlying an IPO is fundamentally more complex than
the valuation of a product. For instance, investors not only care about demand at
the crowdfunding stage but also about demand on the market after investment. Con-
sumers in the crowdfunding setting just want the product (or not) but do not care
about aggregate demand as long at it is sufficient for the entrepreneur to invest.
Second, consumers who constitute potential outside investors are only partially in-
formed about the value of the firm through their private knowledge of their own val-
uation. However, consumers do not possess information about the valuations of other
consumers, that is, they do not know how many consumers value the product pos-
itively. In principle, the entrepreneur may auction off shares in the firm directly to
consumers. However, this auction can at best only aggregate consumers’ information
about product valuations together with their beliefs about the market size. Due to the
lack of information about the market size, this funding mechanism cannot implement
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first-best financing outcomes under all circumstances. Instead, by committing to a
price in the crowdfunding campaign ex-ante, the entrepreneur (and consumers alike)
may learn about the market size before they make an investment decision.
Third, IPOs involve the sale of a fixed quantity of claims on the value of the firm.
Suppose those claims directly map into claims on the future product. In the context of
crowdfunding, the entrepreneur does not want to commit to a fixed quantity of claims
on the future product. Suppose the entrepreneur decides to auction off a fixed quantity
of claims on the future product. Moreover, suppose that the supply of claims is below
the potential market size and thus creates scarcity. The scarcity of claims is crucial to
incentivize consumers’ truthful revelation in the auction. However, upon observing
consumers’ valuation through an auction, the entrepreneur has an incentive to sell
more quantities of the product ex-post. But this time inconsistency leads to a failure of
the auction to begin with.
Furthermore, as the entrepreneur sells claims that promise a fixed repayment in the
future (in the form of the prospective product), reward-based crowdfunding shares a
closer resemblance to debt contracts rather than equity. Intuitively, the state-contingent
pricing rule exhibits cash flows that may be interpreted as a combination of debt and
credit lines that the entrepreneur may draw on in some demand states. More specif-
ically, the entrepreneur may borrow vL from each consumer and offer them a fixed
repayment of vL (regardless of whether she develops the product or not). In addi-
tion, the entrepreneur asks consumers for a credit line that allows her to withdraw
an additional vH − vL in demand state (nL, vH) but nothing in demand state (nH , vL).
These payments yield the same expected profits and utilities as the profit-maximizing
crowdfunding mechanism but may be regarded as traditional financing tools.9
1.5 Conclusion
Reward-based crowdfunding involves the sale of claims on the future product to fi-
nance product development costs. By committing to a price of the product in the fund-
ing stage, entrepreneurs may observe the number of consumers who are interested in
buying the product at that particular price. Entrepreneurs thereby learn about product
demand and may improve their screening for viable investments vis-à-vis financing
through uninformed outside investors.
9The notion that the optimal security mix under asymmetric information is a combination of credit
lines, debt and equity follows DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007).
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1 Crowdfunding and Demand Uncertainty
I consider a setting where consumers have private information about their indi-
vidual valuations and demand uncertainty has two facets: the entrepreneur does not
know the number of consumers who value her product positively (themarket size) nor
does she observe the common private positive valuation of consumers (the reservation
price). Entrepreneurs may choose fixed prices which preclude financing of some de-
mand states that are nonetheless profitable. Alternatively, entrepreneurs may commit
to price schedules that depend on the number of contributors to the crowdfunding
campaign. This pricing scheme specifies that consumers with low reservation prices
always pay their reservation price, while consumers with high reservation prices pay
their true reservation price as long as there are few contributors and the low price
when there aremany pledgers. Entrepreneursmay hence exploit the uncertainty about
the market size to incentivize consumers’ participation. This state-contingent pricing
scheme ensures that all viable projects get financing if different combinations of mar-
ket size and consumer reservation prices yield positive profits.
Using mechanism design theory, I characterize the profit-maximizing crowdfund-
ing mechanism in the setting where the entrepreneur faces uncertainty with respect to
the distribution from which consumers’ private valuations are drawn. The correlation
in consumers’ valuations (conditional on receiving a positive valuation) in principle
allows the entrepreneur to extract the full surplus. However, the corresponding mech-
anism is sensitive to consumers’ beliefs about other consumers’ behavior and features
only one equilibrium with full-surplus extraction for the entrepreneur. The belief-
robust profit-maximizing mechanism ensures truthful behavior but in general does
not allow the entrepreneur to extract the full consumer surplus since she either has
to grant consumers with high valuations an information rent or does not produce for
low-valuation consumers. Moreover, the belief-robust profit-maximizing mechanism
does only lead to first-best financing outcomes under certain parameter constellations
with respect to consumers’ information rent.
While existing features of crowdfunding platforms may in principle allow for an
indirect implementation of the state-contingent pricing rule, there are a number of
potential impediments and interactions that are outside of my framework. For in-
stance, I do not consider the simultaneous presence of different positive consumer
valuations which would give rise to different forms of price discrimination or product
differentiation. I also do not model moral hazard or private cost information on the
entrepreneur’s side. Hidden actions and asymmetric information on both sides of the
crowdfunding game might impose further limits on the potential of crowdfunding to
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finance ventures, but they might also open up avenues for other potentially comple-
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2 Building Trust Takes Time: Limits to
Arbitrage in Blockchain-Based
Markets
Joint work with Nikolaus Hautsch and Stefan Voigt
Distributed ledger technologies replace trusted clearing counterparties and security
depositories with time-consuming consensus protocols to record the transfer of own-
ership. This settlement latency exposes cross-market arbitrageurs to price risk. We
theoretically derive arbitrage bounds that increase with expected latency, latency un-
certainty, volatility, and risk aversion. Using Bitcoin order book and network data,
we estimate arbitrage bounds of, on average, 121 basis points, explaining 91% of the
observed cross-market price differences. Consistent with our theory, periods of high
latency-implied price risk exhibit large price differences, while asset flows chase arbi-
trage opportunities. Blockchain-based settlement thus introduces a non-trivial friction
that impedes arbitrage activity.
2.1 Introduction
Traditional security markets are organized around trusted intermediaries that enable
seemingly frictionless trading on and across different markets. For instance, central
counterparty clearing covers counterparty risks between transacting parties during
the time window from the execution of a trade to the legal transfer of ownership
through security depositories. This form of clearing allows for a temporal separa-
tion of the settlement process, which typically takes two to three business days (e.g.,
SEC, 2017), and the process of trading on still unsettled positions. In contrast, dis-
tributed ledger technologies promise secure, fast, and cheap settlement without the
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need of such designated intermediaries. Instead of relying on trusted third parties,
decentralized validators interact with each other to establish consensus about trans-
action histories and the transfer of ownership (e.g., Biais et al., 2019). Consensus pro-
tocols specify how validators may reach agreement and how fast this agreement may
be accomplished, which is typically in the order of a few minutes. Decentralized sys-
tems thus considerably speed up the process of settlement compared to markets with
central clearing and settlement. However, at the same time distributed ledger tech-
nologies slow down individual market participants who cannot dispose of positions
before validators record the transfer of ownership in the ledger.
Replacing trusted intermediaries with time-consuming consensus protocols thus ex-
poses cross-market traders to a new type of latency that restricts them in their flexibil-
ity to trade (and thus to react to changing market conditions) sufficiently fast. We refer
to this period as settlement latency, which does not only determine the speed of clearing
but—unlike in traditional markets—also affects the speed of trading. This latency is an
inherent feature of distributed ledger systems and is several magnitudes larger than
execution latencies in traditional markets (e.g., Chiu and Koeppl, 2019; Easley et al.,
2019). In that sense, distributed ledger technologies exhibit a direct link between the
process of trading and the process of settlement.
In this paper, we show that the latency caused by decentralized settlement imposes
limits to (statistical) arbitrage since arbitrageurs cannot immediately exploit cross-
market price differences. This friction is particularly relevant whenever there is no
possibility to bypass settlement latency without any risks or costs, that is, whenever
(margin-based) short-selling is costly and cross-exchange inventory holdings are risky.
In these scenarios, limits to arbitrage arise and may explain severe and persistent vio-
lations of the law of one price.
As an illustration, Figure 2.1 provides compelling evidence for such violations of
the law of one price. The plot shows the midquotes of different exchanges that feature
trading of Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that is settled on a distributed ledger, against US
Dollar for a representative day in 2018. The average daily price difference across all
exchange pairs through our sample is around 33 bp and thus economically (highly)
significant. As Choi et al. (2018) or Makarov and Schoar (2020) also report, these price
differences persist, are not traded away, and (as we show in this paper) cannot be
reconciled solely with transaction costs.
We document that arbitrage bounds due to settlement latency can explain a ma-
jor part of the magnitude and time variation of these price differences. Our analy-
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Figure 2.1: Bitcoin-US Dollar Midquotes on May 25, 2018
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Notes: This figure shows the midquotes of one Bitcoin in US Dollar on May 25, 2018, for 16 different
exchanges. We gather high-frequency order book information by accessing the public application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs) of each exchange every minute. We calculate midquotes as the average of
the best bids and best asks.
sis builds on a general theoretical framework that shows how settlement latency in a
volatile market translates into bounds below which price differences may vary with-
out being arbitraged away by risk-averse arbitrageurs. We model the trading decision
of an arbitrageur who monitors prices on different markets but faces settlement la-
tency, which limits her possibility to exploit concurrent price differences between two
markets. In fact, whenever she buys on one market (at the current price), she has to
wait until the transfer of the asset is validated before she can sell on the other market.
The latency underlying this transfer thus exposes arbitrageurs to the risk of adverse
price movements. Consequently, risk-averse arbitrageurs only exploit (concurrent)
price differences if these price differences are sufficiently large to compensate for the
price risk during the settlement period. This reluctance to trade gives rise to bounds
above which a risk-averse arbitrageur exploits violations of the law of one price. Price
differences below these bounds, however, may persist, as they are consistent with the
risk-return trade-off of a rational arbitrageur.
In our theoretical setting we thus focus on a scenario in which any intermediation
services, which allow to bypass settlement latency, are either not available or are too
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costly. In fact, in a distributed ledger system such financial intermediation either does
not exist at all (if the idea of decentralizationwithout designated intermediaries is fully
internalized) or can implicitly only be provided by the trading platforms themselves.
Since such intermediation confronts the exchanges with counterparty and credit risk,
such services are either not available, very limited, or costly. Hence, we consider sit-
uations, where inventory holdings on an exchange are too expensive, too risky, or ex-
hausted and short-selling is prohibitively expensive or not possible. In that sense, our
model allows us to quantify the economic frictions (in terms of arbitrage bounds) that
arise if a central clearing counterparty—which essentially enables continuous trading
through immediate clearing—is replaced by a time-consuming decentralized consen-
sus mechanism. Our results are independent of the specific underlying technology
and sufficiently general to be applicable to other types of latencies on financial mar-
kets (for instance, execution latencies).
We provide closed-form expressions for the arbitrage bounds under fairly general
assumptions and show that they increase with (i) the arbitrageurs risk aversion, (ii)
the volatility on the sell-side market, (iii) the expected settlement latency, and (iv)
the variance of the settlement latency. Our characterization of the arbitrage bounds
also accounts for transaction costs and settlement fees that traders may choose to give
validators an incentive to enable a fast validation.
We use minute-level data from order books of 16 exchanges that feature trading
Bitcoin against US Dollar between January 2018 and October 2019. The order books
allow us to detect potential arbitrage opportunities between each exchange pair, taking
transaction costs such as trading fees and market impact into account. Furthermore,
we gather comprehensive information about the Bitcoin network, including the time it
takes for every transaction from entering the Bitcoin network until its inclusion in the
blockchain, that is, its settlement. Using this information, the estimation of arbitrage
bounds rests on three ingredients. First, we construct estimates of exchange-specific
spot volatilities based on minute-level best bid quotes. Second, we parametrize the
latency distribution as a conditional gamma distribution depending on network and
transaction-specific characteristics that affect the settlement latency. Third, in line with
the existing literature, we choose an isoelastic utility function with exogenously given
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The average estimated arbitrage bound for a relative risk aversion of 2 amounts to
121 bp. This magnitude constitutes an economically highly significant friction and
may explain severe distortions of the law of one price. We find that 84% of all ob-
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served concurrent price differences based on best bids and asks across markets fall
within these bounds. Adjusting additionally for transaction costs, the bounds con-
tain even up to 91% of the observed price differences. Equivalently, we show that
the average implied relative risk aversion necessary to explain all observed concur-
rent cross-exchange price differences amounts to 17. This estimate is high compared
to existing estimates of coefficients of relative risk aversion in the asset pricing liter-
ature (e.g., Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Chetty, 2006) and suggests the existence of
additional market frictions as settlement latencies and transaction costs cannot fully
explain all (apparent) arbitrage opportunities.
We show that the derived arbitrage bounds can explain a substantial portion of both
the magnitudes of observed cross-market price differences and their variation over
time. This explanatory power persists even if we control for additional market fric-
tions such as market illiquidity, the absence of margin trading, and risky inventory
holdings (e.g., Pontiff, 1996; Lamont and Thaler, 2003a,b; Roll et al., 2007; De Jong
et al., 2009). In particular, we find that large cross-exchange price differences coincide
with episodes of high limits to arbitrage, which are in turn driven by high volatilities
and long settlement latencies.
Finally, we show that themarket perceives arbitrage opportunities and limits thereof.
In fact, we illustrate that variations in price differences between exchanges trigger vari-
ations in cross-exchange asset flows. To perform this analysis, we collect wallets that
are under the control of the exchanges in our sample and compile a unique and novel
data set of 3.9 million cross-exchange transactions with an average daily volume of
72 million US Dollar. Using the derived limits to arbitrage as instruments for cross-
exchange price differences, we tackle the inherent endogeneity arising from the simul-
taneity between price differences and cross-exchange asset flows. We find that asset
flows into an exchange significantly respond to variations in concurrent price differ-
ences, particularly those explained by variations in limits to arbitrage, while we also
control for latency-induced price risk and exchange-specific characteristics. We thus
contribute to the literature on limits to arbitrage (e.g., De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997; Gromb and Vayanos, 2010) by highlighting a friction that arises in
decentralized markets and which impedes arbitrageurs’ ability to exploit mispricing.
Our results also contribute to a better understanding of the economic implications
of distributed ledger systems for trading on financial markets. In fact, the promise of
fast and low-cost transaction settlement leads central banks and marketplaces to ac-
tively explore potential applications of such systems for transaction settlement (e.g.,
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BIS, 2017; NASDAQ, 2017; ECB and BoJ, 2018; SIX, 2018). While existing papers typ-
ically focus on the costs associated with the decentralized settlement process and po-
tential welfare gains (e.g., Abadi and Brunnermeier, 2018; Chiu and Koeppl, 2019),
we consider the implications of blockchain-based settlement for cross-market trading.
Our emphasis lies on the economic frictions that originate from the time-consuming
effort necessary to establish trust in blockchain-based markets. The absence of trusted
intermediaries does not only expose arbitrageurs to price risk but also exposes ex-
changes to counterparty risk.
Most exchanges, therefore, require several confirmations to regard an incoming trans-
action as valid, rather than just a single one. These additional confirmation require-
ments reflect the inherent fear of fraudulent transactions from so-called double spend-
ing attacks, where an attacker tries to spend his funds twice in different transactions.
Requiring multiple confirmations by the network decreases the success probability
of such an attack, as the reversal of a transaction becomes computationally more in-
volved the more advanced the overall transaction history is. Some exchanges in our
sample require up to 5 additional confirmations, which, apart from increasing security,
also considerably scales up settlement latency. Hence, with decentralized settlement,
exchanges only achieve trust through sufficiently high security requirements, which
make it prohibitively hard to manipulate the system. This security, however, comes at
the cost of increased (computational) complexity, which in turn takes time. To quantify
the costs of these additional security requirements, we compare the arbitrage bounds
of a (hypothetical) scenario, where all exchanges require just one confirmation, to a
(hypothetical) scenario where all exchanges require ten confirmations. We find that
the estimated arbitrage bounds increase by on average 7 bp per additional confirma-
tion.
These costs are economically significant and explain recent efforts of blockchain-
based marketplaces to circumvent settlement latencies via the introduction of fast pri-
vate inter-exchange settlement networks.1 However, any attempt to bypass the settle-
ment latency in decentralized markets by reintroducing the functions of third-party
clearing effectively undermines the fundamental principle of decentralized settlement
which deliberately abstains from all designated intermediaries. In practice, market-
places may adopt the role of clearing houses and take over counterparty risk dur-
1For instance, since October 2018, the company Blockstream has been running a private side-chain
to the main Bitcoin blockchain which connects several exchanges and allows for transfer of assets
between exchanges in less than 2 minutes.
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ing the settlement period. The internal netting procedures of exchanges, however,
only work with high collateral requirements. It is thus impossible to bypass the wait-
ing time necessary to establish sufficient security and trust in a decentralized system
without any other costs or frictions. Settlement and validation by a distributed ledger
system without any intermediaries is hence fundamentally not compatible with fast
trading. Our paper provides theoretical and empirical guidance for the quantification
of the economic frictions that arise whenever trusted clearing counterparties—which
may be regarded as a different type of friction—are removed.
2.2 Settlement Latency and Limits to Arbitrage
2.2.1 Arbitrage Returns under Settlement Latency
We consider an economy containing a single asset that is traded on two different mar-
kets b and s. The trading activity on these markets is exogenously given and we as-
sume that agents can continuously monitor the quotes of the asset across all markets.
We assume that market i ∈ {b, s} continuously provides marginal buy quotes (asks)Ait
and sell quotes (bids) Bit (with Bit ≤ Ait) for one marginal unit of the asset at time t. We
address the possibility to trade more than one marginal unit of the asset and the con-
sideration of transaction costs in the next section and show that these generalizations
do not affect our main insights.
Our sole agent is an arbitrageur who aims to exploit observed price differences
across markets. The arbitrageur continuously monitors the quotes on markets b and s
and considers the following strategy: if buying on one market and selling on the other
market implies a profit, she intends to buy a marginal unit of the asset on the market
with the lower buy quote, transfer the asset to the market with a higher sell quote and
sell it as soon as the transfer is settled.
We assume that (margin-based) short-selling is too costly to render a short-based
strategy profitable or, alternatively, that margin constraints, which would allow for
short sales, bind. Similarly, we assume that inventory holdings on any of the markets
are too risky or are exhausted. In that sense, we consider a scenario where, upon
observing the quotes, any cross-market price differences have already been absorbed
up to the point where the arbitrageur is forced to physically transfer the asset between
markets.
Without loss of generality, we focus on a scenario where the arbitrageur buys on
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market b and sells on market s. The converse case of selling on market b and buying
on market s can be handled analogously. Hence, in case of frictionless trading and no
latency in settlement, the arbitrageur exploits observed price differences if
Bst > A
b
t , (2.1)
as she can buy the asset onmarket b atAbt , instantaneously transfer the asset tomarket s
and sell it again at price Bst .
An instantaneous transfer is not possible, however, whenever the settlement of the
transaction is time-consuming. Such a (possibly random) latency constitutes a fun-
damental element of distributed ledger systems that do not rely on central clearing
entities. It should not be confused, however, with latency in order execution as heavily
discussed in the context of high-frequency trading (e.g., Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013;
Foucault et al., 2017). Such latencies are in the order of milliseconds and thus of sev-
eral magnitudes smaller than settlement latencies. Therefore, without loss of general-
ity, we refrain from latency in order execution and assume that markets process orders
instantaneously.
Let latency τ denote the random waiting time until a transfer of the asset between
markets is settled. If the buy transaction on market b takes place at time t and the
transfer of the asset to market s is settled at t + τ , the arbitrageur faces the sell quote
Bst+τ . The profit of the arbitrageur’s trading decision is thus at risk if the probability of
losing money is non-zero, that is, if
P
(
Bst+τ < A
b
t
)
> 0. (2.2)
In this case, a risk-averse arbitrageur faces limits to (statistical) arbitrage whenever the
associated risk exceeds the expected return (see, e.g., Bondarenko, 2003). To formalize
the trading decision of the arbitrageur, denote the log quotes by abt := log
(
Abt
)
and
bst := log (B
s
t ), respectively, to cast the payoff in log returns. The log return resulting
from buying on market b at time t and selling on market s at time t + τ is then given
by
rb,s(t:t+τ) := b
s
t+τ − abt = δb,st︸︷︷︸
instantaneous
return
+ bst+τ − bst︸ ︷︷ ︸
exposure to
price risk
, (2.3)
where δb,st := bst−abt defines the return the arbitrageur would earn under instantaneous
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settlement, that is, in the absence of any latency. The second part of the decomposi-
tion captures the risk of adverse price movements on the sell-side market. As the
instantaneous return δb,st is observable and thus known in t, the arbitrageur only faces
uncertainty about the evolution of prices on the sell-side market. The price process on
the sell-side market is given as follows.
Assumption 1. For a given latency τ , we model the log price change on the sell-side bst+τ − bst
as a Brownian motion with drift µst such that
rb,s(t:t+τ) = δ
b,s
t + τµ
s
t +
t+τ∫
t
σstdW
s
k , (2.4)
where σst denotes the spot volatility of the bid quote process on market s, and W sk denotes a
Wiener process. We assume that σst is constant over the interval [t, t + τ ] and rule out any
jumps.2
The dynamics of the sell price thus expose the arbitrageur to uncertainty about her
profits. The uncertainty is triggered by the spot volatility σst and the latency τ . We
require only weak assumptions regarding the stochastic nature of the latency.
Assumption 2. The stochastic latency τ ∈ R+ is a random variable equipped with a con-
ditional probability distribution pit(τ) := pi (τ |It), where It denotes the set of available in-
formation at time t. We assume that the moment-generating function of pit(τ), defined as
mτ (u) := Et (euτ ) for u ∈ R, is finite on an interval around zero.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to fully characterize the return distribution pit
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
through the interval of random length from t to t + τ for a wide range of latency
distributions.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the returns follow a normal variance-mean mixture
with probability distribution
pit
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
=
∫
R+
pit
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
∣∣τ) pit (τ) dτ, (2.5)
2Time-varying and stochastic volatility can be incorporated by means of a change of the time-scale
of the underlying Brownian motion. We provide the corresponding derivations in Appendix B.2.
However, both the time-variability of σst and the presence of jumps would further increase the price
risk the arbitrageur is facing. In that sense, the bounds derived in this paper are conservative.
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and corresponding characteristic function3
ϕrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u) = eiuδ
b,s
t mτ
(
iuµst −
1
2
u2(σst )
2
)
. (2.6)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
For any valid distribution pit(τ), Lemma 4 characterizes the impact of stochastic latency
on the return distribution. In Appendix B.3, we illustrate the special case where pit(τ)
follows an exponential distribution and show that the resulting return distribution
follows an asymmetric Laplace distribution.
2.2.2 Arbitrage Bounds for Risk-Averse Arbitrageurs
To quantify the arbitrageur’s assessment of risk, we have to equip her with a corre-
sponding utility function.
Assumption 3. The arbitrageur has a utility function Uγ(r) with risk aversion parameter γ,
where r are the log returns implied by her trading decision. Furthermore, we assume U ′γ(r) > 0
and U ′′γ (r) < 0.
The arbitrageur maximizes the expected utility Et (Uγ(r)), which we express in terms
of the certainty equivalent (CE). We derive the CE of exploiting concurrent cross-
market price differences in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1–3, the certainty equivalent (CE) resulting from the arbi-
trage trade is given by
CE =δb,st + Et(τ)µst
+
∞∑
k=2
U
(k)
γ
(
δb,st + Et(τ)µst
)
k!U ′γ
(
δb,st + Et(τ)µst
)Et((rb,s(t:t+τ) − δb,st − Et(τ)µst)k) , (2.7)
where U (k)γ (r) := ∂
k
∂rk
Uγ (r).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
3The characteristic function fully describes the behavior and properties of a probability distribution.
For a random variable X , ϕX(u) is defined as ϕX(u) = E(eiuX), where i is the imaginary unit and
u ∈ R is the argument of the characteristic function.
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Theorem 1 allows us to compare the expected utility of making the arbitrage trade
versus staying idle (which yields a riskless return of zero). The arbitrageur is will-
ing to exploit cross-market price differences if and only if the CE of trading given by
Equation (2.7) is positive. A positive CE corresponds to a statistical arbitrage oppor-
tunity in the sense of positive expected risk-adjusted profits. Whenever the observed
price differences δb,st are positive but CE is negative, the arbitrageur does not trade.
In this case, although the trade would be profitable under the possibility of instanta-
neous settlement, limits to (statistical) arbitrage arise due to stochastic latency. Hence,
the arbitrageur is indifferent between trading and staying idle if the observed price
differences δb,st imply CE = 0.
Definition 1. We define the arbitrage bound dst as the minimum price difference necessary
such that the arbitrageur prefers to trade. Formally, dst is the maximum of zero and the (unique)
root4 of
F (d) =d+ Et(τ)µst
+
∞∑
k=2
U
(k)
γ (d+ Et(τ)µst)
k!U ′γ (d+ Et(τ)µst)
Et
((
rb,s(t:t+τ) − d− Et(τ)µst
)k)
. (2.8)
Price differences below the arbitrage bound dst might persist as the arbitrageur prefers
not to trade in such a scenario.
More intuitive representations of the arbitrage bound can be derived by assuming
that the arbitrageur is equipped with absolute or relative risk aversion. In particular,
we follow Schneider (2015) in ignoring the impact of higher order moments above
the fourth degree of the Taylor representation in Equation (2.8) and assume that the
price process has a drift of µst of zero. These two additional assumptions yield an
analytically tractable formulation of the arbitrage bound. The following lemma gives
the analytical closed-form expression for dst under the assumption of a power utility
function.
Lemma 5. If, in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, the arbitrageur has an isoelastic utility
function Uγ(r) :=
(1+r)1−γ
1−γ with risk aversion parameter γ > 1, the arbitrage bound for µ
s
t = 0
4By definition of the CE, we have F (d) = U−1γ
(
Et
(
Uγ
(
d+ µstτ +
∫ t+τ
t
σstW
s
k
)))
. Since U ′γ(r) > 0,
the expectation is increasing in d. Moreover, since U ′′γ (r) < 0, the inverse U−1γ (r) > 0 is also strictly
concave. Thus, F (d) is strictly increasing and has a unique root.
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is given by
dst =
1
2
σst
√
γEt (τ) +
√
γ2Et (τ)2 + 2γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2) (Vt(τ) + Et(τ)2). (2.9)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Hence, dst positively depends on (i) the arbitrageur’s risk aversion γ, (ii) the local
volatility on the sell-side market, σst , (iii) the (conditionally) expected waiting time
until settlement, Et (τ), and (iv) the conditional variance of the waiting time, Vt (τ).
We show in Appendix B.4 that the special case of an exponential utility function with
constant absolute risk aversion γ yields a similarly tractable expression.
The arbitrage bound obviously depends on the arbitrageur’s risk aversion γ. Ac-
cordingly, for a risk-neutral arbitrageur, we have dst = 0 and she would exploit any
positive price difference δb,st > 0. In this case, any price differences between the two
markets should be absorbed immediately. Hence, in the absence of any other frictions,
the existence of persistent price differences between twomarkets (which are not traded
away) indicates that the markets are populated by risk-averse arbitrageurs who do not
exploit price differences below the threshold dst . We thus denote the interval [0, dst ] as a
no-trade region in which price differences between markets b and s are not exploited.5
The lower bound dst is a fundamental pillar of markets with settlement latency, as
the implied costs of settlement latency affect the entire action and contracting space
of market participants. The only possibility to circumvent this latency would be the
ability to sell instantaneously at the more expensive market to lock in the price differ-
ence. This is only possible, however, if the arbitrageur already has an inventory of the
asset on the expensive (sell) market or if she can borrow the asset on that market. The
first alternative bears considerable additional risks. To be able to exploit instantaneous
price differences whenever they arise, arbitrageurs have to keep inventory on the sell-
sidemarket over longer periods. Only investors who do not require a premium for this
inventory risk (e.g., due to hedging needs or diversification benefits) could act as risk-
neutral arbitrageurs.6 The second strategy requires that short-selling is offered by an
5The risk aversion is associated with the arbitrageur’s attitude towards the risk of a single trade. Theo-
retically, repeatedly exploiting price differencesmay lead to a vanishing variance of the arbitrageurs’
aggregate returns which is equivalent to a contraction of the relevant bounds. From an empirical
perspective, however, high autocorrelation in the resulting individual returns due to the latency
questions the feasibility of such a law of large numbers.
6In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that investors in Bitcoin markets exert substantial effort to keep
their inventory holdings at exchanges at a minimum to avoid exposure to any exchange-related
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intermediary (e.g., the trading platform itself) and that margin constraints do not bind.
The absence of central counterparties or trusted intermediaries, however, is likely to
cause high costs of borrowing as the lack of trust manifests itself in substantial margin
requirements to counterbalance counterparty risks. As a consequence, high margin re-
quirements discourage market participants from circumventing latency-implied price
risks. Our results thus characterize arbitrage bounds in a situation where inventory
holdings or margins are exhausted and arbitrageurs are fully exposed to settlement
latency. In this sense, we quantify the frictions that arise if trust and security of the
settlement process are exclusively provided by a decentralized consensus mechanism.
2.3 Transaction Costs and Settlement Fees
Most markets request trading fees that agents pay upon the execution of a trade.
For instance, traders frequently pay fees as a percentage of the trading volume when
they execute trades on centralized exchanges. Similarly, broker-dealers usually charge
markups for the execution of trades in over-the-counter markets. Moreover, markets
typically exhibit limited supply in the form of price-quantity schedules that agents are
willing to trade, possibly leading to substantial price impacts for large trading quan-
tities. To incorporate trading fees and liquidity effects into our framework, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Trading the quantity q ≥ 0 on market i exhibits proportional transaction
costs such that the average per unit sell and buy quotes are
Bit(q) = B
i
t
(
1− ρi,B(q)) (2.10)
Ait(q) = A
i
t
(
1 + ρi,A(q)
)
, (2.11)
with ρi,B(q) ≥ 0 and ρi,A(q) ≥ 0, both monotonically increasing in q.
The presence of transaction costs changes the objective function of the arbitrageur who
risks.
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focuses on maximizing returns net of transaction costs defined as
r˜b,s(t:t+τ) = b
s
t+τ − bst + δb,st − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q)
1− ρs,B(q)
)
= rb,s(t:t+τ) − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q)
1− ρs,B(q)
)
. (2.12)
From this expression immediately follows that transaction costs decrease the expected
utility of the arbitrageur. A different interpretation of Equation (2.12) is that trans-
action costs only increase the instantaneous return required to make the arbitrageur
indifferent between trading and staying idle. The following lemma summarizes the
arbitrageur’s decision problem in the presence of transaction costs.
Lemma 6. Under assumptions 1–4, the arbitrageur prefers to trade a quantity q > 0 over
staying idle if
δb,st − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q)
1− ρs,B(q)
)
> dst . (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In addition to transaction costs, in distributed ledger systems, also settlement fees
need to be taken into account. In such systems, validators typically receive a reward
for confirming transactions. This reward (at least partly) comprises fees that origi-
nators of transactions offer to potential validators. Since the information that can be
added to the ledger at any point in time is usually limited, such fees aim to provide
validators with incentives to prioritize the settlement of transactions that include a
higher fee (see, e.g., Easley et al., 2019). By offering a higher fee, arbitrageurs can thus
decrease the settlement latency they face. We extend our framework to incorporate
such latency-reducing settlement fees as follows.
Assumption 5. A settlement fee f > 0 implies a latency distribution pit (τ |f) that can be
ordered in the sense that for f˜ > f , pit (τ |f) first-order stochastically dominates pit
(
τ |f˜
)
, that
is, P
(
τ ≤ x|f˜
)
> P (τ ≤ x|f) for all x ∈ R+.
The ordering of latency distributions in Assumption 5 implies a lower CE of trading
for f˜ > f .7 Denote by dst(f) the arbitrage bound associated with the latency distribu-
tion pit (τ |f). Theorem 1 then implies that dst(f) > dst(f˜), that is, by paying a higher
7We refer to Hadar and Russell (1969) and Levy (1992) for an explicit analysis of the relation between
stochastic dominance and expected utility.
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settlement fee, the arbitrageur can reduce the risk associated with settlement latency
and becomes more likely to trade. For simplicity, we assume that dst(f) is differentiable
such that Assumption 5 implies ∂
∂f
dst(f) < 0.
While settlement fees reduce the latency, they are costly for the arbitrageur. Since
the arbitrageur does not hold inventory of the asset on the buy-side market, she has
to acquire the additional quantity f to spend it in the settlement process. In line with
practical implementation in most systems, where cryptocurrencies are transferred, we
assume that the arbitrageur has to pay the settlement fee in terms of the underlying
asset. Given the transaction costs from above, the choice of f thus also affects the trad-
ing quantity q. The following lemma characterizes the arbitrageur’s decision problem
in the presence of transaction costs and settlement fees.
Lemma 7. Under assumptions 1–5, the arbitrageur prefers to trade a quantity q > 0 and pay
a settlement fee f > 0 over staying idle if
δb,st − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q + f)
1− ρs,B(q)
)
> dst(f). (2.14)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Trading a larger quantity might deliver higher total returns, but it comes at the cost of
higher transaction costs on both the buy-side and sell-side markets. Moreover, paying
higher settlement fees leads to lower arbitrage bounds but at the cost of additional
transaction costs on the buy-side market. The arbitrageur’s trading decision thus fea-
tures a trade-off between q and f with endogenous arbitrage bounds. Formally, the
arbitrageur aims to maximize total returns
max
{q,f}∈R2+
Bst
(
1− ρs,B(q)) q − Abt(1 + ρb,A(q + f))(q + f) (2.15)
subject to the constraint
δb,st − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q + f)
1− ρs,B(q)
)
≥ dst(f). (2.16)
We characterize the arbitrageur’s optimal choice of trading quantities and settlement
fees in the following lemma.
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Lemma 8. A total return maximizing arbitrageur only pays a settlement fee f ∗ > 0 to trade a
quantity q∗ > 0 if the following necessary conditions are met:
1− ρs,B(q∗)
q∗
>
∂
∂q
ρs,B(q∗) (2.17)
− ∂
∂f
dst(f
∗) >
∂
∂q
ρs,B(q∗)
1 + ρs,B(q∗)
. (2.18)
Otherwise, the arbitrageur optimally sets f ∗ = 0. Moreover, a total return maximizing arbi-
trageur chooses trading quantities q∗ > 0 and settlement fees f ∗ ≥ 0 such that
δb,st − log
(
1 + ρb,A(q∗ + f ∗)
1− ρs,B(q∗)
)
= dst(f
∗). (2.19)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The first part of the lemma provides conditions for choosing the settlement fee. Ac-
cording to Equation (2.17), the arbitrageur chooses a positive settlement fee as long as
the marginal price impact for the trading quantity is below the average price impact.
However, Equation (2.18) shows that the reduction of the arbitrage bound through a
higher settlement fee must exceed the implied opportunity costs, that is, the possible
gain in selling a higher quantity. As a consequence, the arbitrageur tends to pay a
higher settlement fee if the sell-side market is very liquid (keeping the marginal price
impact low) and the settlement fee has a high impact on the arbitrage bound (i.e.,
reducing the latency and thus risk). If any of these two conditions is violated, the
arbitrageur optimally chooses not to pay any settlement fee but might still decide to
trade.
The second part of the lemma states that the arbitrageur always chooses trading
quantities and settlement fees such that the constraint in Equation (2.16) binds. If the
constraint were not binding, the arbitrageur could trade a larger quantity to increase
her total returns at the expense of higher transaction costs.
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2.4 Bitcoin Order Book and Network Data
2.4.1 Bitcoin Order Book Data
We gathered order book information from the public application programming inter-
faces (APIs) of the 16 largest cryptocurrency exchanges that feature BTC versus USD
trading.8 We retrieved all open buy and sell orders for the first 25 levels on a minute
interval from January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. The granularity of our data yields
detailed information on order book depth.9
Table 2.1 gives the corresponding exchanges and provides summary statistics of the
underlying order book data of our sample period. We observe a strong heterogeneity
of exchange-specific liquidity. For instance, whereas investors could have traded BTC
versus USD at Coinbase Pro with an average spread of 0.45 USD, the average quoted
spread at Gatecoin has been about 337 USD since January 2018. For most exchanges,
however, the relative bid-ask spreads are comparable to those from equity markets
such as Nasdaq or NYSE, where relative spreads range from 5 basis points (bp) for
large firms to 38 bp for small firms (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014).
The exchanges also exhibit substantial heterogeneity in terms of trading-related
characteristics. Taker fees range from 0% on Lykke to 1% on Gemini. Another poten-
tial transaction cost are withdrawal fees that have to be paid upon the transfer of BTC
from the exchange to any other exchange or private address. Exchanges charge up to
0.003 BTC for withdrawal requests, which corresponds to roughly 30 USD in prices as
of April 2018, irrespective of the withdrawn amount. Furthermore, exchanges have
different requirements with respect to the number of block confirmations before they
proceed to process BTC deposits. For instance, Kraken requires that incoming transac-
tions must be included in at least 6 blocks. The objective of these requirements is to
reduce the possibility of an attack that aims at revoking previous transactions, that is, a
so-called ’double-spending attack’. In such a scenario, a potential attacker has to alter
all blocks containing the corresponding transaction. The probability that an attacker
catches up with the honest chain decreases exponentially with the number of blocks
the attacker has to alter. For instance, in the case of a confirmation requirement of 10
blocks, the probability of a successful attack is less than 0.01% (5%), if the attacker has
8Some exchanges do not feature fiat currencies. However, they allow trading BTC against Tether, a
token that is backed by one USD for each token and trading close to par with USD.
9To the best of our knowledge, none of these exchanges offers the opportunity to place hidden orders.
Our data set thus reflects a real-time image of the available liquidity on each exchange.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Order Book Sample
Order Books Spread (USD) Spread (bp) Taker Fee With. Fee Conf. Margin Business
Binance 941,399 2.61 3.29 0.10 0.00100 2 3 7
Bitfinex 938,703 0.62 0.74 0.20 0.00080 3 3 3
bitFlyer 919,182 15.13 20.52 0.15 0.00080 3 3
Bitstamp 938,483 5.11 6.33 0.25 0.00000 3 7 3
Bittrex 940,523 9.07 13.20 0.25 0.00000 2 7 3
CEX.IO 936,378 11.73 15.07 0.25 0.00100 3 3 3
Gate 907,874 81.24 90.92 0.20 0.00200 2 7 7
Gatecoin 560,111 336.52 515.87 0.35 0.00060 6 7 3
Coinbase Pro 941,539 0.45 0.54 0.30 0.00000 3 3 3
Gemini 912,944 2.57 3.40 1.00 0.00200 3 7 3
HitBTC 919,686 2.96 3.68 0.10 0.00085 2 7 7
Kraken 936,970 2.63 3.24 0.26 0.00100 6 3 3
Liqui 491,516 30.15 45.13 0.25 3 7
Lykke 918,768 44.04 57.95 0.00 0.00050 3 7 7
Poloniex 916,876 5.38 7.51 0.20 1 3 7
xBTCe 887,289 13.34 17.87 0.25 0.00300 3 3 7
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of order book data used in our study. We gathered high-
frequency order book information of 16 exchanges by accessing the public application programming
interfaces (APIs) every minute. Order Books denotes the number of successfully retrieved order book
snapshots between January 1, 2018 and October 31, 2019. Spread (USD) is the average quoted spread
in USD, Spread (bp) is the average spread relative to the quoted best ask price (in basis points). Taker
Fee is the associated trading fee in percentage points relative to the trading volume. With. Fee referes to
the withdrawal fee in BTC. Conf. refers to the number of blocks that the exchange requires to consider
incoming transactions as being valid. Empty cells indicate missing values. Margin refers to the existence
of BTC shorting instruments at the exchange. Business indicates whether the exchange allows business
accounts and hence access to institutional investors.
a share of 30% (10%) of the total available computing power (Nakamoto, 2008). As we
discuss below, these requirements confront arbitrageurs with a mechanical increase in
settlement latency.
Finally, we collected information about two exchange characteristics that might help
arbitrageurs to circumvent the exposure to settlement latency. On the one hand, some
exchanges offer margin trading instruments which allow traders to short BTC and
avoid settlement latency. However, such margin trading always comes at the cost of
substantial collateral deposits which the exchanges control. On the other hand, some
exchanges allow businesses to open an account which provides institutional investors
with the opportunity to hold inventories and exploit price differences. Holding inven-
tories at exchanges is costly though, since it is associated with continuous exposure to
fluctuations in prices and exchange-specific default or hacking risks. However, as we
demonstrate in Section 2.6, the mere presence of margin trading instruments or access
for institutional investors is not a sufficient condition to completely offset the impact
of settlement latency.
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2.4.2 Bitcoin Network Data
Wegathered transaction-specific information from blockchain.com, a popular provider
of Bitcoin network data. We downloaded all blocks verified between January 1, 2018,
and October 31, 2019, and extracted information about all verified transactions in this
period. Each transaction contains a unique identifier, a timestamp of the initial an-
nouncement to the network, and, among other details, the fee (per byte) the initiator
of the transaction offers validators to verify the transaction.10
Any transaction in the Bitcoin network, irrespective of its origin, has to go through
the so-called mempool which is a collection of all unconfirmed transactions. These
transactions wait until they are picked up by validators and get verified. The size
of the mempool thus reflects the number of transactions that wait for confirmation. By
design, the Bitcoin protocol restricts the number of transactions that can enter a single
block. This restriction induces competition among the originators of transactions who
can offer higher settlement fees to make including transactions in the next block at-
tractive to validators. Consequently, transactions with no or very low settlement fees
may not attract validators and thus stay in the mempool until they become verified
eventually.11
Validators bundle transactions that wait for verification and try to solve a compu-
tationally expensive problem which involves numerous trials until the first validator
finds the solution. By design of the Bitcoin protocol, validators successfully find a so-
lution and append a block on average every 10 minutes (during our sample period,
new blocks are announced to the network on average every 9.7 minutes). The time
until verification, however, should not be confused with the time it takes until a new
block is mined. Even though the expected block validation time is 10 minutes, it is ex-
ante uncertain when a transaction is included in a block for the first time. The number
of outstanding transactions serves as a proxy for fluctuations in congestion of the Bit-
coin network. Whereas on average 1,644 transactions per block have been included
in our sample period, the average number of transactions in the mempool is above
10,000 with temporary peaks of more than 41,000 transactions waiting for verification.
For any transaction this induces stochastic settlement latency. The probability of be-
10The fee per byte is more relevant than the total fee associated with a transaction as block sizes are
limited in terms of bytes. In principle, a transaction can have multiple inputs and outputs, that is,
several addresses that are involved as senders or recipients of a transaction, which increases the
number of bytes.
11Relaxing this artificial supply constraint might reduce issues pertaining to settlement latency but at
the cost of network security (e.g., Hinzen et al., 2019).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Transactions in the Bitcoin Network
Mean SD 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
Fee per Byte (in Satoshi) 47.41 183.08 1.21 5.00 14.06 45.52 200.25
Fee per Transaction (in USD) 1.98 24.19 0.02 0.09 0.28 1.12 7.54
Latency (in Min) 41.03 289.26 0.73 3.55 8.82 20.75 109.52
Mempool Size (in Number) 10,018.74 14,876.52 432.00 1,812.00 4,503.50 11,057.50 41,884.50
Transaction Size (in Bytes) 507.28 2174.13 192.00 225.00 248.00 372.00 958.00
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the Bitcoin transaction data used in our study. The sam-
ple contains all transactions settled in the Bitcoin network from January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. Our
sample comprises 139,704,737 transactions that are verified in 99,129 blocks. Fee per Byte is the total fee
per transaction divided by the size of the transaction in bytes in Satoshi where 100,000,000 Satoshi are 1
Bitcoin. Fee per Transaction is the total settlement fee per transaction (in USD). We approximate the USD
price by the average minute-level midquote across all exchanges in our sample. Latency is the time until
the transaction is either validated or leaves the mempool without verification (in minutes). Transaction
Size denotes the size of a transaction in bytes. Mempool Size is the number of other transactions in the
mempool at the time a transaction of our sample enters the mempool.
ing included in the next block decreases with the number of transactions that wait for
settlement and increases with the settlement fee the investor is willing to pay.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the recorded transactions. The average
settlement fee per transaction is about 2 USD. The distribution of fees exhibits a strong
positive skewness with a median of 0.28 USD. The average waiting time until the
verification of a transaction is about 41minutes, while themedian is about 8.8 minutes.
2.4.3 Price Differences Across Markets
To provide systematic empirical evidence on the extent of potential arbitrage opportu-
nities and thus violations of the law of one price, we compute the observed instanta-
neous cross-market price differences, adjusted for transaction costs, of all 120 exchange
pairs (with the total number of exchanges N = 16), defined as
∆˜t :=

0 · · · δ˜N,1t
...
. . .
...
δ˜1,Nt · · · 0
 =

0 · · · b˜1t
(
qN,1t
)
− a˜Nt
(
qN,1t
)
...
. . .
...
b˜Nt
(
q1,Nt
)
− a˜1t
(
q1,Nt
)
· · · 0
 , (2.20)
where b˜it(q
i,j
t ) is the transaction cost-adjusted (log) sell price of q
i,j
t units of the asset on
exchange i at time t, and a˜it(q
i,j
t ) is the transaction cost-adjusted (log) buy price of q
i,j
t
units of the asset. For analyses in which we abstract from transaction costs, we use the
best bid and ask quotes of each exchange.
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In line with our definition in Section 2.3, transaction costs are proportional to the
trading quantity. We choose qi,jt as the quantity that maximizes the resulting return
for the exchange pair i and j given the prevailing order books at time t, the taker fees
of exchanges i and j and withdrawal fees of exchange j. Accordingly, we account for
proportional exchange-specific taker fees (as reported in Table 2.1), which increase the
average buy price and decrease the average sell price. We then use the resulting trans-
action cost-adjusted order book queues and apply a grid search algorithm to identify
the trading quantity that maximizes the total return for each exchange pair. As a last
step, we check if the resulting trading quantity exceeds the withdrawal fee that the
buy-side exchange charges for outgoing transactions (see Table 2.1). If the optimal
trading quantity is below the withdrawal fee, we set the trading quantity to zero. This
data-driven approach thus mimics the strategy of an arbitrageur who aims to maxi-
mize profits by optimally accounting for the prevailing order book depth and other
trading-related fees. As price differences obviously can only be positive in one trad-
ing direction, we set negative price differences to zero as such scenarios (even without
latency) do not correspond to arbitrage opportunities. The resulting matrix of price
differences thus contains only non-negative values.
Figure 2.2 depicts the daily average of minute-level price differences based on op-
timal trading quantities according to Equation (2.20) across all exchange pairs. We
observe a substantial variation over time. The average daily price difference across all
exchange pairs is on average 33 bp. The 90% quantile is on average 129 bp, indicating
a large dispersion of price differences through our sample period.
Figure 2.3 shows the average price differences for each exchange pair. The heatmap
shows that some exchanges exhibit quotes that tend to deviate quite systematically
from (nearly) all other exchanges. For instance, Bitfinex, CEX.IO, Gatecoin and HitBTC
quote on average higher bid prices than most other exchanges and thus exhibit large
price differences when used as a sell-side market. Conversely, other exchange pairs
do not feature large average price differences. For instance, there are hardly any price
differences whenever Coinbase Pro or Kraken serve as sell-side markets.
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Figure 2.2: Price Differences over Time
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Notes: This figure shows the daily average of price differences adjusted for transaction costs δ˜b,st , across
all exchange pairs from January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. Price differences are based on minute-level
transaction cost-adjusted bid and ask quotes for each exchange according to Equation (2.20). We account
for exchange-specific taker fees according to Table 2.1 and compute the quantity which maximizes the
return for each exchange pair using a grid search algorithm. The shaded area indicates the 10% and
90% quantiles of price differences on a given day.
2.5 Quantifying Arbitrage Bounds
2.5.1 Spot Volatility Estimation
To estimate the spot volatility, we follow the approach of Kristensen (2010). For each
market s and minute t, we estimate (σst )
2 by
(̂σst )
2
(hT ) =
∞∑
l=1
K (l − t, hT )
(
bsl − bsl−1
)2
, (2.21)
where K (l − t, hT ) is a one-sided Gaussian kernel smoother with bandwidth hT and
bsl corresponds to the quoted bid price on market s at minute l. The choice of the
bandwidth hT involves a trade-off between the variance and the bias of the estimator.
Considering too many observations introduces a bias if the volatility is time-varying,
whereas shrinking the estimation window through a lower bandwidth results in a
higher variance of the estimator. Kristensen (2010) thus proposes to choose hT such
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Figure 2.3: Price Differences between Exchanges
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Notes: The heatmap shows the average price differences, adjusted for transaction costs, δ˜b,st , across
time for each exchange pair in our sample. Price differences are based on minute-level transaction
cost-adjusted bids and asks for each exchange according to Equation (2.20). We account for exchange-
specific taker fees according to Table 2.1 and compute the quantity which maximizes the return for
each exchange pair using a grid search algorithm. The darker the color, the higher the average price
difference through our sample period in the specific exchange pair. White or very light colors indicate
that there are on average no or few price differences for a specific exchange pair.
that information on day T − 1 is used for the estimation on day T . Formally, the band-
width on any day of our sample is the result of minimizing the Integrated Squared
Error (ISE) of estimates on the previous day, that is,
hT = argmin
h>0
1440∑
l=1
[(
bsl − bsl−1
)2 − (̂σsl )2(h)]2 , (2.22)
where l refers to the minutes on day T − 1 and (̂σsl )
2
(h) is the spot variance estimator
for minute l on day T − 1 based on bandwidth h.
For each exchange, we trim the distribution of all estimates at 1% on both tails to
eliminate outliers (e.g., due to flickering quotes). Figure 2.4 displays the cross-market
average of spot volatility estimates on a daily basis. Since the underlying asset is
identical, the resulting estimates—as expected—do not differ substantially across ex-
changes. The average minute-level volatility across exchanges is about 0.09%, which
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Figure 2.4: Time Series of Spot Volatility Estimates
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Notes: This figure shows the daily cross-market average of minute-level spot volatility estimates from
January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. For each exchange, we estimate minute-level spot volatilities as
the time-weighted average of squared bid price changes with a one-sided Gaussian kernel (Kristensen,
2010). For each day, we compute the average volatility across all exchanges. The shaded area corre-
sponds to the range of average daily exchange-specific volatility estimates.
translates into a daily volatility of about 3.4%, significantly higher than the average
daily volatility of the S&P 500 index during the same period, which yields roughly
0.65%.12
2.5.2 Latency Prediction
We use all verified transactions to parametrize the latency in the settlement process of
the Bitcoin blockchain. In line with Chiu and Koeppl (2019) and Easley et al. (2019)
we expect that transaction fees and mempool congestion play an important role in
the determination of the expected time until verification. Accordingly, we employ
a gamma regression where the conditional probability density function of latency τi
12We convert minute-level estimates to the daily level by multiplying it with the square root of the
number of minutes on any given trading day, that is,
√
1440.
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with rate parameter βi and shape parameter αT is given by
pi(τi|θT ) = β
αT
i
Γ (αT )
ταT−1i e
−βiτi , (2.23)
where
θT := (θ
β
T , αT )
′ ∈ Rk and βi = exp(−x′iθβT ), αT > 0. (2.24)
Here, xi ∈ RK includes an intercept and denotes (pre-determined) covariates driving
τi, θ
β
T ∈ RK denotes the corresponding vector of parameters and Γ (x) :=
∫
R+ z
x−1e−zdz
is the Gamma function. The gamma distribution collapses to an exponential distribu-
tion for αT = 1. We estimate the parameter vector θT using all verified transactions
on day T − 1 via maximum likelihood, both with and without covariates. In addition,
we estimate an exponential model by fixing αT = 1. As covariates xi, we include set-
tlement fees and the (log) size of the mempool. The settlement fees enter as fees per
byte as the relevant metric for validators who face a restriction in terms of the maxi-
mum size of a block in bytes. The number of transactions waiting for verification at
the time when a transaction is announced serves as a proxy for competition among
transactions.
In Table 2.3, we provide summary statistics of the estimated parameters. The num-
bers in the brackets denote the 5% and 95% quantiles of the time series of estimated
parameters. The marginal effect of settlement fees is statistically significant and has
the expected sign for nearly all days, that is, higher fees predict a lower latency. The
mempool size exhibits a positive impact on latencies through our sample period, that
is, congestion of the mempool decreases the probability of inclusion of a transaction in
the next block (see, e.g., Huberman et al., 2017; Easley et al., 2019). A likelihood ratio
test against a model without covariates indicates that the regressors are jointly highly
significant. We therefore find clear evidence that the waiting time until a transaction
enters the next block of the blockchain is predictable. We moreover find that the ex-
ponential distribution is rejected in favor of the more general gamma distribution in
nearly 93% of all days.
To predict the (conditional) moments of the latency distribution while avoiding any
look-ahead bias, we use the estimated parameter θˆT based on transactions from day
T − 1 to parameterize the latency distribution for every minute t of day T . We provide
further direct evidence for the predictability of settlement latency by computing the
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in-sample as well as out-of-sample root mean square prediction errors (MSPEs). In
particular, for the in-sampleMSPE, we use all transactions that feed into the estimation
of θˆT (i.e., all transactions verified on day T − 1). The out-of-sample MSPE is based
on predictions for all transactions verified on day T using the estimated parameter
vector θˆT . We find that the in-sample MSPE is on average smaller for the unrestricted
model specifications and that the unrestricted models exhibit on average a lower out-
of-sample MSPE compared to their restricted counterparts. As a consequence, we
predict the latency using the unrestricted Gamma model.
Accordingly, the conditional mean and variance of the latency τ , induced by a trans-
action at minute t on day T with characteristics xt, is given by
Êt (τ) = αˆT exp (x′tθˆ
β
T ), and V̂t (τ) = αˆT exp (2x
′
tθˆ
β
T ), (2.25)
where xt consists of the mempool size and the fee an arbitrageur is willing to pay at
time t. While the mempool size is observable at any point in time, we use the optimal
fee as derived in Lemma 8 as a proxy for the individually chosen settlement fees.
2.5.3 Estimation of Arbitrage Bounds
Based on the empirically relevant CRRA case of Lemma 5, the estimated arbitrage
bounds dˆst at minute t are given by
dˆst =
1
2
σˆst
√
γm1 +
√
γ2m21 + 2γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)m2, (2.26)
with
m1 = Êt (τ) + Êt (τB) · (Bs − 1), (2.27)
m2 = V̂t (τ) + V̂t (τB) · (Bs − 1)2 +
(
Êt (τB) · (Bs − 1) + Êt (τ)
)2
, (2.28)
where σˆst denotes the square root of the estimated spot volatility on the sell-side ex-
change, and Êt (τ) and V̂t (τ) denote the estimated conditional mean and variance of
the latency distribution, respectively. Moreover, Bs refers to the number of blocks that
the sell-side exchange s requires to consider incoming transactions as valid (see Table
2.1). This exchange-specific security requirement thus further increases the settlement
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Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates for the Duration Models
Exponential Gamma
w/o Covariates w/ Covariates w/o Covariates w/ Covariates
Intercept 3.31 1.41 3.86 1.19
[2.510, 4.246] [-0.070, 3.675] [2.626, 5.250] [0.013, 2.596]
α 0.62 0.63
[0.358, 0.902] [0.365, 0.900]
Fee per Byte -0.22 -0.22
[-0.486, -0.031] [-0.501, -0.031]
Mempool Size 0.23 0.31
[-0.043, 0.452] [0.059, 0.530]
LR (Covariates) 91.33 74.59
LR (Gamma vs. Exponential) 92.68
MSPE (In-Sample) 65.67 65.74 65.67 66.02
MSPE (Out-of-Sample) 70.97 70.81 70.97 70.55
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the estimated parameters of the gamma durationmodel
given by Equation (2.23). Fee denotes fee per byte andMempool Size refers to the number of unconfirmed
transactions in the mempool. We estimate eachmodel for each day in our sample, where we consider all
transactions confirmed on a particular day. We report the time series averages of the estimated param-
eters. Values in brackets correspond to the 5% and 95% percent quantiles of the estimated parameters.
LR (Covariates) summarizes likelihood ratio tests of the corresponding unrestricted duration model with
covariates against the restricted model without covariates. LR (Gamma vs. Exponential) summarizes like-
lihood ratio tests of the gamma duration model against the exponential specification. The reported
values denote the percentage of days where the null hypothesis that the likelihood of the more general
model equals the likelihood of the restricted model is rejected at the 95% significance level. MSPE refers
to the mean squared prediction error for out-of-sample and in-sample tests, respectively.
latency beyond the waiting time until a transaction’s validation in the first block.13
We thus decompose the latency into two components: the time it takes until a trans-
action is included in the blockchain (i.e., the first block), τ , and the additional time
until exchanges accept the transaction as being de facto immutable. While τ is par-
tially under the control of the arbitrageur, the validation time of subsequent blocks is
exogenous. In fact, we do not find evidence against non-zero autocorrelation in wait-
ing times and constant volatility in the block validation time. This evidence supports
the notion that the validation times of blocks are partially under control of the Bitcoin
network and are internally impaired by the computational complexity of the underly-
ing cryptographic problem. As a result, we can safely assume that the waiting times
between subsequent blocks after the first one, which includes the current transaction,
13bitFlyer and Liqui do not report a minimum number of confirmations. They rather use a discretionary
system depending on the individual transaction and the state of the network. In this case, we as-
sume the number of confirmations to be equal to the median across all exchanges that provide such
information, which is 3.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Arbitrage Bounds over Time
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Notes: This figure shows the daily average estimated arbitrage bound based on a CRRA utility func-
tion with risk aversion parameter γ = 2 from January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. We estimate the
bounds using spot volatility estimates following Kristensen (2010) and out-of-sample predictions of the
conditional moments of the latency based on a gamma duration model. The solid blue line shows the
daily averages (in basis points) across all exchanges. The shaded area corresponds to the range of daily
exchange-specific averages.
are independently and identically distributed. As validators append a new block on
average every 9.7 minutes in our sample, we use this magnitude as the best possible
prediction of the time between two subsequent blocks, Êt (τB). Accordingly, V̂t (τB)
denotes the (sample) variance of the time between two consecutive blocks.
We fix the coefficient of risk aversion to γ = 2 and estimate dˆst for each exchange on
a minute level.14 As shown by Figure 2.5, we observe substantial variation of these
bounds over time. Arbitrage bounds are large especially during phases of high price
volatility. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation between volatility
and expected latency is significantly different from zero, which suggests that settle-
ment latency constitutes a source of risk not captured by price fluctuations.
Table 2.4 gives summary statistics of the resulting time series of arbitrage bounds.
We observe that these bounds range, on average, between 91 bp and 197 bp. While the
conditional moments of the latency distribution affect the time series variation of the
14Our calibration follows Conine et al. (2017), who estimate an average coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion of about 2 over an extensive sample period.
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bounds, the cross-sectional variation is driven by the exchange-specific spot volatilities
and the required number of confirmations, Bs. For instance, Gatecoin and Kraken re-
quireBs = 6 confirmations and produce on average the highest bounds, while Poloniex
requires only Bs = 1 confirmation yielding the smallest median bound. To quantify
the effect of the exchange-specific security componentBs, we decompose the arbitrage
bounds into the component resulting from the latency until a transaction is included
in a block for the first time, τ , and the component resulting from the waiting time
until a transaction fulfills exchange-specific security requirements, (Bs − 1)τB. The
second to last column in Table 2.4 gives the increase in the median arbitrage bound
when we take the exchange-specific number of confirmations into account. The val-
ues correspond to the (percentage) difference between the median arbitrage bound as
of Equation (2.26) and the respective bounds based on the assumption Bs = 1 for all
exchanges. We observe that the impact of exchange-specific security components on
arbitrage bounds is substantial and accounts on average for 23% of the bounds.
To shed more light on the implied costs of decentralized settlement under suffi-
ciently high security standards, we quantify the relation between the level of security
and the resulting latency. For each exchange, we compute arbitrage bounds for a given
hypothetical number of confirmations and compare it to the baseline case of no addi-
tional security requirements (i.e., whenever the inclusion in the first upcoming block is
sufficient). As a result, we find that requiring 10 confirmations at all exchanges (high
security) would yield average arbitrage bounds of 175 bp, whereas the average bound
when requiring only 1 confirmation (low security) would be 101 bp. The resulting
difference between requiring 1 confirmation and 10 confirmation hence amounts to
more than 73%. This analysis shows how security in a distributed ledger translates
into settlement latency which in turn materializes into 7 bp of no-arbitrage regions per
additional block.
Moreover, our theoretical framework allows us to directly analyze the relevance of
the latency uncertainty. As the uncertainty of the arbitrageurs’ returns increases with
the variance of the settlement latency, we can compare the estimated arbitrage bounds
to the (hypothetical) case of a deterministic latency. The last column in Table 2.4 re-
ports the percentage increase in arbitrage bounds when adjusting for the randomness
in latency. The values correspond to the percentage difference between the median
arbitrage bound and bounds based on the assumption Vt(τ) = Vt(τB) = 0. We find
that the impact of the randomness in latency is substantial and accounts on average
for 41% of the arbitrage bounds.
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Table 2.4: Summary of Exchange-Specific Arbitrage Bounds
Mean SD 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Security Uncertainty
Binance 114.75 318.76 24.35 42.10 68.92 125.59 320.28 13.54 41.53
Bitfinex 117.22 299.25 18.89 42.47 73.26 136.19 324.19 23.98 40.85
bitFlyer 130.85 317.68 33.02 57.07 86.62 145.18 333.88 24.09 40.72
Bitstamp 126.34 294.72 28.45 50.53 80.46 145.61 341.72 23.69 40.79
Bittrex 129.03 277.80 30.94 57.25 89.41 143.51 333.37 14.32 41.63
CEX.IO 120.84 286.39 29.46 52.72 81.69 136.05 305.50 24.44 40.60
Gate 101.50 277.20 24.12 43.81 68.78 117.27 260.03 14.04 41.48
Gatecoin 196.89 219.90 2.62 46.70 118.29 274.82 638.77 45.95 40.26
Coinbase Pro 114.84 305.25 17.89 40.75 71.77 132.79 318.48 24.44 40.68
Gemini 115.36 343.30 21.07 43.27 72.42 130.54 309.53 24.44 40.77
HitBTC 101.22 287.97 19.10 37.64 62.72 112.79 273.14 14.14 41.36
Kraken 135.07 271.66 25.37 54.09 91.53 164.15 357.11 41.86 40.50
Liqui 90.79 60.20 23.51 49.96 77.40 115.62 201.88 28.97 39.98
Lykke 133.43 379.31 18.58 44.51 80.57 150.73 381.17 25.21 40.61
Poloniex 94.69 264.09 18.49 33.32 55.53 104.34 260.68 0.00 45.13
xBTCe 106.16 246.56 19.90 40.74 70.58 131.44 281.96 24.15 40.78
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of estimated arbitrage bounds for each sell-side market.
We compute arbitrage bounds for a CRRA utility function with risk aversion parameter γ = 2. We esti-
mate the bounds using the spot volatility estimator of Kristensen (2010) and out-of-sample predictions
of the conditional moments of the latency based on a gamma duration model. We report all values in
basis points (except otherwise noted). Security gives the (percentage) contribution of the required num-
ber of confirmations to the median arbitrage boundary. Uncertainty corresponds to the (percentage)
contribution of the uncertainty in latency to the median arbitrage boundary.
2.5.4 Evidence for Arbitrage Opportunities
To quantify to which extent observed cross-market price differences exceed the esti-
mated arbitrage bounds and thus constitute potential arbitrage possibilities, we define
the price differences adjusted for transaction costs in excess of arbitrage bounds as
E˜t :=
∆˜t −

dˆ1t
...
dˆNt
(1 . . . 1)
 Ψ˜t, (2.29)
where the (i, j)-th element of Ψ˜t is defined as Ψ˜t,i,j = 1
{
b˜it(q
j,i
t )− a˜jt(qj,it ) > dˆit
}
, 1{·} is
the indicator function, and corresponds to the element-wise multiplication operator.
Figure 2.6 plots the time series of cross-sectional daily average price differences in
excess of the arbitrage bounds. The red solid line corresponds to price differences
at the best bid and best ask not adjusted for transaction costs. The blue dashed line
shows the corresponding excess price differences after adjusting for transaction costs.
Taking transaction costs into account lowers the returns in excess of arbitrage bounds
on average by 25%.
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Figure 2.6: Price Differences in Excess of Arbitrage Bounds over Time
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Notes: This figure shows daily average minute-level returns in excess of the estimated arbitrage bounds
across all exchange pairs from January 1, 2018, to October 31, 2019. The solid red line corresponds to
price differences based on the best bid and best ask of the individual exchange pairs, Et. The dashed
blue line displays the corresponding excess price differences after adjusting for transaction costs, E˜t.
In our sample, we find that for a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2, about
84% of observed price differences fall within the estimated bounds. After adjusting for
transaction costs, on average, 91% of all observed price differences are in the no-trade
region. Therefore, the vast majority of cross-exchange price differences on the Bitcoin
market do not constitute arbitrage opportunities but are still too small to be traded
away by rational arbitrageurs, taking into account transaction costs and the risks due
to stochastic settlement latency.
Observations outside of the arbitrage bounds might arise due to additional mar-
ket frictions, which are not captured by our theory, for instance, capital controls (see,
e.g., Choi et al., 2018) or exchange-specific risks. As exchanges themselves are vul-
nerable to different sources of risk (e.g., default or hacking risk), the disutility of be-
ing exposed to a specific exchange may prevent arbitrageurs from exploiting certain
cross-market trades, unless these trades provide additional compensation outside of
our current framework. Furthermore, local regulation or access restrictions may de-
ter cross-market arbitrage activity altogether. For instance, US-based exchanges typi-
cally do not allow European citizens to open an account. To adjust for such exchange-
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Figure 2.7: Excess Price Differences between Exchanges
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Notes: This heatmap shows the average price differences adjusted for transaction cost, δ˜b,st , in excess
of the arbitrage bounds dst across time for each exchange pair in our sample. Price differences are
based on minute-level transaction cost-adjusted bid and ask quotes for each exchange according to
Equation (2.20). We account for exchange-specific taker fees according to Table 2.1 and compute the
quantity which maximizes the return for each exchange pair using a grid search algorithm. The darker
the color, the larger the average price difference through our sample period in the specific exchange pair.
White or very light colors indicate that there are on average no or few price differences for a specific
exchange pair.
specific effects, we decompose price differences in excess of arbitrage bounds on the
exchange-pair level. Figure 2.7 shows a heatmap of average excess price differences.
In analogy to Figure 2.3, some exchanges in our sample seem to persistently quote
lower prices than others (e.g., Gatecoin), even after adjusting for transaction costs and
latency-implied price risk.
Observations outside of arbitrage boundsmay not only occur due to additional mar-
ket frictions but are also consistent with higher risk aversion. As estimates of γ in the
asset pricing literature range from as little as 0.35 to as much as 9.0 (see, e.g., Hansen
and Singleton, 1982; Chetty, 2006), plausible levels of relative risk aversion are hard
to pin down. Therefore, in Figure 2.8, we display the implied relative risk aversion, γˆt,
corresponding to the lowest value of relative risk aversion which prevents all traders
from exploiting the observed cross-exchange price differences.15 We observe that the
15See Appendix B.5 for more details on the construction of γˆt.
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Figure 2.8: Implied Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion over Time
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Notes: This figure shows the daily average implied risk aversion parameter, γˆt, from January 1, 2018,
to October 31, 2019. We compute γˆt as the smallest relative risk aversion such that all observed price
differences adjusted for transaction costs fall within the implied limits to arbitrage.
implied minimum risk aversion exhibits substantial variation over time with an av-
erage of around 17. This relatively high level indicates that risk aversion cannot be
the only reason for observing large cross-exchange price differences but suggests the
presence of further market frictions.
2.6 Arbitrage Bounds and Cross-Exchange Activity
The preceding analysis demonstrates that our derived arbitrage bounds can reconcile
a large fraction of the observed cross-exchange price differences in our sample. How-
ever, these results neither provide an indication to which extent the variation in these
price differences can be attributed to variation in the economic frictions underlying
the arbitrage bounds nor whether arbitrageurs in fact act according to our proposed
theoretical framework. Our model exhibits two key features that we should observe
in the data. On the one hand, large price differences should be consistent with times
of high volatility, long settlement latencies, and high uncertainty in latencies. On the
other hand, during periods of large price differences, that is, in periods where price
differences likely exceed the arbitrage bounds transfers of assets between exchanges
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should increase consistent with the notion that arbitrageurs have to physically transfer
assets between markets to exploit arbitrage opportunities.
To address the relation between price differences and arbitrage bounds, we com-
pute the cross-sectional hourly average of differences between the price level on each
sell-side exchange and prices on all other exchanges. We then relate this aggregate
hourly measure of price differences to hourly averages of arbitrage bounds or, alterna-
tively, measures of their components (i.e., spot volatility and moments of the realized
settlement latency distribution) as well as exchange-specific characteristics.
More specifically, we estimate the model
δst = α
s + β1d
s
t + γ1x
s
t + ε
s
t , (2.30)
where s indexes all sell-side exchanges, δst are exchange s-specific average price dif-
ferences in hour t, αs is a sell-side exchange fixed effect to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the exchange level, and εst is a white noise error term. dst refers to the
average estimated arbitrage bound of exchange s or, alternatively, a collection of their
individual components.16 The latter includes the average hourly sell-side spot volatil-
ity, the hourly median and variance of realized waiting times of transactions entering
the mempool until being included in a block for the first time (where we rescale the
variance to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Finally, xst contains
the average hourly bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity.
Table 2.5 provides the estimation results. Consistent with our theoretical frame-
work, we find a statistically significant positive relation between price differences and
arbitrage bounds. The marginal effect of arbitrage bounds is statistically and econom-
ically significant: a 1 bp increase in arbitrage bounds is on average associated with
a 0.3 bp increase of price differences. Directly replacing the (pre-estimated) arbitrage
bounds with their components confirms that large price differences are consistent with
periods of high price risk due to settlement latency. Moreover, we interact the ar-
bitrage bounds with sell-side exchange-specific dummies indicating whether the ex-
change offers margin trading instruments (Margin) and access for institutional traders
(Business Accounts). We find that exchanges with margin trading are less sensitive
to arbitrage bounds but still exhibit a significant relation between price differences
and arbitrage bounds. The costs of margin trading for investors thus seem to exceed
the risk-adjusted latency-implied price risk, presumably due to substantial margin re-
16In the latter case, dst and β1 are corresponding vectors.
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quirements by the exchanges as the absence of central clearing requires costly insur-
ance against counterparty risk. Similarly, exchanges which feature access for insti-
tutional traders are less sensitive to arbitrage bounds, consistent with the notion that
large institutions are more likely to hold inventories at different marketplaces andmay
exploit price differences without transferring assets.
However, the sensitivity of price differences to latency-related variables on top of
the presence of short-selling instruments and inventory holdings suggests that circum-
venting the blockchain consensus protocol via alternative strategies is not sufficiently
pervasive to offset the impact of arbitrage bounds. Finally, in line with Roll et al.
(2007), we also find that liquidity, measured by the magnitude of bid-ask spreads, is
an additional market friction that increases cross-market price differences. The panel
regression thus indicates that arbitrage bounds due to settlement latency explain price
differences even after adjusting for frictions related to trading costs.
To analyze the relation between price differences and arbitrage activity, we expand
our data by cross-exchange asset flows. Since exchanges are reluctant to provide the
identity of their customers, it is virtually impossible to identify actual transactions by
arbitrageurs. However, we take the overall transfer of assets between two different
exchanges as a measure for the trading activity of cross-market arbitrageurs. For each
exchange, we thus collected a list of addresses that are likely under the control of the
exchanges in our sample.17 Bitcoin transactions are pseudonymous in the sense that
each transaction publicly reveals all addresses associated with the transaction, but it
is hard to map these addresses to their respective physical or legal owners. Exchanges
typically control a large number of addresses to keep track of individual users’ assets.
However, algorithms are available which link addresses to certain exchanges (e.g.,
Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Foley et al., 2019). Usually, the matching procedure is based
on either having observed an address being advertised to belong to an exchange or
by actively sending small amounts of Bitcoin to exchanges. We gathered 62.6 mil-
lion unique exchange addresses which allow us to identify 3.9 million cross-exchange
transactions with an average daily volume of 72 million USD in our sample period.18
For any given hour and exchange, arbitrage opportunities involving a particular ex-
change might arise using the exchange as a sell-side and buy-side market during that
time period. To be able to adjust for exchange-specific characteristics, we take the sum
17We thank Sergey Ivliev for his tremendous support on this front.
18We compute the average daily volume by extracting the hourly sum of net flows (inflows to an ex-
change minus the outflows in BTC) and multiplying it by the hourly average midquote across all
exchanges.
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Table 2.5: Price Differences and Sources of Price Risk
Dependent Variable: Price Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arbitrage Bound (in %) 0.307∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(15.98) (18.62) (12.84)
Spot Volatility (in %) 5.416∗∗∗
(16.99)
Latency Median (in Minutes) 0.003∗∗∗
(3.92)
Latency Variance (Standardized) 0.078∗∗∗
(3.53)
Arbitrage Bound ×Margin Trading -0.258∗∗∗
(-7.07)
Arbitrage Bound × Business Accounts -0.220∗∗∗
(-5.38)
Spread (in %) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(2.91) (1.95) (2.42) (2.65)
Exchange Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.163 0.162 0.162
Exchange-Hour Observations 213,984 213,984 213,984 213,984
Notes: This table provides OLS estimates based on a regression of hourly average sell-side exchange-
specific price differences and the main components of price risk due to stochastic settlement latency.
Price Differences is the sell-side exchange-specific average hourly price difference from all other ex-
changes (in percent). Spot Volatility is the average hourly sell-side spot volatility estimate based on
one-sided Gaussian kernel estimates (Kristensen, 2010). Latency denotes the hourly median (variance)
of the waiting time of transactions entering the Bitcoin mempool, where we rescale the variance to have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Arbitrage Bound corresponds to the average hourly sell-
side exchange calibrated arbitrage bound as of Equation (2.26). Margin is a dummy variable that indi-
cates the availability of margin trading instruments, and Business Accounts indicates whether exchanges
offer access for institutional investors. We compute Spread as the hourly sell-side exchange-specific av-
erage percentage spread. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed),
respectively.
of cross-market flows into exchange s in hour t and denote the resulting aggregated
variable as f st .
In addition, we have to take into account that cross-market asset flows, f st , and price
differences, δst , are jointly determined, giving rise to a simultaneity problem. On the
one hand, arbitrage activity is expected to increase with higher price differences (in
excess of arbitrage bounds). On the other hand, price differences should decrease in
response to arbitrage trades as arbitrageurs enforce adjustments towards the law of
one price. To overcome the resulting inconsistency of estimates in a regression of f st
on δst , we use the estimated arbitrage bounds and, alternatively, their components as
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instruments for price differences. Arbitrage bounds satisfy the two necessary condi-
tions for the validity as an instrument. First, we find a positive correlation between
price differences and arbitrage bounds after netting out the effects of other exogenous
variables (see Table 2.5). Second, the only role arbitrage bounds play in influencing
cross-market flows is through their effect on the endogenous price differences.
We hence estimate the model
f st = β2δˆ
s
t + γ2x
s
t + ε
s
t , (2.31)
by two-stage least squares, where δˆst = αˆs + βˆ1dst + γˆ1xst denotes the fitted values
obtained from the regression in Equation (2.30) and xst corresponds to the exchange-
specific spread to control for liquidity.
Table 2.6 reports the results of the two-step estimation procedure. The first two
columns take the US Dollar value of flows as the left-hand-side variable, while the last
two columns take their natural logarithm to reduce the impact of outliers. In columns
(2) and (4), we use the estimated arbitrage bounds as instruments, while in columns
(1) and (3) their components (spot volatility, median settlement latency and variance
of realized latencies) serve as instruments.
Throughout all specifications, we find a significant positive relation between cross-
exchange flows into an exchange and (instrumented) price differences: a one-percentage-
point increase in price differences is on average associatedwith a 0.5% increase in asset
flows into an exchange in a given hour. These results are robust to controlling for bid-
ask spreads, which are negatively related to inflows coming from other exchanges.
The negative marginal effect of the bid-ask spread is consistent with the notion that
higher transaction costs deter arbitrageurs’ activity. Hence, the regression results indi-
cate that cross-exchange flows increase in response to larger price differences triggered
by larger arbitrage bounds. This provides evidence for arbitrageurs chasing profitable
arbitrage opportunities by actively transferring assets across markets.
2.7 Conclusion
Many market participants believe that distributed ledger technology has the potential
to radically transform the transfer of assets. Replacing trusted intermediaries and cen-
tral clearing parties with decentralized consensus protocols may increase efficiency
and security. However, a new friction emerges as the potential merits come at the cost
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Table 2.6: Cross-Exchange Flows and Arbitrage Opportunities
Dependent Variable: Exchange Inflows (in 100k USD) Log(1 + Exchange Inflows)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Differences (in %) 2.407∗∗∗ 2.525∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(17.03) (15.09) (17.63) (15.53)
Spread (in %) -0.355∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(-3.74) (-3.73) (-3.67) (-3.61)
Exchange Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exchange-Hour Observations 213,984 213,984 213,984 213,984
Notes: This table provides the estimated marginal effects based on a two-stage least square regression of
cross-exchange asset flows on price differences and bid-ask spreads. Inflows are the average hourly BTC
inflows (in USD) to market s from all other markets in our sample. Price Differences are the fitted values
of Equation (2.30) and denote price differences on sell-side market s. In columns (1) and (3), we instru-
ment price differences with all components of arbitrage bounds. Columns (2) and (4) correspond to the
estimation results where we directly use the estimated arbitrage bounds as an instrument. We compute
Spread as the hourly sell-side exchange-specific average percentage spread. We report t-statistics based
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
of latency in the settlement process. We theoretically show that settlement latency im-
plies limits to arbitrage as it exposes arbitrageurs to price risk. We derive arbitrage
bounds for arbitrary concave utility functions and a general class of latency distri-
butions. The arbitrage bounds increase with spot volatility, risk aversion, expected
latency, and uncertainty in latency. Furthermore, we calibrate these arbitrage bounds
for the special case of a utility function with constant relative risk aversion.
We quantify limits to arbitrage in the Bitcoin market and find that settlement latency
is a quantitatively important market friction which imposes arbitrage bounds of, on
average, 121 bp. The quantification of latency-induced limits to arbitrage is essential
to assess the efficiency of a market relying on distributed ledger technology. In fact,
we show that on average, 91% of observed Bitcoin price differences adjusted for trans-
action costs are within the corresponding arbitrage bounds.
We also provide direct evidence for the economic impact of settlement latency. The
law of one price is substantially violated and price differences are particularly large
during times of high latency-implied price risk. We also collected a novel data set
of exchange wallets to examine cross-exchange Bitcoin flows and find that asset trans-
fers between exchanges respond to price differences adjusted for latency-implied price
risk. The findings provide direct evidence that price differences are actively explored
by risk-averse arbitrageurs only if potential gains offset latency-implied price risk.
Therefore, our analysis illustrates that trustless markets come at substantial costs
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with potentially far-reaching implications. First, limits to arbitrage implied by settle-
ment latency may harm price efficiency, as the lower activity of arbitrageurs reduces
the information flow across markets. Second, deviations from the law of one price
affect the pricing of securities, as risk neutral probabilities are not uniquely defined.
Third, the implied costs of settlement latency depend on the design of the distributed
ledgers and should influence the decision whether to migrate to a decentralized set-
tlement system. Overall, our paper provides an initial step to understand the impact
of decentralized settlement on financial markets.
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3 Perceived Precautionary Savings
Motives: Evidence from FinTech
Joint work with Francesco D’Acunto, Thomas Rauter, and Michael Weber
We study the spending response of first-time borrowers to an overdraft facility and
elicit their preferences, beliefs, and motives through a FinTech application. Users in-
crease their spending permanently, lower their savings rate, and reallocate spending
from non-discretionary to discretionary goods. Interestingly, liquid users react more
than others but do not tap into negative deposits. The credit line acts as a form of
insurance. These results are not fully consistent with models of financial constraints,
buffer stock models, or present-bias preferences. We label this channel perceived pre-
cautionary savings motives: liquid users behave as if they faced strong precautionary
savings motives even though no observables, including elicited preferences and be-
liefs, suggest they should.
3.1 Introduction
During recessions, monetary and fiscal policies aim to stimulate consumption through
credit because household consumption comprises the largest share of gross domestic
product (Agarwal et al., 2017). At the same time, household credit growth has been
a major and often unforeseen driver of financial crises (Schularick and Taylor, 2012;
Baron and Xiong, 2017; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017; Mian and Sufi, 2015; Mian et al.,
2017). Understanding themicro-level channels throughwhich household credit affects
consumption and saving decisions is thus important to understand the dynamics of
business cycles and to inform the design of effective credit-based expansionary poli-
cies.
In this paper, we introduce a unique FinTech setting in which we observe the ex-
tensive margin of credit—initiation of overdraft facilities to first-time borrowers—
75
3 Perceived Precautionary Savings Motives: Evidence from FinTech
combined with the possibility to elicit directly a set of preferences, beliefs, and indi-
vidual perceptions that theoretical and empirical research commonly relates to house-
holds’ saving and consumption behavior. These dimensions, which are typically un-
observed in large-scale micro data, include risk preferences, patience, expectations
about future employment status, future large expenses, medical expenses, bequest
motives, subjective life expectancy as well as financial literacy and generalized trust
in others. We use this setting to estimate the consumption effects of providing first-
time borrowers with a credit facility and to test directly for a broad set of typically
unobserved channels that, based on earlier theoretical and empirical research, might
explain the effects of credit on spending.
In our baseline analysis, we estimate a set of double-differences specifications in
which we compare bank users’ change in consumption spending after activating the
overdraft facility relative to before and relative to users whose overdraft facilities are
not yet activated. The average user increases her spending by 4.5 percentage points of
income inflows after credit is available relative to before and relative to users whose
overdraft facility is not yet active. This positive effect on spending does not revert
fully over time—we detect permanent increases in spending and drops in savings for
the average user.
The surprising result is that the baseline effect is heterogeneous across users but not
based on dimensions earlier research proposed, such as motives to smooth consump-
tion or liquidity constraints. Instead, Figure 3.1 shows that the effect increases mono-
tonically as the liquidity of users increases. The higher the ratio of liquid deposits to
income inflows, the stronger is the spending reaction to the provision of credit. More-
over, the higher this ratio, the more permanent is the effect as we document below.
Liquid users seem to behave as if they have strong precautionary savings motives
and hence accumulate liquid savings before the overdraft facility is available. They
have inflows over the previous twelve months similar to other users but save a larger
fraction of their income by spending substantially less. Once the overdraft becomes
available, consistent with an insurance effect of the facility, liquid users start spending
more of their existing liquid savings and decrease their savings rate permanently. In-
terestingly, liquid users do not use the overdraft facility, in the sense that only 10% of
them ever tap into negative deposits and make use of the credit line. The availability
of an overdraft facility makes these users dissave part of their existing liquidity but
not more than that, again consistent with strong precautionary savings motives that
are reduced once the facility is available.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption Response by Deposit-to-Income
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ consumption response to the
mobile overdraft. To generate the plot, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles of deposits to inflows from lowest to highest. We then
interact the resulting grouping variable with a binary indicator that equals 1 if a user has access to a
mobile overdraft in a given month. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point
estimates in each quintile. We double cluster standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
The spending response by liquidity is a robust feature of the data. First, we rule
out that our results are driven by the amount or volatility of inflows into the account
before the credit line is available. Moreover, the results are similar if we only consider
individuals who consume large parts of their inflows, for alternative definitions of
deposits to inflows, for users in areas that have high versus low savings rates—and
hence potentially different social norms about the importance of savings—for urban
versus rural users, or users living in former communist countries and others. Thus,
peculiar norms of saving or aversion to debt in specific European countries, such as
Germany, do not drive our results.1
Our results are puzzling to the extent that the previous literature typically found
that liquidity constraints drive borrowers’ reaction to the credit availability. Hence,
the least liquid users should react the most in terms of spending—the opposite of our
1We thank Amit Seru for suggesting sample splits based on areas with different norms about saving
and borrowing within and across European countries.
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finding. For instance, research that studies increases in the intensive margin of credit,
such as increasing existing credit card limits, finds that users at the constraint (i.e.,
that maxed out their previous limit) react more to the increase of credit lines (see, e.g.,
Gross and Souleles, 2002; Aydin, 2015; Agarwal et al., 2017). The crucial difference
of our setting is that we study the provision of credit lines to borrowers who did not
have access to credit beforehand (extensive margin of credit).2 The insurance role of
obtaining a credit facility for the first time does not apply to borrowers who already
had access to credit, and hence the effect we document could not arise in earlier set-
tings that vary the intensive margin of credit. Another difference between our results
and earlier research is that our liquid users do not tap into negative deposits but only
consume out of their existing savings and new inflows, which suggests that changes
in credit limits or in the intensive margin of credit would barely have any effect on
them.
To understandwhether standard determinants of precautionary savingsmotives ex-
plain our results, we exploit the fact that our FinTech provider allows us to reach users
directly through their app and elicit their preferences, beliefs, and motives. First, risk
aversion and/or prudence are important potential drivers of savings behavior inde-
pendent of income volatility (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005). We detect no economic
or statistical differences in the levels of risk aversion and patience across users based
on their liquidity. Moreover, users who have high subjective beliefs about future large
expenses, such as medical expenses, or about future income uncertainty (Guiso et al.,
1992; Ben-David et al., 2018) might save a larger fraction of their income. Even here, we
find no systematic differences in the cross-section of deposit to inflows. We do not find
systematic differences in terms of subjective life expectancy, beliefs about future em-
ployment status, health conditions, or bequest motives, either. Finally, we do not find
any systematic differences in terms of financial literacy or generalized trust—liquid
users understand the incentives to borrow and save similarly to other users.
Ultimately, the majority of users—all those above the bottom 40% by liquidity—
behave as if they had precautionary savings motives before accessing the credit line.
These motives disappeared with the activation of credit lines, which we could inter-
pret as a form of insurance against future negative states. At the same time, none of
the standard explanations for precautionary savings motives appear to have the po-
tential to explain our results, either individually or jointly. For this reason, we label our
mechanism “perceived precautionary savings”—users perceive strong precautionary
2We discuss the institutional setting in detail in Section 2.
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savings motives, but neither their preferences, subjective or objective beliefs or other
characteristics we elicit directly based on earlier theoretical and empirical research,
explain these motives.
We argue that neither models of buffer stock consumption (Deaton, 1991; Carroll,
1997), buffer stock consumption with durables (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017; Ay-
din, 2015), the standard life-cycle permanent income model of Friedman (1957) nor
heterogeneous-agents models with assets of different liquidity (Kaplan et al., 2014)
can explain our results in full. Non-standard preferences such as present-biased pref-
erences are also unlikely to explain all our results. If the users who react the most
to overdraft activation were present-biased, they would have consumed out of their
higher deposits even before activating the overdraft facility, which is not true in the
data. Our results are closer to Olafsson and Pagel (2018) who document that FinTech
app users who hold wealth in deposit accounts and use overdraft facilities at the same
time increase consumption spending on paydays. In our setting, we show that indi-
viduals with the highest deposits-to-inflows ratio react the most in terms of spending
once they activate the overdraft facility, whereas in Olafsson and Pagel (2018) indi-
viduals with lower amounts of deposits spend more in response to income payments.
Ultimately, our results call for further theoretical and empirical evidence on potential
alternative drivers of precautionary savings motives, either based on standard or non-
standard beliefs. For instance, a promising direction could be to allow heterogeneity
in the extent to which agents have biased beliefs regarding the occurrence of small-
probability events, such as catastrophic states of the world.
A remaining concern with our baseline double-differences analysis is that users
might activate the overdraft facility endogenously when they know they are about
to make a large expense. The facts that the spending effect for liquid households is
permanent and that elicited expectations about upcoming large expenses do not differ
across liquid and illiquid users reduce this concern.
To address this concern directly, we propose two tests. First, we repeat our double-
differences analysis restricting the sample only to users who activated their overdraft
facility in the first month in which the bank made it available.3 The rationale is that
the timing at which the bank decided to make the facility available can barely coin-
cide with the timing at which users would have endogenously decided to activate the
facility because users did not know that the overdraft facility would have been made
available at that time. Although the sample size drops substantially in this test, we esti-
3We thank Greg Buchak and Michaela Pagel for suggesting this test.
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mate the samemonotonic pattern in terms of change in spending by liquidity quintiles
and we can reject the null hypothesis that the changes are zero at conventional levels
of significance for the top two quintiles.
For the second test, we propose a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) that
exploits the rule the FinTech provider uses to compute the limit of the overdraft facility.
This limit is a rounded function of users’ income based on a set of pre-specified income
bandwidths of which users are not aware. The FinTech application computes the limits
automatically, with no role for bank officers to change the approved limits—this is
why the app allows users to open the approved line of credit automatically in just a
few seconds—and hence there is no scope for manipulating one’s assignment to the
high- or low-treatment group.
In this RDD, we compare users that are observationally indistinguishable, as we
document directly, but end up being assigned different overdraft limits based on small
differences in their income inflows. This assignment combines the extensive margin of
credit—so that the insurance effect of the facility exists for everybody—with a higher
or lower intensive margin in terms of credit limit. The RDD confirms the consumption
response to the availability of credit. We cannot use this RDD for our baseline analysis
and heterogeneity tests because by construction the RDD only uses a small subset
of users who are close to the sharp threshold. Heterogeneity in the RDD sample is
minimal by construction given that the treated and control users are almost identical
in most characteristics.
Ultimately, our results might provide novel insights into the effects of providing
credit to households over the business cycle. Providing insurance against potential
negative future spending shocks appears to increase the spending of households with
high deposit-to-inflows ratios. However, this policy intervention would not increase
their debt positions or interest payments because these users would not draw on the
overdraft facilities. If anything, providing insurance to these households at times
of economic slumps might increase aggregate demand swiftly since households that
hoard cash due to perceived precautionary savings motives might end up spending
parts of their savings. Also, providing insurance to perceived precautionary savers
might be virtually costless based on our results because these individuals would not
end up paying any interest and would not accumulate debt over time.
The main challenge to policies based on our findings might be political in nature.
During times of economic crisis, policy-makers would provide virtually costless in-
surance to wealthier households (in terms of liquid wealth) to nudge them to spend
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more instead of providing subsidies to induce spending by all households, including
those who might become risky borrowers over time. Whether governments might
find enough political support for this type of policy is a matter for future research in
political economy and political sciences.
Methodologically, the paper suggests a compelling reason for macroeconomists and
financial economists to use FinTech settings for research on household borrowing, sav-
ing, and spending. FinTech platforms allow the researcher to access users directly in a
logistically simple way that barely involves any costs because users can be contacted
interactively through apps. Easy direct access to users allows the elicitation of typi-
cally unobserved characteristics, as demonstrated in this paper, and has potential for
field experiments to gauge the causal effects of theoretical channels that act through
preferences, beliefs, and perceptions on actual high-stake decision-making.
3.2 Institutional Setting
We cooperated with a leading European FinTech bank to test for the effects of intro-
ducing a mobile overdraft facility on consumption spending. The digital-only bank
does not operate a branch network and provides all its services through an Android
or iOS mobile app. The bank currently operates under a European banking license in
several countries and has more than 1 million customers.
Users can open a bank account within 10 minutes by entering their personal infor-
mation into the app. They are required to verify their identity by providing a copy of
their passport or personal identification through video conferencing before the bank
confirms the account and users obtain their debit card by mail. The free mobile check-
ing account is the bank’s baseline product. Contrary to US banks, our FinTech lender
does not offer credit cards, which is common in the countries in which it operates.
Moreover, note that EU legislation does not require banks to provide any credit fa-
cilities to their customers, which is why our setting allows us to test for the effects
of providing an overdraft facility to users for the first time that allows borrowing for
consumption spending.4
In terms of day-to-day operations, customers manage their account entirely via the
bank’s mobile app, which provides monthly consumption statistics and allows users
4For instance, for the case of Germany, the largest European country, which enters our sample,
see the information sheet by the national bank regulator, BaFin: https://www.bafin.de/DE/
Verbraucher/Bank/Produkte/Dispokredit/dispokredit_node.html.
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to set their daily payment and withdrawal limits, lock their card, or change their PIN
in real time.
In February 2015, the bank started to offer a mobile credit line to users across sev-
eral European countries. Residents of these countries with a sufficiently high credit
score are eligible for the mobile overdraft facility. Customers can activate the credit
line directly in their mobile app within one minute and receive a maximum overdraft
amount that ranges between 500 and 5,000 Euros depending on their credit score and
other financial and personal characteristics. The bank uses a fully automated algo-
rithm to allocate maximum credit amounts to users. In Section 3.6, we describe the
bank’s loan granting and credit allocation process in detail. Users who are granted a
mobile credit line specify their desired credit amount which they can change in real
time via the mobile app depending on their consumption needs. However, customers
cannot select an amount that exceeds the maximum overdraft limit granted to them
by the bank. Users pay an annual interest rate of approximately 10 percentage points
on their used overdraft amount, which the bank charges once per quarter. The mobile
app provides daily updated information on users’ accrued interest costs. Customers
can turn on push notifications that remind themwhenever their account balance turns
negative and they start using the overdraft. The bank cancels the mobile credit line
if users default on their interest payments, receive unemployment benefits, or experi-
ence direct debit reversals.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
Our sample consists of users who received an overdraft between February 2015 and
September 2017. We focus on individuals that the bank classifies as main account users
based on their consumption and inflow history to alleviate the concern that customers
might have additional accounts with other banks, which we cannot observe directly.
Main account users are individuals that receive a regular monthly salary or incoming
standing order into their mobile checking account for at least two consecutive months.
Prior research shows that European bank clients satisfy approximately 70% of their
daily consumption needs through their primary salary account and that the majority
of individuals only has one bank account (Bain, 2017; ING, 2018). As a result, our
consumption and overdraft data cover most if not all financial activities that main
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account users carry out via their mobile bank account. In a set of robustness analysis,
we show that our results do not change if we use other thresholds or alternative filters
to screen out users who are unlikely to be main account users.
For all the users in our sample, we first obtained detailed transaction-level con-
sumption data, credit line information, and personal user characteristics from the
bank. Specifically, we received information about the type, amount, and timestamp of
all financial transactions that pass through users’ checking accounts between Febru-
ary 2015 and March 2019. To protect users’ identity, the bank rounded all transaction
amounts to the nearest Euro and only provided us with the day but not the exact time
of each transaction. Our raw dataset contains 58,310,004 individual financial transac-
tions, which we aggregate into user-month observations. Each within-user time series
starts with the month in which the user signed up on the mobile app, verified her
identify, and the bank opened the account, and ends with the closing of the account or
the last month of our sample period (March 2019). We code observations of our flow
variables as zero if the user did not have any corresponding financial transaction in
the given month.
An important feature of the transaction-level data is the classification of financial
transactions into categories, which the bank provided to us. The first classification
consists of six broad categories based on the transaction method: (i) cash deposits
and withdrawals, (ii) incoming or outgoing wire transfers within the Single Euro Pay-
ments Area (SEPA), (iii) foreign wire transfers from or to non-SEPA countries, (iv)
direct debit withdrawals (including reversals), (v) bank-imposed fees, and (vi) card-
based electronic payments. In a second classification, which captures the scope of each
transaction, the bank categorizes each debit-card payment into one of seventeen mer-
chant category code (MCC) groups, based on the vendor that receives the payment.
MCC groups specify the vendor’s industry and allow us to identify which type of
product or service the account holder purchased. The seventeen MCC groups cover a
broad range of users’ consumption spending and include both discretionary (e.g., en-
tertainment, shopping, or gastronomy) and non-discretionary consumption categories
(e.g., groceries, family, or utilities/furniture).
In addition to the transaction-level data, we obtained data on the activation and us-
age of credit lines. This dataset contains granular information about the application
date, the granted overdraft amount, and activating users’ financial characteristics. We
observe all user-specific input parameters that enter the bank’s credit allocation algo-
rithm, including each individual’s credit score, employment status, regular salary, and
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other credit-relevant inflows.
Since the bank shared the precise inner workings of its overdraft granting process
with us, we are able to perfectly replicate the credit allocation decision for all mobile
credit line users in our sample. Moreover, the credit-line dataset contains the complete
history of all overdraft setting changes that users made once the credit facility was
activated.
Finally, the bank provided us with additional data on the demographic and personal
information of each main account user. We obtained data on users’ gender, year of
birth, and residential zip code. To ensure data anonymity, the bank did not share the
name, address, or precise date of birth of account holders.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for our main overdraft sample. We define all
the variables we use in the empirical analysis in Appendix Table C.1. We trim all ratios
that involve consumption-related variables at the 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate the
impact of outliers due to data errors or extreme values.5
Our final dataset contains 603,157 user-month observations for 36,005 unique indi-
viduals who obtained amobile credit line between February 2015 and September 2017.
As is common in FinTech settings,6 the user base of the bank consists primarily of male
millennials who live in urban areas. The average user in our sample is 34 years old,
has monthly inflows of 2,220 Euros, and opened the mobile bank account 1.6 years
ago. Female users represent about one fifth (21%) of the sample, and about half of the
users live in large cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (53%).
In terms of spending, all overdraft users combined spent a total of 441 million Euros
via their mobile checking account over our sample period. On average, these individ-
uals consumed 48% of their monthly inflows, of which approximately two thirds are
attributable to electronic card transactions and the remainder is cash consumption. For
each Euro that users spent electronically on non-discretionary goods, they purchased
61 cents of discretionary items. Main account users had access to the bank’s mobile
overdraft facility in 91% of all user-months. The average maximum overdraft amount
5We obtain similar results when we instead winsorize our regression variables at the 5th and 95th
percentile or when we use alternative trimming approaches (e.g., trimming at the 1% level in each
tail).
6For instance, see D’Acunto et al. (2019), Gargano and Rossi (2018), D’Acunto et al. (2019), and
D’Acunto and Rossi (2020).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
User Age [Years] 603,157 34.07 9.93 23.91 27.00 31.49 38.66 48.91
Female [0/1=Yes] 603,157 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Urban [0/1=Yes] 603,157 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Account Age [Years] 603,157 1.57 0.86 0.47 0.88 1.49 2.18 2.78
Overdraft Available [0/1=Yes] 603,157 0.91 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Overdraft Amount [Euro] 574,328 1,561.38 1,602.05 500.00 500.00 1,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00
Consumption [Euro] 603,157 730.81 949.42 0.00 131.00 465.00 993.00 1,715.00
Inflows [Euro] 603,157 2,219.84 5,948.55 90.00 380.00 1,124.00 2,534.00 4,564.00
Consumption / Inflows [%] 603,157 48.11 44.89 0.00 13.88 37.24 70.08 108.00
Card Consumption [Euro] 603,157 498.58 736.64 0.00 67.00 281.00 646.00 1,206.00
Card Consumption / Inflows [%] 603,157 33.80 37.17 0.00 6.49 22.12 47.85 84.72
Cash Withdrawals [Euro] 603,157 220.92 400.55 0.00 0.00 90.00 300.00 600.00
Cash Withdrawals / Inflows [%] 603,157 13.44 19.56 0.00 0.00 5.33 19.27 40.00
Discretionary [Euro] 603,157 208.36 419.58 0.00 1.00 70.00 242.00 550.00
Non-Discretionary [Euro] 603,157 290.22 469.75 0.00 26.00 159.00 373.00 692.00
Discretionary / Non-Discretionary [%] 484,683 61.03 79.26 0.00 7.66 34.41 82.45 155.17
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for our user-month panel. The sample consists of 36,005
users that received an overdraft between February 2015 and September 2017 and covers each individ-
ual’s complete transaction history from February 2015 to March 2019. For each variable, we report the
number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (P10), 25% quantile (P25),
median (P50), 75% quantile (P75), and 90% quantile (P90). We define all variables in Appendix C.1.
equals 1,561 Euros.
3.4 The Effect of Mobile Overdrafts on Users’
Spending Behavior
In this section, we first assess how the average user changes her spending behavior
once she activates the overdraft facility on her mobile phone. We then move on to
document a set of heterogeneity results in users’ response to the availability of the
credit line. We find that users with higher ratios of deposits to income flows are the
ones reacting the most in terms of increasing their spending after they obtain access to
the overdraft facility.
Our baseline analysis considers individuals’ monthly consumption expenditures
and uses a double-differences (DD) design. The DD estimator compares changes in
the level of spending around the activation of mobile overdrafts between individuals
that already have and those that do not have access to the credit line yet. We restrict
the analysis to mobile overdraft users only to address the endogeneity of being eligi-
ble for the overdraft facility, which by construction depends on a set of demographic
characteristics that might be correlated with changes in spending patterns over time.
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Moreover, the DD design allows us to address the concern that individuals who never
activate the overdraft despite being eligible might differ systematically from active
users based on unobserved characteristics. These characteristics might also predict
spending patterns over time, such as users’ inattention to their financial situation or
the possibility that some individuals use the bank account only for the purpose of
depositing their money but do not use it for regular consumption activities.
The baseline DD design does not account for the possibility that unobserved shocks
at the individual level determine the timing of users’ overdraft activation and spend-
ing patterns over time. We tackle this concern directly later in the paper in two ways.
First, we repeat the analysis after restricting the sample to users who activated the
overdraft facility in the first month in which the bank made it available. The concern
of endogenous timing of activation is less compelling in this subsample because these
users could not foresee this option well in advance before activation. Second, we pro-
pose a sharp RDD that only compares users at the time they activate their facilities,
relative to before.
Despite the potential endogeneity of the timing of activation, we use the DD design
for the baseline analysis because this design allows us to assess potential channels
driving the consumption response in the full sample. Instead, by construction, the
RDD is based on estimating local treatment effects among a restricted subsample of
users in the overall population, based on their closeness to the regression discontinuity
we exploit.
3.4.1 Overall Consumption Expenditure Response
For our DD analysis, we estimate the following OLS regression model:
Consumption Spendingi,t = β ×Overdraft Availablei,t + Fixed Effectsi,t + εi,t. (3.1)
The dependent variable is the sum of all cash withdrawals and debit-card transactions
by individual i in month t, divided by the amount of the user’s account inflows in
month t− 1. Our main variable of interest, Overdraft Available, is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile overdraft facility in the given month.
We include user fixed effects to absorb time-invariant systematic differences in con-
sumption spending patterns across overdraft users, such as differences in occupation,
gender, cultural background, or education. We also include NUTS 3 × year-month
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fixed effects to account for concurrent but unrelated time-varying economic or insti-
tutional changes within local sub-national districts called NUTS 3 in the European
Union, which correspond to US counties.
We draw statistical inferences based on double-clustered standard errors at theNUTS
2 region and year-month levels because consumption patterns are likely correlated
cross-sectionally and over timewithin close-by locations. We use a broader geographic
definition for the spatial clustering of standard errors because the NUTS 2 level, which
corresponds roughly to the state level in the US, fully subsumes the NUTS 3 level in
the EU’s administrative classification. This level of clustering is more conservative
than NUTS 3 because it allows for correlation of unknown form across the residuals
not only across users in the same county but also across users in neighboring counties
that belong to the same region. Because cross-sectional residuals of decision units are
typically positively correlated across space, the NUTS 2 level of clustering is also more
conservative than clustering standard errors at the individual level. We verify this
claim directly by repeating our baseline estimations separately using different levels
of clustering, including different geographic partitions and individual-level cluster-
ing, and indeed we find that the confidence intervals around our point estimates are
wider when we cluster at the NUTS 2 level than at the individual level (see the bottom
right panel of Figure 3.6).
In Table 3.2, we present the estimated effects of mobile overdraft availability on con-
sumption behavior. Column (1) documents an average positive effect of mobile over-
drafts on users’ monthly consumption expenditures. In terms of magnitude, overall
cash and card-based consumption normalized by the user’s lagged account inflows
increases by 4.572 percentage points (t-statistic: 11.11), which corresponds to an in-
crease of approximately 9.5% relative to the pre-treatment sample mean (4.572/48.11).
In columns (2) and (3), we differentiate between cash withdrawals, that is, cash spend-
ing, and debit-card spending. We find that account holders increase their spending
significantly through both payment types. In relative terms, the increase in card-based
spending (coefficient: 3.152; t-statistic: 9.71) is larger than the increase in cash with-
drawals (coefficient: 1.345; t-statistic: 7.73) and accounts for approximately 70% of
users’ overall consumption response. Finally, in column (4), we study the change in
the ratio between discretionary and non-discretionary spending and find that users in-
crease their discretionary spending by 2.9% relative to their non-discretionary spend-
ing.
Apart from users’ timing to activate the overdraft, we can interpret our DD esti-
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Table 3.2: Effect of Overdraft Availability on Users’ Consumption Behavior
Dependent Variable (×100): ConsumptiontInflowst−1
Card Consumptiont
Inflowst−1
Cash Withdrawalst
Inflowst−1
Discretionaryt
Non-Discretionaryt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overdraft Availablet 4.572∗∗∗ 3.152∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 2.902∗∗∗
(11.11) (9.71) (7.73) (5.38)
Economic Effect Size: 9.503% 9.325% 10.007% 4.755%
Fixed Effects:
User Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS 3 × Year-Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
NUTS 2 48 48 48 48
Year-Month 49 49 49 50
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.300 0.339 0.185
User-Year-Month Observations 603,157 603,157 603,157 484,683
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates of OLS regressions estimating the effect of mobile over-
draft facilities on users’ consumption behavior (equation (3.1)). Consumption is the sum of users’ Card
Consumption and Cash Withdrawals in the given month. Card Consumption is the user’s total amount
of electronic card consumption. Cash Withdrawals is the user’s total amount of cash withdrawals from
ATMs in the given month. Inflows is the total amount of all incoming transactions a user receives in the
given month. Discretionary is the sum of users’ monthly spending on Entertainment, Shopping, Gas-
tronomy, and Travel. Non-Discretionary consumption equals Card Consumption minus Discretionary
spending. Overdraft Available is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile over-
draft in the given month. We compute the Economic Effect Size as the pre-treatment average of each
outcome variable multiplied by the corresponding coefficient estimate. We report t-statistics based on
standard errors double-clustered at the NUTS 2 and year-month level in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
mates causally only subject to the assumption that the spending behavior of treated
and control users would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the activation
of the credit line. This parallel-trends assumption is not testable, but we can directly
assess whether the spending behavior of treated and control users followed parallel
trends before the shock. In Figure 3.2, we provide graphical evidence that treated and
control users have parallel and almost identical consumption patterns during the time
period leading up to the mobile overdraft activation. Treated users sharply increase
their spending during the first twomonths in which they have access to the credit line.
Subsequently, the treatment effect stabilizes at around 2% higher consumption relative
to inflows and does not fully revert in the long run. We can reject the null hypothesis of
no differences between the spending of treated and control users throughout the sam-
ple period and at any horizons we observe in the data after activation. As we discuss
below, these baseline effects mask substantial heterogeneity—some groups of users
face a permanent spending effect of the overdraft facility, whereas the effect dissipates
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Figure 3.2: Consumption Pattern around Overdraft Availability
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Notes: This figure shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for OLS regres-
sions estimating the effect of mobile overdrafts on users’ consumption behavior. We estimate
model (1) from Table 3.2 but replace the Overdraft Available indicator with separate time dum-
mies, each marking a one-month period (except for event period t− 1).
over time for other users.
3.5 Heterogeneity and Perceived Precautionary
Savings
Our results so far have focused on average effects across users. To investigate the eco-
nomic channels behind the baseline results and to assess the extent to which existing
models might explain them, we study the heterogeneity of the baseline consumption
effect in the cross-section of users (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2017).
The observational data we have do not include direct information on a set of char-
acteristics that are crucial to assess the relevance of different models, such as risk aver-
sion, bequest motives, and beliefs. This lack of information typically makes it hard for
empirical studies to pin down channels. To solve this problem, we exploit the unique
feature that our FinTech bank can communicate with users through the online app
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to elicit preferences and beliefs directly through a survey instrument. This elicitation
is a methodological contribution of our paper and the main reason for why the Fin-
Tech nature of the lender with which we cooperate is central to our analysis. Without
the FinTech app interface, accessing traditional bank users to elicit characteristics di-
rectly would require either inviting these individuals to a human-subjects laboratory
or sending surveys via mail or phone call, which would limit substantially the scope
and possibility of the intervention. We see our paper as one of the very first papers
that emphasize the potential for using app-based online bank settings to elicit char-
acteristics of borrowers that would otherwise be barely observable in most real-time
studies of borrowing and spending.
3.5.1 Consumption Smoothing? Income Growth and Age
We start by assessing the heterogeneity of the baseline effect across two characteristics
we can observe in the field data, that is, (i) the growth of income inflows 6 months
after overdraft activation relative to 6 months before activation, and (ii) users’ age.
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) suggests that agents want to smooth their
consumption over time. Empirically, income paths are increasing early in life before
flattening out. Hence, the PIH predicts that younger users and users with a steeply
increasing income path are more likely to use the overdraft facility to smooth their
consumption and borrow against their higher future income to increase their spending
on impact relative to other users.7
To assess this prediction, we split the sample into quintiles based on the two observ-
able characteristics listed above. We then repeat the baseline DD analysis of Equation
(3.1) adding a set of interactions between an indicator for whether the user belongs to
the quintile of the respective characteristic and our overdraft treatment variable. To
make the results easier to visualize, in Figure 3.3 we report the estimated coefficients
and 95% confidence intervals for each interaction term in graphical form.
The left panel reports the effects across quintiles of income growth. The estimated
effect does not exhibit any systematic difference for users in the bottom two quintiles
compared to users in the top two quintiles, and we do not reject the null hypothesis
that the effect is equal across all of the quintiles.
7Not only the level but also the uncertainty of the future income path might be relevant to predict
spending (Guiso et al., 1992). We tackle this point directly below using past income volatility as well
as with a survey instrument to elicit uncertainty about future income flows.
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Figure 3.3: Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing?
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ consumption response to the
mobile overdraft. To generate these plots, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile) based on
the underlying user characteristic. We then interact each of the 5 quintile indicators with a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile overdraft in the given month. Vertical bands
represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates of each quintile. We double cluster standard
errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
In the right panel of Figure 3.3, we split the sample into quintiles by age. Despite the
fact that our users are on average younger than the broader population, we still detect
substantial differences in age between the bottom quintile and the top quintile, whose
averages are about 20 and 45 years. We can plausibly argue that users across these
quintiles are on different consumption life-cycle paths. The bottom panel of Figure
3.3, though, vividly shows the lack of heterogeneity of the baseline effect across the
age distribution. In terms of magnitudes, we estimate coefficients that range between
3% and 4% in each quintile. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
effects are the same across all quintiles at any plausible level of significance and, if
anything, the point estimates are slightly larger for older users, who plausibly face
more stable income processes.
3.5.2 Liquidity Constraints? Deposits over Income Flows
Next, we consider the potential role of liquidity constraints in explaining our results
(Deaton, 1991). For this analysis, we split the sample by quintiles based on the deposits-
to-inflows ratio in the month before activation. We use deposits to inflows as a proxy
for liquidity constraints. If liquidity constraints explained our results, we would ex-
pect that users with lower deposits-to-inflows ratios would increase their spending
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Figure 3.4: Consumption Response by Deposit-to-Inflows Quintile
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ consumption response to the
mobile overdraft. To generate this plot, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile) based
on the deposits-to-inflows ratio in the month before treatment. We then interact each of the 5 quintile
indicators with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile overdraft in the given
month. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates of each quintile. We
double cluster standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
and tap into negative deposits after accessing the overdraft facility, whereas otherwise
similar users with high deposits-to-inflows ratios would barely react.
Figure 3.4 reports the results for estimating the interaction coefficients across quin-
tiles of deposits to inflows. We detect substantial heterogeneity, but the heterogeneity
of the effects goes in the opposite direction to what liquidity constraints would predict.
In fact, the effect of overdraft availability on spending is (insignificantly) negative for
users in the bottom quintile—the most liquidity-constrained users—and is zero for
those in the second quintile. The effect increases nonlinearly and is disproportionally
higher the higher the quintile. The estimated effect is about 2% for users in the third
quintile, 5% in the fourth quintile, and 12% in the top quintile. It is the least liquidity-
constrained users who increase their average spending more after having access to the
overdraft facility relative to before.
This pattern is not an anomaly peculiar to users in the top quintile by liquidity: the
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Figure 3.5: Consumption Pattern by Deposit-to-Inflows Quintile
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Notes: This figure shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for OLS regressions estimat-
ing the heterogeneous effect of mobile overdrafts on the consumption behavior of users with different
ex-ante liquidity. To generate this plot, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile) based on
the deposits-to-inflows ratio in the month before treatment. We estimate model (1) from Table 3.2 but
replace the Overdraft Available indicator with separate time dummies, which we further interact with
our quintile indicators. Each time dummy marks a one-month period (except for event period t − 1).
Coefficients are normalized by subtracting the pre-treatment mean for each quintile. We double cluster
standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
positive effect is economically and statistically significant for the median user, and is
large also for users in the third and fourth quintiles, which suggests the effect we un-
cover involves the majority of the sample. We also want to stress that while liquidity-
constrained users, the users in quintile 1, do not increase their consumption on average
after the activation, they do so on impact in the month post activation and decrease
their spending slightly in subsequent months (see Figure 3.5).
In Figure 3.5, we report the estimated coefficients across the deposit-to-inflows quin-
tiles over time. The blue dashed line reports the estimated coefficients for users in the
top quintile by deposits to inflows, the red solid line refers to users in the first quintile,
and grey lines refer to users in other quintiles. Users in every quintile increase their
consumption spending on impact to the availability of the credit line. However, we
also see that users in the top quintile increase their spending more than others on im-
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pact and that these users increase their spending permanently, that is, their spending
does not revert to the pre-activation level over time. We do detect the same permanent
effect for users in the fourth quintile, whereas the increase in spending reverts to zero
for other users. Importantly, we detect no difference in spending patterns across users
before the overdraft facility becomes available.
These consumption patterns suggest that the more liquid users might decrease their
savings rate after accessing the overdraft facility, and that this decrease is permanent
rather than transitory. We assess this mirroring conjecture by plotting the dynamics of
the savings rate across quintiles of liquidity (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix).8 And,
indeed, we find that the savings rate of the most liquid users drops permanently after
they get access to the overdraft facility. We do not observe the same permanent pattern
for the least liquid users, as well as for users in all other quintiles except for the fourth
liquidity quintile.
At first sight, the results in Figures 3.4, 3.5, and C.1 are puzzling: the association
between users’ pre-overdraft liquidity and their spending after overdraft activation
seems to go in the opposite direction of what wewould have expected under a liquidity-
constraints explanation. Before digging deeper into the drivers of this empirical regu-
larity, we perform a large set of robustness tests to verify this pattern is a robust feature
of the data.
First, in Figure 3.6, we assess the robustness of the consumption pattern by liquidity
quintile across a set of relevant subsamples and specifications. In the top left panel,
we compare the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for the baseline speci-
fication and a second specification in which we additionally include interaction terms
for (i) user age, (ii) inflow growth in the six months before and after overdraft avail-
ability, and (iii) inflow volatility in the twelve months prior to the overdraft treatment.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across specifications
either economically or statistically.
In the top right panel of Figure 3.6, we compare the baseline effect in the full sample
of users to the results when we restrict the working sample only to users with an
active account for at least 12 months before the overdraft became available. This test is
relevant because one might be concerned that users who drive our effect were merely
opening an account to take advantage of the overdraft facility. These users might plan
tomake larger purchases andmovemoney from other accounts into the online account
8We thank Greg Buchak for suggesting that we directly compute the savings rate and examine its
evolution over time.
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Figure 3.6: Robustness Tests
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Notes: The plots follow the methodology of Figure 3.4. In the top left panel, we additionally control
for user characteristics at treatment (overdraft available interacted with user age, inflows growth and
inflows volatility at treatment). In the top right panel, we keep only users that had an account with the
bank for at least 12 months before they activated the overdraft facility. In the middle left panel, we focus
on users who exhibit an average consumption rate of at leastX%over the sample period where we vary
X from 40 to 70. In the middle right panel, we group users into quintiles based on the average deposits-
to-inflows ratio from 12 until 3months before treatment. In the bottom left panel, we focus on users who
activate the overdraft at the introduction date and compare them to users who activate the overdraft at
least one year after the introduction. In the bottom right panel, we provide baseline regression results
for various standard error clusterings. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point
estimates of each quintile. Except for the bottom right panel, we double cluster standard errors at the
NUTS 2 and year-month level.
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resulting in large savings to deposits and large spending responses. As expected, the
estimates are substantially noisier in the smaller sample of long-term users, but we
replicate our baseline results.
The middle panels of Figure 3.6 consider two forms of measurement error that
would be problematic in our setting. First, we do not know whether the financial
transactions we observe are all the transactions of our sample users because we can-
not rule out for sure that these individuals have accounts at other banks. To alleviate
this concern, we repeat the analysis restricting our sample to users whose average
spending with our bank equals at least 40%, 50%, 60%, or 70% of their monthly in-
come.9 Our point estimates are similar and remain statistically significant when we
increase this threshold despite the drop in the number of observations.10
Second, in the middle right panel of Figure 3.6, we consider the robustness of our
results with respect to the definition of our sorting variable—deposits over inflows.
Specifically, we assess whether the consumption-liquidity pattern differs depending
on whether we sort users based on the ratio measured in the month before the over-
draft treatment or the one-month period starting 3 months before activation. We find
no detectable difference in the baseline results which ensures that transfers into the
account immediately before activation due to future spending plans cannot drive the
patterns we document.
In the bottom panels, we show (i) that the statistical significance of our results barely
changes across different levels of clustering and (ii) that our results remain robust
whenwe restrict the sample to users who activate the overdraft at the first introduction
of the overdraft product by the bank to alleviate the concern that users open accounts
with the intention to activate the overdraft.11
To further assess the robustness of the baseline consumption responses based on
deposits to inflows, in Figure 3.7 we compare the estimated coefficients by quintiles
across alternative demographic groups to check whether observables might drive the
baseline relationship. This test is relevant because it could still be the case that in-
dividuals in the top quintiles by deposits to income might have characteristics that
according to the PIH would predict a larger consumption response to the availabil-
ity of credit despite the fact that we do not observe that these characteristics matter
9We thank Greg Buchak for suggesting this robustness test.
10As an additional (untabulated) test, we exclude all users who have any incoming or outgoing wire
transfers other than direct income deposits, which might capture individuals who have other ac-
counts at different institutions. Even in this case, the results barely change.
11We thank Michaela Pagel for suggesting these robustness tests.
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Figure 3.7: External Validity
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ consumption response to the
mobile overdraft for various sample splits. To generate these plots, we take the cross-section of users at
their treatment date and assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest
(5th quintile) based on the deposits-to-inflows ratio. We then interact each of the 5 quintile indicators
with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile overdraft in the given month.
Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates of each quintile. We double
cluster standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
unconditionally. Irrespective of whether we compare users who (i) live in European
regions (NUTS 1) with above or belowmedian savings rates (top left panel), (ii) reside
in former communist countries or not (top right panel), (iii) live in rural versus urban
areas (bottom left panel) 12, or (iv) are young versus old (bottom right panel), we fail
to detect any systematic differences in the baseline pattern.
Overall, the fact that users with higher deposits-to-inflows ratios spend more after
they have access to the overdraft is a robust feature of the data.
12We define urban users as those who live in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants.
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3.5.3 Evidence on Objective Drivers of Precautionary Savings
In the standard life-cycle model, several individual characteristics, which are typi-
cally unavailable in observational field data, could predict the spending reaction to
overdraft availability. For instance, systematic differences in users’ risk aversion, time
preferences, beliefs about life expectancy, or bequest motives might drive these results.
Moreover, expecting imminent large expenses due to unobserved health reasons, other
unobserved reasons, as well as private information about the probability of becoming
unemployed and hence having more volatile income streams in the future might all
contribute to the observed consumption effects (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Chetty
and Szeidl, 2007; Carroll, 1997).
These dimensions either predict larger precautionary savings motives due to pref-
erence heterogeneity for a given level of objective uncertainty or might translate into
differences in precautionary savings due to subjective needs. Once the overdraft fa-
cility becomes available to these users, it might act as a form of insurance and trigger
higher spending because users know they can now tap into negative deposits using
the overdraft facility if a shock occurs.
In addition to these precautionary savings motives, one can think of other channels
that could explain users’ willingness to spend liquid assets after they obtain access
to the overdraft. For instance, agents might have low financial literacy and might be
unable to optimize their allocation of resources over time. Alternatively, users might
be distrustful of others and hence display a precautionary savings motive that is not
based on their financial characteristics.
In Figure 3.8, we consider two dimensions that might predict differential precau-
tionary savings motives across liquidity quintiles, which we can directly measure in
our data. First, we consider age in the left panel. Age increases monotonically with the
bins by deposits-to-income inflows, ranging from 31.4 to 35.1. Although the difference
between the fifth and first bin is statistically different from zero, the magnitude of this
difference is less than 10% of the average age in the top bin. More importantly, though,
the typical precautionary savings explanation would suggest that younger users have
higher precautionary savings motives because these users are likely to have more un-
certain income paths, might expect higher future income growth, might face less em-
ployment stability, and might still not be in the workforce at all.
Second, we test whether income uncertainty drives our results in the right panel.
Specifically, we average the standard deviation of income inflows over the 12 months
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Figure 3.8: User Characteristics by Deposits-to-Inflows Quintile
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ characteristics by deposits-to-
inflows quintile. To generate these plots, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile) based on
the deposits-to-inflows ratio in the month before treatment. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence
intervals for the mean of each quintile.
before overdraft facility activation within bins. We do not detect any systematic pat-
tern or difference between the bottom and top bin by deposits to income. This fact is
prima facie evidence that differences in income uncertainty do not justify why users
in the top bin behave as if they have stronger precautionary savings motives.
We also report descriptive statistics by bins of deposits to inflows in Panel A of
Table 3.3. We do not find large differences in demographics such as age or gender.
Moreover, we find that lower outflows drive the higher deposits of users with high
liquidity rather than higher inflows or higher levels of deposits twelve months ago.
3.5.4 Eliciting Preferences, Beliefs, and Motivations
Considering the other dimensions we discussed in the previous section requires elic-
iting users’ preferences, beliefs, and motivations. To make progress on this front, in
June and July 2019 we fielded a survey intervention that we designed to elicit users’
risk and time preferences, a large set of beliefs, motivations, perceptions, as well as
financial literacy and generalized trust.
Users could answer the elicitation survey either when using the app on their desk-
top or on their mobile phones. We sent 73,000 survey invitations, targeting a response
rate between 10% to 15%, based on other surveys the FinTech bank ran on the platform
in the recent past. Overall, we obtained 7,901 responses to the survey, which represents
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Table 3.3: User Characteristics by Deposits-to-Inflows Quintile
Panel A: Users’ Financial Characteristics
Deposits / Inflows Quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 SD
Flow Characteristics
Cumulative Inflowst−12:t−1 11,491.77 13,381.19 14,930.03 10,580.58 10,753.34 16,980.36
Inflowst−1 1,270.25 1,775.88 1,882.12 1,779.34 1,293.43 3,961.29
Inflowst−12:t−1 957.65 1,115.10 1,244.17 881.71 896.11 1,415.03
SD(Inflowst−12:t−1) 836.63 941.74 1,191.37 793.55 901.77 1,635.70
SD(Consumptiont−12:t−1) 392.22 369.24 380.01 307.52 267.60 367.89
Cumulative Outflowst−12:t−1 11,778.41 13,135.22 13,767.61 9,589.49 7,774.88 15,500.42
Deposit Characteristics
Depositst−1 39.45 451.87 1,128.83 1,715.09 4,163.05 8,520.52
Depositst−12 283.02 320.74 468.30 434.86 627.48 1,225.21
Depositst−12:t−1 273.90 459.46 729.29 814.87 2,012.25 2,432.76
Negative Depositst+1:t+3 0.65 0.41 0.29 0.19 0.10 0.47
Account Characteristics
User Aget 31.35 32.25 32.69 33.15 35.05 9.89
Female 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.41
Urban 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.47 0.50
Account Aget 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.71 0.36
Users 1,909 1,909 1,910 1,908 1,909 9,545
Panel B: Users’ Subjective Beliefs
Deposits / Inflows Quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 SD
Risk Aversion [0-10] 5.13 4.63 4.47 4.65 4.72 2.31
Trust Level [0-10] 5.29 5.74 5.53 5.31 5.47 2.15
Risk-Return Category [1-4] 2.88 2.85 3.03 2.93 2.86 0.74
Patience [> 100] 118.98 119.07 119.45 121.96 117.48 17.42
Likelihood of Large Expenses [0-10] 4.13 4.29 4.48 4.46 4.80 2.63
Likelihood of Large Medical Expenses [0-10] 2.32 2.26 2.32 2.50 2.45 2.29
Likelihood of Losing Job [0-10] 1.34 1.15 1.41 1.14 1.29 2.12
Health Satisfaction [0-10] 6.99 7.28 7.16 7.02 7.41 2.21
Reasons for Saving [1-4] 2.20 2.26 2.23 2.35 2.29 0.98
Basic Financial Computation Ability [1-3] 2.85 2.72 2.82 2.70 2.69 0.56
Life Expectancy [number] 83.37 85.57 84.70 83.06 83.13 10.63
Users 96 141 112 114 136 599
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of user characteristics and survey responses. Panel A
provides descriptive statistics for users at the time of overdraft activation, sorted into quintiles based
on the ratio of deposits over inflows in the month before activation of the overdraft facility. Subscript t
refers to the activation date of each user in our sample. The last column reports the standard deviation
of the corresponding characteristic across all users. Panel B reports a set of preferences and beliefs
dimensions we elicited from users through an ad-hoc survey intervention. We take the cross-section of
users at their treatment date and assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile)
to highest (5th quintile) based on the ratio of deposited amount over income. We limit the sample to
users that activate the overdraft facility in our main sample.
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a response rate of 11%, in line with survey-based studies. Of the 7,901 respondents,
we kept the survey outcomes of users for which we observe the activation of the over-
draft facility during our sample period. Overall, we obtain 597 survey responses from
users that belong to the baseline consumption sample and have activated the overdraft
facility within our time frame.13
Importantly, when we approached users, we did not disclose that the aim of the
intervention was to link their answers to spending behavior around the introduction
of the overdraft facility. Being silent about the overdraft facility was crucial to reduce
the concern of experimenter demand effects—the possibility that subjects guess the
aim of the experiment and align their answers and choices correspondingly.
The issue of experimenter demand effects is one of the strongest concerns faced by
experimental economics and survey-based elicitation tools, as discussed recently, for
instance, by De Quidt et al. (2018). Because we did not refer to the overdraft facility
in any way within our survey, it is implausible that users would understand that the
scope of the experiment was to assess the drivers of their spending and borrowing
behaviors and hence could manipulate their answers to our questions. A drawback
of the lack of direct reference to the overdraft facility experience is that we could not
ask users directly for the motivations they had to activate and use the facility. Be-
cause of the issue of demand effects, the answers to such a direct question would have
been barely interpretable anyway due to strategic motives in users’ answers (see, e.g.,
D’Acunto, 2018, 2019).
We designed the survey questions following earlier research. We elicited risk aver-
sion by asking users to rank their willingness to take on risks in financial matters on a
scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high) (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 2008; D’Acunto et al.,
019b,c). For time preferences, we gave users a hypothetical choice between a certain
amount at the time of the survey or increasing amounts one month later (see, e.g., Ben-
jamin et al., 2010; Coibion et al., 2019). To elicit expectations about upcoming large ex-
penses, we asked users to rank their probability of facing large consumption expenses
or large medical expenses over the following 12 months (D’Acunto et al., 019a). We
elicited similar rankings for users’ expectations about the possibility of losing their job
over the following 12 months, which aims to capture uncertainty about future income
flows (Guiso et al., 1992), users’ satisfaction with their health conditions, and users’
generalized trust towards others (see, e.g., Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Guiso et al.,
2004; D’Acunto et al., 2018). To elicit users’ financial literacy, we asked them to as-
13We report the original survey questions in Appendix Table C.2.
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sess whether the amount that would compound in their checking account at a certain
interest rate would be above or below a given value (see, e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell,
2011). Among the potential questions the literature proposed for assessing financial
literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014), the ability to understand compounding is most
relevant for our setting in which we study the borrowing and spending behavior of
bank customers that consider the use of a credit line.
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the results for the basic preferences, beliefs, and motiva-
tions we elicited. We sort users into five quintiles based on their deposits-to-inflows
ratio before accessing the overdraft facility. We then compute the average quantita-
tive response of these users to the elicitation questions within each bin, which we plot
together with the 95% confidence interval of the mean in each quintile in Appendix
Figure C.3.
Across the dimensions we elicited, we fail to detect any systematic patterns in the
cross-section of liquidity. None of the dimensions we consider, which could have
explained the responses in Figure 3.4 in a standard life-cycle consumption–savings
model, seems to be able to capture such patterns. Not only are the averages within
quintiles not different from each other statistically, but they are also similar in terms
of economic magnitude, which suggests that low statistical power in the small survey
sample is unlikely to drive the lack of variation across quintiles.
Overall, our evidence based on elicited preferences, beliefs, andmotivations directly
dismisses the most compelling standard channels that would justify a spending in-
crease by liquid users but not illiquid users once the overdraft facility becomes avail-
able to them.
3.5.5 The Perceived Precautionary Savings Mechanism
The heterogeneity results suggest a pattern whereby users with higher liquidity (cash
deposits) over income react more than others to the activation of the overdraft facility
in terms of spending. This pattern is intriguing because we might have expected the
most liquid users to be those that had the least need for an overdraft facility if they
wanted to spend more before activation. In contrast, if the overdraft facility is mainly
used to smooth spending and alleviate liquidity constraints, users in the bottom liq-
uidity quintile should react most.
Alternatively, users might accumulate liquidity over time because of the perception
of possible future needs. Therefore, sorting users at the time of the overdraft acti-
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vation corresponds to sorting users based on their perceived need of precautionary
savings. So far, comparing bins by deposits-to-inflows ratios does not suggest that
users in the top bin have any objective reason to have stronger precautionary savings
motives than users in the lower bins. We now assess whether users in the top bin also
behave in line with precautionary savers in terms of using the overdraft, apart from
increasing consumption spending after activating the overdraft facility. Precautionary
savers, contrary to liquidity-constrained individuals, would likely not tap into nega-
tive deposits and would not increase their debt levels through the overdraft facility.
Instead, they should view the facility as a form of insurance against negative income
shocks or unexpected expenses and would thus spend some of the existing liquid-
ity they had accumulated before the overdraft facility was available once they knew
they could tap into negative deposits if needed. Hence, we would expect a permanent
increase in the consumption spending of these high deposits-to-inflows users and a
decrease in the savings rate as we indeed observe in the data.
The results in Figure 3.4 are broadly consistent with users in the top liquidity bin
behaving as if they had strong precautionary-savings motives. First, these users are
substantially less likely than users in lower bins to tap into negative deposits after
activation, despite increasing their consumption spending substantially more relative
to the pre-period than these other users. The probability of tapping into negative de-
posits in the three months after activation ranges from 67% for users in the bottom
bin to 10% for users in the top bin. Moreover, it is unlikely that a large fraction of the
individuals in our sample have objective precautionary savings motives due to po-
tentially unexpected large medical bills or other medical-related expenses because the
75th percentile of age in our sample equals 38.7 years.
A potential concern with our interpretation is that users decide they want to pur-
chase big ticket items and move cash to the deposit account at our bank before they
activate the overdraft facility. However, in the data we do not observe heterogeneity in
the cumulative inflows at our bank in the three months before activation by deposits
to inflows. Moreover, we test directly for this potential alternative interpretation by
comparing the change in the ratio of spending on big ticket items over total spend-
ing before and after activation of the overdraft facility and across users by liquidity
quintiles.14 Figure C.2 in the Appendix reports the change in this ratio across liquid-
ity quintiles and unveils that, in fact, the ratio has barely changed economically and
14For this test, our definition of big ticket items refers to purchases of goods and services which cost
above 5,000 Euros. The results are similar if we change this threshold.
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statistically for most users. In particular, the change does not display the monotonic
pattern by liquidity that we should observe if this explanation was relevant to our
results.
Overall, users with a high share of deposits to inflows and hence high liquidity be-
have as if they had precautionary savings motives and hence accumulated savings
and saved a larger share of their income before the overdraft facility became available
to them. Once they have access to the overdraft facility which acts like an insurance
for additional future spending needs, possibly due to unexpected expenses or income
shortfalls, they increase consumption spending. These users, though, do not display
any of the characteristics that are typically associated with individuals that have pre-
cautionary savings motives, such as high income volatility or higher risk aversion.
Based on these considerations, we label the mechanism we document in this paper as
perceived precautionary savings.
3.5.6 Alternative Explanations and Channels
We move on to consider a set of additional potential alternative interpretations of
our results. First, the facility might free up liquid resources users were keeping in
their bank accounts because of private information about upcoming individual in-
come shocks. In this vein, even models of buffer-stock savings that allow for both im-
patience and precautionary savings motives might explain our results at least in part.
Our heterogeneity results do not seem fully consistent with this interpretation for a
set of reasons. Income uncertainty decreases with age and the heterogeneity results
by age we discuss above are not consistent with this form of precautionary-savings
motive. Moreover, we find the pre-activation volatility of income flows does not pre-
dict the reaction to the availability of credit. Also, as discussed above, users close to
the liquidity constraint do not react on average post activation, whereas those farther
away from the constraint react the most, and the buffer-stock interpretation predicts
the opposite pattern.
A second potential explanation is a buffer-stock model with durable consumption
similar to the one Aydin (2015) studies. However, a set of results suggests this inter-
pretation cannot fully explain the results in our setting. In addition to the facts that the
least liquidity-constrained users react the most and that we do not see any differential
reaction based on pre-activation income volatility, we find users that react the most on
average do not tap into negative deposits and hence de facto never use the facility.
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A third interpretation we consider is present-biased preferences—the fact individu-
als discount the distant future bymore than they discount the immediate future (Meier
and Sprenger, 2010). This interpretation by itself is unlikely to explain all our results,
because if the individuals that react the most to overdraft activation were present-
biased, they would have consumed out of their higher deposits even before activating
the overdraft facility, which we do not observe in the data.
Contrary to the alternative explanations we have discussed in this section, the per-
ceived precautionary savings channel is consistent with the baseline facts we docu-
ment as well as with the fact that users at the top of the distribution by deposits over
income flows react the most to the activation of the overdraft facility.
At first, our results might appear inconsistent with a large literature documenting
users that are most constrained ex-ante react the most to the extension of credit (see,
e.g., Agarwal et al., 2017; Aydin, 2015; Gross and Souleles, 2002). The major differ-
ence between these studies and our paper is that earlier studies exploited changes in
the intensive margin of credit, that is, changing the extent of credit for agents who
were already borrowing. We, instead, focus on the extensive margin of credit, that
is, providing users with a borrowing facility for the first time. The insurance effect
of first-time borrowing facilities could not be detected in earlier research even if this
effect was true because all the agents in earlier work were already provided with in-
surance around the change in credit limits. The insurance mechanism did not change
within agents over time in intensive-margin studies reconciling our work with previ-
ous findings in the literature.
In our setting, users that previously were most concerned about future unexpected
expenses or had higher precautionary savings demands for other reasons that we cap-
ture by sorting on deposits to inflows seem to react the most to the provision of a
downside insurance mechanism—the overdraft facility.
3.6 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
An important identification concern with our analysis so far is the endogenous timing
at which users open their accounts. One might worry that users activate the account
only when they foresee the need for an overdraft facility, for instance when they plan
to have larger-than-usual upcoming expenses.
We provide tentative evidence that this endogeneity concern might not be as rele-
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vant in our setting as one might worry. To do so, we repeat our tests by restricting the
sample only to users who activated their overdraft facility within one month after the
online bank made it available.15 The rationale for this test is that users who activate
the facility as soon as it is available might be less likely to have planned to activate
it in view of large upcoming expenses because they could not know the fact that the
bank would have provided such facility nor the timing. We report the results for this
test in Figure 3.6 (bottom left panel). Although this test restricts the baseline sample
substantially, and hence increases our estimated standard errors, the baseline spend-
ing patterns by liquidity quintiles are quite similar to the baseline analysis in terms
of economic magnitudes, and the coefficients for the two top quintiles, just like in the
baseline analysis, are statistically different from zero.
Despite this evidence, one might worry that other omitted variables might simulta-
neously impact users’ consumption behavior and overdraft activation decision, giving
rise to a spurious relation between the two. One example for such a correlated omitted
variable might be time-varying, user-specific exposure to television commercials that
independently advertise the bank’s overdraft, and various consumer products, even
for users who have been banking with our provider for quite some time and hence do
not open new accounts.
To directly address these endogeneity concerns, in this last part of the paper we es-
timate the causal effects of the availability of the mobile overdraft on spending in a
sharp RDD that exploits variation in users’ overdraft limits based on thresholds em-
bedded in the bank’s credit allocation algorithm. Our sharp RDD conditions the anal-
ysis on users’ (possibly endogenous) selection into the mobile overdraft and relies on
exogenous variation in the size of the credit line along the intensive margin.
We do not implement this design for the baseline analysis of the paper because we
can only exploit a limited number of users in the sample for the RDD setting. By con-
struction, as we discuss in more detail below, the RDD only uses users who are close to
pre-specified thresholds based on the algorithm that assigns the overdraft amount to
those activating an overdraft facility. Because of the limited sample, any meaningful
statistical analysis of heterogeneity and variation across subgroups of users would be
impossible.
15We thank Michaela Pagel and Greg Buchak for suggesting this test.
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3.6.1 Credit Allocation Algorithm
The bank’s credit allocation process consists of two steps. First, the bank determines
whether users pass all exclusion criteria and are thus eligible for a mobile credit line.
Overdraft applicants receive a credit line if they (i) are employed, (ii) live in countries
where the bank offers a mobile overdraft, (iii) have a minimum credit score of F , and
(iv) if their checking account did not trigger any direct debit reversals. The bank ob-
tains credit scores from consumer credit bureaus, which collect information on users’
credit histories to estimate default probabilities and assign individual credit ratings
from A (lowest default risk) to M (highest default risk). A credit score of F implies
that the individual has an estimated default probability of less than 10 percent.
Second, the bank determines the maximum overdraft amount for each eligible user
based on the applicant’s credit score and average account income according to the
following formula:
Overdraft Amount =

Max Limit if 2× Income ≥Max Limit
Min Limit if 2× Income ≤Min Limit
250× b2×·Income
250
e otherwise,
(3.2)
where bxe rounds the number x to the nearest integer.
For each rating notch between A and F, the bank specifies a lower (Min Limit) and
upper limit (Max Limit) for each user’s allocated credit amount. Income is a linear
function of the user’s different inflow types in the months prior to the overdraft ap-
plication. Our data sharing agreement with the bank does not allow us to report the
rating-specific overdraft limits or the precise formula that transforms users’ account
inflows into income. However, we can disclose that the bank differentiates between
regular salary and non-salary related inflows (e.g., pensions, child benefits, study sup-
port from parents, etc.) and puts a higher weight on the former. The lower and upper
overdraft limits monotonically increase in the customer’s credit rating and range be-
tween 500 and 5,000 Euros.
To determine each user’s maximum available overdraft amount, the bank’s fully au-
tomated credit allocation algorithm multiplies the Income variable by 2. If the result-
ing value exceeds (falls below) the upper (lower) credit limit, the maximum overdraft
amount is bounded from above (below) by the rating-specific limit. If the doubled
income falls between the upper and lower limit, the amount is rounded to the closest
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250 Euro multiple at the midpoint. Panel A of Figure 3.9 illustrates the rounding con-
vention embedded in the credit algorithm. For example, if overdraft applicant A has a
salary of 2,100 Euros and no additional account inflows, her implied overdraft amount
after multiplying the income by 2 equals 4,200 Euros which, if rounded to the closest
250 Euro threshold, translates into a maximum available overdraft amount of 4,250
Euros (assuming that the upper and lower credit limits do not bite). The bank’s credit
allocation process gives rise to 18 unique thresholds within the interval between 500
and 5,000 Euros, at which the maximum overdraft amount jumps discontinuously by
250 Euros. At these thresholds, users with almost identical incomes who find them-
selves on opposite sides of the rounding threshold receive different overdraft limits
for plausibly exogenous reasons. Crucially, users are not aware of the algorithm and
the algorithm is fully automated leaving no room for human intervention.
3.6.2 Empirical Implementation
We limit our analysis to users whose maximum overdraft amount equals the indi-
vidual’s income multiplied by two and rounded to the nearest multiple of 250. That
is, we drop all users whose transformed income exceeds or falls below the upper or
lower credit limit (within the given rating notch) such that the rounding thresholds
embedded in the bank’s credit allocation algorithm do not affect the maximum over-
draft amount. For each user in our RDD sample, we compute the forcing variable Xi,
which quantifies the individual’s distance (in Euros) to the nearest rounding thresh-
old. Xi removes differences in absolute rounding thresholds across individuals and is
centered around zero. Users with Xi ≥ 0 are treated and receive a maximum over-
draft amount that is 250 Euros higher than those of control users for whom Xi < 0.
The probability that a user’s overdraft limit gets rounded up by 250 Euros changes
discontinuously from 0 to 1 at the rounding threshold. Panel B of Figure 3.9 illustrates
the exact treatment rule of our sharp RDD and plots users’ treatment assignment for
different values of the forcing variable Xi. In areas close to the rounding threshold
(where Xi = 0), treated and control users have almost identical income profiles.
To examine the causal effect of mobile credit lines on users’ consumption behavior,
we implement the following sharp RDD
τ ≡ E (Ci(1)|Xi = 0)− E (Ci(0)|Xi = 0) . (3.3)
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τ is the RD treatment effect and Ci(1/0) is the change in treated (1) or control (0) users’
average consumption three months before and after the credit allocation decision, di-
vided by the individual’s average inflows in the three months prior to the overdraft
application. To estimate this model, we fit a weighted least squares regression of the
observed consumption change on a constant and polynomials of Xi on both sides of
the rounding threshold. The RD treatment effect is the difference in estimated inter-
cepts from these two local weighted regressions. Formally, each user’s consumption
change equals
Ci =
Ci(0) if Xi ≥ 0Ci(1) if Xi < 0. (3.4)
We focus on observations within the interval [−h, h] around the rounding threshold,
where h > 0 denotes our bandwidth. The kernel functionK(·) specifies our regression
weights. µˆ+/− is the estimate of E (Ci(1/0)|Xi = 0) for observations above or below the
threshold, which we define as:
Cˆi = µˆ+/− +
p∑
j=1
µˆ+/−,jX
j
i . (3.5)
p denotes to the order of the local polynomial. The RD treatment effect then equals:
τˆ = µˆ+ − µˆ−. (3.6)
To operationalize the RD estimator, we need to specify (i) the order of polynomial
p, (ii) the kernel function K(·), and (iii) the bandwidth h. We follow Gelman and
Imbens (2018) and only use polynomials of order 1 and 2 to avoid overfitting issues.
We apply weights from a triangular kernel because it is the mean squared error (MSE)
minimizing choice for point estimation in our context (Cheng et al., 1997). Finally, we
employ the MSE-optimal bandwidth selection procedure recommended by Calonico
et al. (2014), which corrects for the bias resulting from subjective bandwidth choices.
We residualize the outcome variables of our RD analysis with NUTS 3 × year-month
fixed effects to ensure that we compare treated and control users from the same Euro-
pean country at a similar point in time.
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3.6.3 Treatment Manipulation and Balancing Tests
Our sharp RDD critically relies on the assumption that the forcing variable for indi-
viduals just below the threshold is similar to those just above the threshold. If users
can manipulate the forcing variable and thereby their assignment to treatment and
control groups, this local continuity assumption is violated, which results in biased
RD estimates (Roberts and Whited, 2013).
Conceptually, it is unlikely users can control their treatment assignment in our set-
ting. Most importantly, the bank’s credit allocation algorithm is proprietary informa-
tion and overdraft users do not know it. Even if individuals were informed about the
precise inner workings of the overdraft allocation formula (in particular its rounding
thresholds), it seems implausible they could precisely manipulate their income, for
example, by negotiating a higher wage with their employer (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
To formally assess the validity of the local continuity assumption, we test for the
presence of a discontinuity in the density ofXi at the rounding threshold. If users sys-
tematically inflate their income to receive a higher overdraft limit, we should observe a
kink in the distribution of our forcing variable to the right of the threshold. We use the
local polynomial density estimator of Cattaneo et al. (2017) to test whether overdraft
users manipulate their assignment into treatment and control group. In Appendix
Figure C.4, we plot both the frequency distribution (Panel A) and density function
based on quadratic local polynomials (Panel B) of our running variable and do not
find graphical evidence for bunching above the rounding threshold. In Figure C.5 in
the Appendix, we report the estimation results of the formal treatment manipulation
test by Cattaneo et al. (2017) for different polynomial and bandwidth choices. In all
specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that our running variable is locally
continuous around the rounding threshold.
The local continuity assumption implies individuals below and above the cutoff
should not only be similar in terms of the forcing variable but also along other char-
acteristics. Since overdraft users lack the ability to precisely manipulate their distance
to the rounding threshold, no systematic differences in observable characteristics be-
tween the two groups of individuals should exist. Consistent with this argument, we
do not find significant differences in the average age, gender, time since account open-
ing, account inflows, and consumption between treated and control users prior to the
activation of the mobile overdraft. As an alternative balancing test, we repeat our RD
analysis but replace our main outcome variable with each observable user character-
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Figure 3.9: Treatment Assignment in Regression Discontinuity Analysis
Panel A: Rounding Logic of Overdraft Allocation Algorithm
2·Income
4,0003,875 4,125 4,250 4,375
Rounded DownRounded Up
Rounded to 4,000 Rounded to 4,250
Panel B: Visualization of Sharp Treatment
Rounded Down
Threshold
Rounded Up
-100 -50 0 50 100
Distance to Threshold
Notes: This figure illustrates how we assign users to the treatment and control groups in our regres-
sion discontinuity analysis based on discrete rounding thresholds embedded in the bank’s credit risk
model. Panel A visualizes the rounding logic of the overdraft allocation algorithm. Panel B plots users’
treatment probability for different values of our forcing variable Xi.
111
3 Perceived Precautionary Savings Motives: Evidence from FinTech
Table 3.4: Assessing RDD Identification Assumptions
Panel A: Treatment Manipulation Tests
Bandwidths EffectiveN Test
Left Right Left Right T -Stat. p-Value
h− 6= h+
T2(hˆ1) 104.17 76.21 373 328 -0.94 0.35
T3(hˆ2) 75.73 82.98 285 345 -0.85 0.39
T4(hˆ3) 89.01 55.32 322 221 0.39 0.70
h− = h+
T2(hˆ1) 111.32 111.32 424 448 -0.05 0.96
T3(hˆ2) 71.59 71.59 248 289 -0.51 0.61
T4(hˆ3) 58.32 58.32 201 229 -0.59 0.56
Panel B: User Characteristics around Rounding Thresholds
Rounded Up Rounded Down Difference in Means
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Diff. t-Stat.
User Age [Years] 32.32 9.34 29.91 33.02 10.12 30.37 0.70 1.13
Female [0/1=Yes] 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 -0.01 -0.35
Account Age [Years] 0.87 0.38 0.83 0.85 0.41 0.79 -0.01 -0.53
Inflowst−3:t−1 [Euro] 1,405.64 1,530.10 1,101.67 1,458.92 1,454.29 1,069.67 53.28 0.56
Consumptiont−3:t−1 [Euro] 558.89 522.39 427.17 620.04 597.38 482.83 61.14
∗ 1.70
Users 500 474 974
Notes: This table provides the results of tests assessing our RDD identification assumptions. Panel A
reports the results of treatment manipulation tests using the local polynomial density estimator by
Cattaneo et al. (2017). Tq(hp) denotes the q-th order local polynomial test with bandwidth hp. Bandwidth
is the mean-squared-error (MSE) optimal bandwidth, Effective N is the effective sample size on each side
of the threshold, and T is the two-sided test statistic with corresponding p-value. The tests in the first
three rows allow for different bandwidths on each side of the threshold, while the tests in the last
three rows impose a common bandwidth on both sides of the threshold. Panel B provides descriptive
user characteristics for individuals above (Rounded Up) and below (Rounded Down) the RD rounding
threshold. For each variable, we report the mean, standard deviation (SD), and median (P50) values. In
the last two columns, we test for differences in means across both types of users. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
istic. In Table C.4 of the Appendix, we document that the RD treatment effect for all
our covariates is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Overall, the evidence in this subsection indicates that overdraft users do not manip-
ulate their treatment assignment and that individuals above and below the rounding
threshold have similar observable characteristics. Both findings suggest the local con-
tinuity assumption is satisfied and thereby corroborates the internal validity of our
sharp RD design.
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Figure 3.10: Regression Discontinuity Results
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Notes: This figure provides graphical evidence for the sharp discontinuity in users’ overdraft limits and
consumption growth rates at the rounding threshold. In Panel A, we plot the income-normalized over-
draft limit that users receive at the treatment date. In Panel B, we plot users’ consumption growth rate,
which we define as the difference in average consumption three months before and after the treatment,
normalized by the average account inflows three months prior to the overdraft application. We aggre-
gate our data into 12 disjoint bins, calculate the average value, plot this value above the midpoint of
each bin, and separately fit two linear regressions through all observations on each side of the rounding
threshold.
3.6.4 RD Consumption Effect
In Figure 3.10, we graphically illustrate the RD treatment effect of a 250 Euro higher
overdraft limit on users’ consumption behavior. We aggregate our data into disjoint
bins and make sure each bin contains either treatment or control observations. We
then calculate the average value of our outcome variable, plot this value above the
midpoint of the bin, and separately fit two linear regressions through all observations
on each side of the rounding threshold.
In Panel A of Figure 3.10, we verify that individuals just above the threshold indeed
receive a higher maximum overdraft amount (relative to their income) compared to
users just below the threshold. The slope of both fitted regression lines is negative
since, within treatment and control group, individuals with larger values of our forc-
ing variableXi have a higher income, whichwe use to normalize users’ overdraft limit.
In Panel B, we plot the change in average (normalized) consumption three months af-
ter and before the user obtained access to the credit line. We find a positive discontinu-
ity in users’ consumption growth right at the rounding threshold, indicating treated
users consume more relative to control users following the exogenous assignment of a
250 Euro higher overdraft limit. In Table 3.5, we present the coefficients from estimat-
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Table 3.5: Consumption Growth around Rounding Thresholds
Dependent Variable (×100): Consumptiont+1:t+3−Consumptiont−3:t−1Inflowst−3:t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conventional 17.63∗∗ 23.48∗∗ 17.96∗∗ 23.70∗∗
(2.19) (2.20) (2.12) (2.34)
Robust 21.56∗∗ 26.52∗∗ 21.83∗∗ 26.62∗∗
(2.37) (2.31) (2.31) (2.46)
Covariates No No Yes Yes
User Observations 876 876 876 876
Order Local Polynomial (p) 1 2 1 2
Order Bias (q) 2 3 2 3
Bandwidth Left 25.47 35.89 23.98 36.86
Bandwidth Right 25.47 35.89 23.98 36.86
Notes: This table presents non-parametric estimates for the RD treatment effect of a 250 Euro higher
overdraft amount on users’ consumption behavior. The dependent variable is the difference in average
consumption three months before and after the treatment, normalized by the average account inflows
three months prior to the overdraft application. We residualize users’ consumption growth rate with
country × year-month fixed effects to ensure that we compare treated and control users from the same
European country at a similar point in time. We only use polynomials of order 1 and 2 to avoid over-
fitting issues (Gelman and Imbens, 2018), apply weights from a triangular kernel because it is the mean
squared error (MSE) minimizing choice (Cheng et al., 1997), and employ the MSE-optimal bandwidth
selection procedure recommended by Calonico et al. (2014). We report both conventional and robust
RD estimates (Calonico et al., 2014, 2019). In columns (1) and (2), we do not add any covariates. In
columns (3) and (4), we control for User Age, gender (Female), and Account Age. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
ing the sharp RD design we formalized in Equations (3.3) to (3.6). We estimate first-
and second-order polynomial regressions at the rounding threshold and report both
bias-corrected and conventional t-statistics (Cattaneo et al., 2017; Gelman and Imbens,
2018). In columns (1) and (2), we document a positive and highly statistically signifi-
cant RD treatment effect on users’ consumption growth. The coefficient estimates do
not attenuate when we add user characteristics as control variables in a linear and
additive-separable way. In line with Calonico et al. (2019), we find adding covariates
increases the precision of our point estimates, which again suggests the local continu-
ity assumption is satisfied.
We conduct two robustness tests to assess the sensitivity of our RD estimates. First,
we examine how sensitive the RD results are with respect to the choice of our band-
width (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Varying the bandwidth is only meaningful over
small intervals around the MSE-optimal choice (Cattaneo et al., 2020). Bandwidths
much larger than the MSE-optimal bandwidth bias the RD estimator, while substan-
tially smaller bandwidths inflate its variance. Figure C.6 in the Appendix shows that
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different bandwidth choices neither substantially affect the magnitude of the point es-
timate nor its significance. Second, we assess how robust our RD point estimates are
to excluding data close to the threshold (see, e.g., Barreca et al., 2011, 2016). We drop
users located within the radius r > 0 of the rounding cutoff, that is, we exclude ob-
servations for which |Xi| ≤ r (Cattaneo et al., 2020). Appendix Figure C.7 plots the
coefficient estimates for different choices of r and shows that observations close to the
rounding threshold do not drive our results. Taken together, the RD results confirm
our baseline findings and alleviate concerns that selection into the app to obtain access
to a line of credit in anticipation of upcoming expenses drive our results.
3.7 Conclusion
We study the consumption response to the introduction of an overdraft facility on
a FinTech app. The average user increases her consumption spending over income
by 4.5 percentage points on impact relative to similar users that have access to the
overdraft facility at a later point in time. The increase in consumption has a permanent
component and we observe a reallocation of consumption from discretionary to non-
discretionary expenses.
The surprising result is that we find a large spending response for users with high
liquid savings, whereas the users with the lowest amount of liquid savings barely re-
act at all to the provision of the overdraft facility. We do not detect any heterogeneity
in preferences or beliefs across liquidity quintiles nor heterogeneity in standard theo-
retical drivers of precautionary savings motives. These results are not fully consistent
with myopic consumers, models with financial constraints, buffer stock models (with
durables), and the canonical life-cycle permanent income model.
When we study heterogeneity in the response by observables, we observe a similar
response for young and old users, for users with low and high income volatility, and
for users with steep and flat income paths.
We argue that a perceived precautionary savings channel might be at work for users
with high deposits over inflows. Before the facility is available, they perceive high
income risk or future expenses and consequently save. Once the overdraft facility is
available, which acts like an insurance against future shortfalls, they increase their
consumption substantially but in fact barely make use the overdraft facility.
Our findings open new paths for future research. What are the microfoundations
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of perceived precautionary savings motives? In particular, does this attitude result
from biased beliefs about the likelihood of future negative states of the world. Or
can modified versions of the neoclassical consumption model predict the patterns we
uncover? In terms of policy and real-world applications, do perceived precautionary
savings change the effectiveness of conventional fiscal policy such as tax rebates? And
could policies be designed to insure perceived precautionary savers in bad times and
nudge them to spend their cash in times in which higher aggregate demand is needed?
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A Appendix to ‘Crowdfunding and
Demand Uncertainty’
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is essentially the same as in Harris and Raviv (1981). Let
γ∗(v) = (x∗(v), t∗(v)) be a solution to the entrepreneur’s problem in (1.36). Given
this solution, there are N ! − 1 other solutions which are the same as γ∗(v) except that
the consumers are rearranged, that is, the elements of v are rearranged. Since prob-
lem (1.36) is a linear program, any convex combination of solutions again yields a
solution to problem (1.36). Averaging over all these N solutions therefore yields again
a solution which leads to the same payoffs as γ∗(v).
Proof of Lemma 2. To see t∗1(0,v−1) = 0 notice that any positive transfer violates the in-
dividual rationality constraint of consumer 1with a valuation of zero. To see x∗1(0,v−1) =
0, suppose x∗1(0,v−k) = 1 holds. Lowering x∗1(0,v−1) to zero then increases the en-
trepreneur’s objective by pi(0,v−1)c while it also relaxes all other constraints where it
enters.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that vr1 denotes the report of consumer 1 and vr−1 denotes
the reports of all consumers other than consumer 1. In line with the incentive compati-
bility condition assume that vr−1 = v−1, that is, all other consumers than consumer 1 re-
port truthfully. The ‘punish them all’ mechanism states that x1(vr1,v−1) = t1(vr1,v−k) =
0 and xk(vr1,v−1) = tk(vr1,v−k) = 0 for all k ∈ N if vr1 /∈ v−k (i.e., the entrepreneur does
not produce unless all consumers with a positive valuation report the same valuation).
Next, I verify that this punishment can be used to sustain full rent extraction in all four
possible scenarios of the expected net surplus.
First, consider the case where only the demand states (nH , vH) or (nL, vH) (or both)
yield positive profits. The entrepreneur extracts the full surplus by setting t1(vL,v−1) =
x1(vL,v−1) = 0, t1(vH ,v−1) = vH and x1(vH ,v−1) = 1. All viable demand states receive
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financing, but consumers with a low valuation never receive a product, whereas con-
sumers with a high valuation never receive an information rent.
Second, consider the case where both demand states (nH , vH) and (nH , vL) yield
positive profits. The entrepreneur extracts the full surplus by setting, in addition
to the above requirements, t1(vL,v−1) = vL, x1(vL,v−1) = 1, t1(vH ,v−1) = vH and
x1(vH ,v−1) = 1 as long as nH consumers report either vL or vH . As long as the other
consumers report truthfully, truth-telling is also weakly optimal for individual 1 and
all incentive and individual rationality constraints are satisfied with equality.
Third, consider the casewhere the three demand states (nH , vH), (nH , vL) and (nL, vH)
yield positive profits. The entrepreneur extracts the full surplus by setting t1(vL,v−1) =
vL and x1(vL,v−1) = 1 if nH consumers report vL, or t1(vH ,v−1) = vH and x1(vH ,v−1) =
1 if nL nH consumers report vH . Again, as long as the other consumers report truth-
fully, truth-telling is weakly optimal for individual 1 and all consumer constraints are
satisfied with equality.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 1 and 2, no consumer with a positive valuation has an
incentive to report a zero valuation as they do not receive any product. I am left with
analyzing whether a consumer with valuation vL has an incentive to report vH , and
vice-versa, given his beliefs about other consumers’ reports. I consider three types of
beliefs:
(a) All other consumers with a positive valuation report a different valuation than
consumer 1, that is, vr1 /∈ vr−1.
(b) Some other consumers with a positive valuation report a different valuation than
consumer 1, while the remaining other consumers with a positive valuation re-
port the same valuation as consumer 1, that is, vr1 = vr−1 for some vr−1 ∈ vr−1 with
vr−1 > 0.
(c) All other consumers with a positive valuation report the same valuation as con-
sumer 1, that is, vr1 = vr−1 for all vr−1 ∈ vr−1 with vr−1 > 0.
To see part (i) of the Lemma, consider the individual rationality constraint of con-
sumer 1 with vL which implies t∗1(vL,vr−1) = vLx∗1(vL,vr−1) for all vr−1. The incen-
tive compatibility constraint of consumer 1 with vL then reduces to t∗1(vH ,vr−1) ≥
vLx
∗
1(vL,v
r
−1) for all vr−1. Truthful reporting is hence weakly optimal for consumer
1with valuation vL regardless of his beliefs about vr−1.
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To see parts (ii) and (iii), I plug t∗1(vL,vr−1) = vLx1(vL,vr−1) into the incentive com-
patibility constraint of consumer 1 with a high valuation, which yields t∗1(vH ,vr−1) =
vHx
∗
1(vH ,v
r
−1) − (vH − vL)x∗1(vL,vr−1) and satisfies both the individual rationality con-
straint of consumer 1with vH and the inequality t∗1(vH ,vr−1) ≥ vLx∗1(vL,vr−1) as long as
x∗1(vH ,v
r
−1) ≥ x∗1(vL,vr−1). Again, truthful reporting is weakly optimal for consumer 1
with valuation vH for all possible beliefs about vr−1.
Finally, note that t∗1(vH ,vr−1) = vHx∗1(vH ,vr−1) can only be a solution if x∗1(vL,vr−1) = 0
as it implies both t∗1(vL,vr−1) ≥ vHx∗1(vL,vr−1) through the incentive compatibility con-
straint of consumer 1with valuation vH , as well as t∗1(vL,vr−1) ≤ vLx∗1(vL,vr−1) through
the individual rationality constraint of consumer 1with vL. Combining both inequali-
ties yields a contradiction except if t∗1(vL,vr−1) = x∗1(vL,vr−1) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by considering the four possible scenarios of
the expected net surplus and deriving the conditions under which the entrepreneur
optimally implements first-best allocations using the belief-robust mechanism.
First, consider the case where only the demand states (nH , vH) or (nL, vH) (or both)
yield positive profits. The entrepreneur maximizes profits and extracts the full sur-
plus by setting t∗1(vL,vr−1) = x∗1(vL,vr−1) = 0, t∗1(vH ,vr−1) = vH and x∗1(vH ,vr−1) = 1.
All viable demand states receive financing, but consumers with a low valuation never
receive a product, whereas consumers with a high valuation never receive an infor-
mation rent. The mechanism exhibits truthful behavior of all consumers for all beliefs
vr−1 (by Lemma 3) and implements first-best allocations in this case.
Second, consider the case where both demand states (nH , vH) and (nH , vL) yield pos-
itive profits. The entrepreneur chooses between setting t∗1(vL,vr−1) = t∗1(vH ,vr−1) = vL
or t∗∗1 (vH ,vr−1) = vH and t∗∗1 (vL,vr−1) = 0. While the former entails first-best production
decisions x∗1(vL,vr−1) = x∗1(vH ,vr−1) = 1 and expected profits
E [Π(γ∗(v))] = pin [nH(vL − c)− I] , (A.1)
the latter involves x∗∗1 (vL,vr−1) = 0 and x∗∗1 (vH ,vr−1) = 1 with expected profits
E [Π(γ∗∗(v))] = pinpiv [nH(vH − c)− I] . (A.2)
The entrepreneur therefore strictly prefers to implement first-best allocations in this
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case, if Equation (A.1) exceeds Equation (A.2), that is, if
(1− piv) [nH(vL − c)− I] > pivnH (vH − vL) . (A.3)
Again, both strategies are consistent with Lemma 3.
Third, consider the casewhere the three demand states (nH , vH), (nH , vL) and (nL, vH)
yield positive profits. If the entrepreneur sets t∗∗∗1 (vL,vr−1) = t∗∗∗1 (vH ,vr−1) = vL and
x∗∗∗1 (vL,v
r
−1) = x
∗∗∗
1 (vH ,v
r
−1) = 1, then she receives expected profits
E [Π(γ(v)∗∗∗)] = pin [nH(vL − c)− I] (A.4)
and demand state (nL, vH) does not get financing. If the entrepreneur chooses t∗∗1 (vL,vr−1) =
x∗∗1 (vL,v
r
−1) = 0, t∗∗1 (vH ,vr−1) = vH and x∗∗1 (vH ,vr−1) = 1, then she receives
E [Π(γ∗∗(v))] = pinpiv [nH(vH − c)− I] + (1− pin)piv [nL(vH − c)− I] (A.5)
and demand state (nH , vL) does not get financing. To finance all demand states and
implement first-best allocations, the entrepreneur may use the transfer schedule
t∗1(v
r
1,v
r
−1) =
vL if (vr1 = vL or vr1 = vH) and nH consumers report vr1 > 0vH if (vr1 = vH) and nL consumers report vH (A.6)
and production decisions
x∗1(v
r
1,v
r
−1) = 1 if nL consumers report vH or nH consumers report v
r
1 > 0, (A.7)
which yields an expected profit of
E [Π(γ∗(v))] = pin [nH(vL − c)− I] + (1− pin)piv [nL(vH − c)− I] . (A.8)
Clearly, (A.8) always dominates (A.4) but strictly dominates (A.5) only if
(1− piv) [nH(vL − c)− I] > pivnH (vH − vL) . (A.9)
The entrepreneur hence prefers to charge the high price and only produce for con-
sumers with high valuations if this condition is violated. If this condition is satisfied,
on the other hand, then the entrepreneur optimally implements first-best allocations.
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To conclude the proof, observe that consumers only receive the information rent
vH − vL in state (nH , vH) and if the entrepreneur chooses the mechanism that imple-
ments first-best allocations, while consumers with valuation vL never receive any sur-
plus.
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B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of the lemma is an application of Equation (2.2) in Barndorff-
Nielsen et al. (1982).
Proof of Theorem 1. First, note that the characteristic function in Lemma 4 yields the
first moment µr of the returns as
Et
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
= (−i) ∂
∂u
ϕrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u)
∣∣∣∣
u=0
= δb,st e
iuδb,st mτ
(
iuµst −
1
2
u2(σst )
2
)
+ eiuδ
b,s
t m′τ
(
iuµst −
1
2
u2(σst )
2
)(
µst + iu(σ
s
t )
2
) ∣∣∣∣
u=0
= δb,st + Et(τ)µst , (B.1)
sincemτ (0) = 1 andm′τ (0) = Et(τ) by definition of the moment-generating function.
In the spirit of Arditti (1967) and Scott and Horvath (1980), we express the expected
utility of the arbitrageur by a Taylor expansion which results in a function of the
higher-order moments of the return distribution. A Taylor expansion of a general
utility function Uγ(r) around the mean µr yields
Uγ
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
U
(k)
γ (µr)
k!
(
rb,s(t:t+τ) − µr
)k
, (B.2)
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where U (k)γ (µr) := ∂
k
∂µkr
Uγ (µr). Then, taking expectations yields
Et
(
Uγ
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
))
= Uγ (µr) +
∞∑
k=2
U
(k)
γ (µr)
k!
Et
((
rb,s(t:t+τ) − µr
)k)
. (B.3)
Following Markowitz (1952), we next consider a first-order Taylor expansion for the
CE.We thus implicitly assume that the risk premium, µr−CE, is small and that higher-
order moments vanish:
Et
(
Uγ
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
))
= Uγ (CE) = Uγ (µr) + U
′
γ (µr) (CE − µr) . (B.4)
Moreover, the first-order Taylor expansion provides a convenient closed-form approx-
imation of the certainty equivalent which is linear in the moments of the return distri-
bution. We obtain the equation in the theorem by equating (B.3) and (B.4), plugging in
(B.1), and solving for CE.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof follows directly from applying Theorem 1 together with
the derivatives of the isoelastic utility function which yields
dst −
1
2
γ
dst
(σst )
2Et (τ)− 1
8
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)
(dst)
3
(σst )
4Et
(
τ 2
)
= 0. (B.5)
Details regarding the moment-generating function of the returns are provided in Ap-
pendix B.4. Then, by Descartes’ rule of signs there is exactly one positive real root to
the polynomial
(dst)
4 − 1
2
γ(σst )
2Et (τ) (dst)2 −
1
8
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)(σst )
4Et
(
τ 2
)
= 0. (B.6)
All four solutions of the quartic polynomial are given by
dst = ±
1√
2
√
γ
2
(σst )
2Et (τ)±
√
γ2
4
(σst )
4Et (τ)2 +
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)
2
(σst )
4Et (τ 2). (B.7)
However, since
γ
2
(σst )
2Et (τ) <
√
γ2
4
(σst )
4Et (τ)2 +
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)
2
(σst )
4Et (τ 2) (B.8)
holds for all γ > 0, σst > 0 and Et (τ 2) > 0, the unique positive real root is given by the
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expression in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6. The Taylor representation of Uγ(r˜) yields for ρ∗ := log
(
1+ρb,A(q)
1−ρs,B(q)
)
:
Et (Uγ(r˜)) = δb,st + Et(τ)µst − ρ∗
+
∞∑
k=2
U
(k)
γ
(
δb,st + Et(τ)µst − ρ∗
)
k!U ′γ
(
δb,st + Et(τ)µst − ρ∗
)Et((rb,s(t:t+τ) − ρ∗ − δb,st − Et(τ)µst)k) .
(B.9)
Let dst be the arbitrage boundary (in absence of transaction costs) as defined in Equa-
tion (2.8). Then, dst + ln
(
1+ρb,At (q)
1−ρs,Bt (q)
)
is a root of the function
F˜ (d) :=d+ Et(τ)µst − ρ∗
+
∞∑
k=2
U
(k)
γ (d+ Et(τ)µst − ρ∗)
k!U ′γ (d+ Et(τ)µst − ρ∗)
Et
((
rb,s(t:t+τ) − ρ∗ − d− Et(τ)µst
)k)
. (B.10)
Therefore, Et (Uγ(r˜)) is positive if and only if
δb,st > d
s
t + ln
(
1 + ρb,At (q)
1− ρs,Bt (q)
)
. (B.11)
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof directly follows from Lemma 6 and Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 8. We cast the arbitrageur’s optimization problem in terms of the La-
grangian
L(q, f ; ξ) =Bst (1− ρs,B(q))q + Abt(1 + ρb,A(q + f))(q + f)
− ξ
(
dst(f)− δb,st + log
(
1 + ρb,A(q)
)− log (1− ρs,B(q))) (B.12)
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and observe that the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions imply
q = 0 ∨ Bst
(
(1− ρs,B(q))− ρs,B′(q)q
)
− Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q + f)) + ρb,A
′
(q + f)(q + f)
)
− ξ
(
ρb,A
′
(q + f)
1 + ρb,A(q + f)
− ρ
s,B′(q)
1 + ρs,B(q)
)
= 0 (B.13)
f = 0 ∨ − Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q + f)) + ρb,A
′
(q + f)(q + f)
)
− ξ
(
d
df
dst(f) +
ρb,A
′
(q + f)
1 + ρb,A(q + f)
)
= 0 (B.14)
ξ = 0 ∨ dst(f)− δb,st
+ log
(
1 + ρb,A(q + f)
)− log (1− ρs,B(q)) = 0. (B.15)
We first consider the case of ξ = 0. Conditions (B.13) and (B.14) now become
q = 0 ∨ Bst
(
(1− ρs,B(q))− ρs,B′(q)q
)
− Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q + f)) + ρb,A
′
(q + f)(q + f)
)
= 0 (B.16)
f = 0 ∨ − Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q + f)) + ρb,A
′
(q + f)(q + f)
)
= 0, (B.17)
which only holds if
1 + ρb,A(q + f) = −ρb,A′(q + f)(q + f). (B.18)
Since ρb,A′(q + f) > 0 by Assumption 4, this cannot be the case for any q > 0 or f > 0.
Also note that ξ = q = f = 0 implies a contradiction. Therefore, constraint given in
Equation (2.16) cannot be slack at the optimum and there does not exist a candidate
solution for ξ = 0.
Next, we turn to the analysis of ξ > 0. The simple case of q = 0 does not deliver any
positive returns and it does not make sense for the arbitrageur to pay any fee f > 0.
If anything, the arbitrageur would prefer not to trade at all, that is, q = f = 0. We are
left with the two interesting cases of q > 0.
For f = 0, the KKT conditions give the candidate solution {q1, f1, ξ1} as solutions to
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the system of equations
Bst
(
(1− ρs,B(q1))− ρs,B′(q1)q1
)
− Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q1)) + ρ
b,A′(q1)(q1)
)
−ξ1
(
ρb,A
′
(q1)
1 + ρb,A(q1)
− ρ
s,B′(q1)
1 + ρs,B(q1)
)
= 0 (B.19)
dst(f1)− δb,st + log
(
1 + ρb,A(q1)
)− log (1− ρs,B(q1)) = 0 (B.20)
f1 = 0. (B.21)
For f > 0, we can get the candidate solution {q2, f2, ξ2} as solutions to
Bst
(
(1− ρs,B(q2))− ρs,B′(q2)q2
)
−Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q2 + f2)) + ρ
b,A′(q2 + f)(q2 + f2)
)
−ξ
(
ρb,A
′
(q2 + f2)
1 + ρb,A(q2 + f2)
− ρ
s,B′(q2)
1 + ρs,B(q2)
)
= 0 (B.22)
−Abt
(
(1 + ρb,A(q2 + f2)) + ρ
b,A′(q2 + f2)(q2 + f2)
)
−ξ
(
d
df
dst(f2) +
ρb,A
′
(q2 + f2)
1 + ρb,A(q2 + f2)
)
= 0 (B.23)
dst(f2)− δb,st + log
(
1 + ρb,A(q2 + f2)
)− log (1− ρs,B(q2)) = 0. (B.24)
However, combining (B.22) and (B.23) shows that the solutions are only admissible if
ξ =
Bst
(
(1− ρs,B(q2))− ρs,B′(q2)q2
)
d
df
dst(f2)− ρ
s,B′ (q2)
1+ρs,B(q2)
> 0. (B.25)
Equation (B.25) now provides us with necessary conditions for a solution to the prob-
lem that entails a strictly positive settlement fee. Namely, q2 > 0, f2 > 0 ξ2 > 0 can
only be solution if one of the following two conditions holds
(i) − d
df
dst(f2) >
ρs,B
′
(q2)
1−ρs,B(q2) and 1− ρs,B(q2) > ρs,B
′
(q2)q2
(ii) − d
df
dst(f2) <
ρs,B
′
(q2)
1−ρs,B(q2) and 1− ρs,B(q2) < ρs,B
′
(q2)q2.
However, condition (ii) cannot hold at the maximum since 1 − ρs,B(q2) < ρs,B′(q2)q2
means that the trading quantity is such that the marginal price impact exceeds the
average price impact. In this case, the arbitrageur would reduce the trading quantity
to raise her total return. Consequently, (i) remains as the necessary condition for a
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candidate solution with a positive settlement fee which completes the proof.
B.2 Latency Distribution under Stochastic Volatility
We can relax the assumption that σst is constant over the interval [t, t+τ ] by allowing σst
to vary over time. More specifically, let σst : R+ → R+ with θ(τ) :=
t+τ∫
t
(σsk)
2 dk < ∞ ∀τ ,
that is, the volatility of the sell-sidemarket follows a (deterministic) pathwith bounded
integrated variance. Assuming µst = 0, we can then rewrite the log returns of the arbi-
trageur for given latency τ as
rb,s(t:t+τ) = δ
b,s
t +
t+τ∫
t
σskdW
s
k . (B.26)
The integral above corresponds to a Gaussian process with independent increments.
More specifically, we get
Et
((
rb,s(t:t+τ) − δb,st
)2)
= θ(τ)− θ(0) = Et
(
W sθ(τ) −W sθ(0)
)
. (B.27)
In other words, the time-changed Brownian motionW sθ(t) has the same distribution as
the log returns given in Equation (B.26) (e.g., Durrett, 1984; Barndorff-Nielsen et al.,
2002). We can thus rewrite the return process as
rb,s(t:t+τ) = δ
b,s
t +
t+θ(τ)∫
t
dW sk , (B.28)
The implications of Lemma 4 still hold, but we need to compute themoment-generating
function of the transformed latency mθ(τ)(u), which depends on the latency distribu-
tion and the dynamics of the volatility process. First, note that, as θ(τ) is strictly in-
creasing, the probability integral transformation yields the distribution of τ(θ),
Pt (θ(τ) = y) = Pt
(
τ = θ−1 (y)
) ∀y > 0. (B.29)
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Finally, the distribution of θ(τ) is fully described via its characteristic function which
is of the form
ϕθ(τ) (u) = Et
(
eiθ(τ)u
)
=
1
2pi
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕτ (s) e
−isτdseiθ(τ)udτ. (B.30)
Lévys characterization allows to extend these ideas to more general non-deterministic
integrands and to stochastic time-changes. Although Equation (B.30) allows to derive
theoretical arbitrage bounds based on Theorem 1 for every continuous local martin-
gale, we restrict our analysis to analytically more tractable and intuitive dynamics of
the price process and the associated settlement latency.
B.3 Return Distribution for Exponentially-Distributed
Latency
To provide an illustrative example, we parameterize the probability distribution of the
stochastic latency as an exponential distribution with locally-constant scale parameter
λt := λ (It). The probability density function of the latency is then given by
pit (τ) = λte
−λtτ , (B.31)
with conditional mean Et (τ) = λ−1t and conditional variance Vt (τ) = λ−2t . The
moment-generating function of the exponential distribution ismτ (u) =
(
1− λ−1t u
)−1
.
Thus, Lemma 4 yields
ϕrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u) =
eiuδ
b,s
t
1− iµst
λt
u+
(σst )
2
2λt
u2
, (B.32)
which corresponds to the characteristic function of an asymmetric Laplace distribution
with Et
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
= δb,st +
µst
λt
and Vt
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
= 1
λt
(
(µst)
2 + (σst )
2) (e.g., Kotz et al., 2012).
Without a drift (µst = 0), the distribution collapses to a symmetric Laplace distribution
with location parameter δb,st , scale parameter
σst√
2λt
, and corresponding probability den-
sity function
pit
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
=
√
2λt
2σst
exp
(
−
√
2λt
σst
∣∣∣rb,s(t:t+τ) − δb,st ∣∣∣) , (B.33)
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Figure B.1: Return Distribution under Exponentially-Distributed Latency
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of stochastic latency (horizontal axis) on the distribution of re-
turns (vertical axis) if log prices follow a Brownianmotion and if latencies are exponentially distributed.
The individual paths correspond to sample draws of the price process and the dots correspond to the
terminal value of the stopped Wiener process. The marginal distribution at the top corresponds to the
sampled latencies. The marginal distribution on the right-hand side corresponds to the sampled dis-
tribution of returns which converges in the limit to a Laplace distribution. The figure below shows the
resulting distributions for a price process with negative drift µst < 0.
with Et
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
= δb,st and Vt
(
rb,s(t:t+τ)
)
= (σst )
2 Et (τ). Hence, not surprisingly, in the
absence of a drift in the underlying Brownian motion, the (conditionally) expected
return implied by the arbitrage strategy is equal to the instantaneous return δb,st =
bst−abt . The (conditional) variance equals the (locally constant) spot variance onmarket
s, (σst )
2, scaled by the (conditional) expected waiting time until the settlement of the
transaction, λ−1t . Hence, the higher the volatility on the sell-side market or the longer
the expected waiting time until the transfer is settled, the higher is the risk of extreme
adverse price movements.
Figure B.1 provides a graphical illustration of the resulting distribution. The plot
shows simulated draws from a Brownian motion stopped at randomly sampled wait-
ing times. The marginal distribution at the top of the figure illustrates the exponential
distribution of the waiting times. The marginal distribution on the right-hand side
shows the resulting sampling distribution of the price process which converges in the
limit to a Laplace distribution. The figure shows the resulting asymmetric Laplace
distribution for a price process with a negative drift, whereas a price process without
drift would yield a symmetric Laplace distribution.
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B.4 Arbitrage Bound under Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion
We provide a further application of our main result to the case of the commonly-used
utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Again, we ignore the
impact of higher order moments above the fourth degree of the Taylor representation
in Equation (2.7). These assumptions yield an analytically tractable formulation of the
arbitrage bound.
Lemma 9. If, in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, the arbitrageur has an exponential utility
function Uγ(r) := 1−e
−γ(1+r)
γ
with risk aversion γ > 0, then the arbitrage boundary is
dst =− Et (τ)µst +
γ
2
(
Vt (τ) (µst)
2 + (σst )
2 Et (τ)
)
− γ
2
6
(
3µst (σ
s
t )
2Vt (τ) + (µst)
3 Et
(
(τ − Et (τ))3
))
+
γ3
24
(
(µst)
4 Et
(
(τ − Et (τ))4
)
+ 6 (σst )
2 (µst)
2 (E (τ)3 + Et (τ 3)− 2Et (τ)2))
+
γ3
8
Et
(
τ 2
)
(σst )
4 . (B.34)
Proof. For the exponential utility, we have U (k) (r) /U ′ (r) = (−γ)k−1 for k ≥ 1. There-
fore, from Theorem 1 we have
CE = δb,st + Et (τ)µst −
γ
2
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(2)
+
γ2
6
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(3)− γ
3
24
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(4) +O (r) , (B.35)
where µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(k) := Et
((
rb,s(t:t+τ) − δb,st − Et (τ)µst
)k)
is the k-th order central moment
of the returns and O (r) corresponds to the Taylor approximation error which we ne-
glect subsequently. Recognizing that by definition mrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(iu) = ϕrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u), we can
derive the moment-generating function of the returns given by
mrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u) = euδ
b,s
t mτ
(
uµst +
1
2
u2(σst )
2
)
. (B.36)
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The central moment-generating function is defined as
Crb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u) = Et
(
exp
(
u
(
r(t:t+τ) − Et(rb,s(t:t+τ))
)))
= exp
(
−uEt(rb,s(t:t+τ))
)
mrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u) . (B.37)
Thus, we have
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(k) =
∂k
∂uk
Crb,s
(t:t+τ)
(u)
∣∣∣∣
u=0
=
∂k
∂uk
exp (−Et (τ)µstu)mτ
(
uµst +
1
2
u2 (σst )
2
) ∣∣∣∣
u=0
. (B.38)
Basic calculus then yields
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(2) = Vt (τ) (µst)
2 + (σst )
2 Et (τ) (B.39)
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(3) = 3µst (σ
s
t )
2Vt (τ) + (µst)
3 Et
(
(τ − Et (τ))3
)
(B.40)
µrb,s
(t:t+τ)
(4) = (µst)
4 Et
(
(τ − Et (τ))4
)
+ 3Et
(
τ 2
)
(σst )
4
+ 6 (σst )
2 (µst)
2 (Et (τ)3 + Et (τ 3)− 2Et (τ)Et (τ 2)) . (B.41)
Then, we plug in equations (B.39)-(B.41) into (B.35). Finally, recognizing that the arbi-
trageur exploits price differences if and only if CE > 0, we can solve for the minimum
instantaneous price differences δb,st which completes the proof.
In the absence of a drift (µst = 0), the arbitrage boundary of Lemma 9 further simplifies
to
dst =
γ
2
(σst )
2Et (τ) +
γ3
8
(σst )
4
(
Vt (τ) + Et (τ)2
)
. (B.42)
Just like in the case of CRRA, the arbitrage boundary dst positively depends on (i)
the arbitrageur’s risk aversion, (ii) the local volatility on the sell-side market s, (iii)
the expected waiting time until settlement, and (iv) the variance of the waiting time,
Vt (τ).
B.5 No-Arbitrage Implied Relative Risk Aversion
We compute the implied relative risk aversion γˆb,st such that all observed price differ-
ences of exchange pair {b, s} at time t are located within the implied limits to arbitrage.
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B.5 No-Arbitrage Implied Relative Risk Aversion
The interpretation of γˆb,st is straightforward: if the risk aversion of an arbitrageur is be-
low γˆb,st , it would be rational to trade. We compute γˆ
b,s
t according to the following
lemma.
Lemma 10. Define γˆb,st as the root of the cubic polynomial(
δ˜b,st
)4
−1
8
(σˆst )
4 c2
(
γˆb,st
)3
− 3
8
(σˆst )
4 c2
(
γˆb,st
)2
− 1
2
(σˆst )
2
(
c1
(
δ˜b,st
)2
+
1
2
(σˆst )
2 c2
)
γˆb,st = 0, (B.43)
where, analogously to Equations (2.27) and (2.28), c1 = Eˆt (τ) + Eˆ (τB) · (Bs − 1) and c2 =
Vˆt (τ) + Vˆ (τB) · (Bs − 1)2 +
(
Eˆ (τB) · (Bs − 1) + Eˆt (τ)
)2
. Then, price differences (adjusted
for transaction costs) δ˜b,st constitute a (statistical) arbitrage opportunity for an arbitrageur with
risk aversion γ only if γ < γˆb,st .
Proof. The proof follows directly from applying Theorem 1 together with the deriva-
tives of the utility function which yields
dst −
1
2
γ
dst
(σst )
2Et (τ)− 1
8
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)
(dst)
3
(σst )
4Et
(
τ 2
)
= 0. (B.44)
Then, by Descartes’ rule of signs there is exactly one positive real root to the polyno-
mial
(dst)
4 − 1
2
γ(σst )
2Et (τ) (dst)2 −
1
8
γ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)(σst )
4Et
(
τ 2
)
= 0. (B.45)
By definition, dst corresponds to the arbitrage boundary for a given risk aversion γ.
The arbitrageur prefers to trade if observed price differences δ˜st exceed the boundary.
Therefore, rewriting Equation (B.45) in terms of γ and replacing dst with δ˜st yields a
cubic polynomial in γ :(
δ˜b,st
)4
−1
8
(σˆst )
4 Et
(
τ 2
) (
γˆb,st
)3
− 3
8
(σˆst )
4 Et
(
τ 2
) (
γˆb,st
)2
(B.46)
− 1
2
(σˆst )
2
(
Et (τ)
(
δ˜b,st
)2
+
1
2
(σˆst )
2 Et
(
τ 2
))
γˆb,st = 0
Replacing the (conditional) expected latencies with the values given by Equations (2.27)
and (2.28) completes the proof.
The exchange pair-specific implied risk aversion γˆb,st is defined in a way such that
the observed price differences δ˜b,st , adjusted for transaction costs, coincide with the
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arbitrage bounds for an isoelastic utility function with risk aversion parameter γˆb,st . As
the arbitrage bounds monotonically increase with risk aversion, any value of γ < γˆb,st
constitutes a trading opportunity for the arbitrageur. Conversely, γ > γˆb,st reflects
that the observed price differences do not justify (unconstrained) trading because an
arbitrageur with a higher risk aversion obtains higher (expected) utility by trading
less or not at all. As the asset is traded on N markets, we define γˆt as the smallest risk
aversion parameter for which all observed price differences fall within the implied
arbitrage bounds, that is,
γˆt := max
i,j∈{1,...,N}
γˆi,jt . (B.47)
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C.1 Supplementing Tables
Table C.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Account Age End of month date minus the date when the user completed the account opening procedure.
Big Ticket Expenditure Indicator variable equal to one if the user has at least one transaction of more than 5,000 Euros in
the given month.
Card Consumption Total amount of electronic card consumption in the given month.
Cash Withdrawals Total amount of cash withdrawals in the given month.
Consumption Sum of Card Consumption and Cash Withdrawals.
Deposits Total amount of available funds in a user’s account at the end of a month.
Discretionary Sum of users’ monthly expenditures on Entertainment, Shopping, Gastronomy, and Travel.
Female Indicator variable equal to one if the user is female.
Incoming Wire Transfers Total amount of all SEPA credit transfers a user receives in the given month.
Inflows Total amount of all incoming transactions a user receives in the given month.
Negative Deposits Indicator variable equal to one if the user has a negative account balance in the given month.
Non-Discretionary Card Consumptionminus Discretionary spending.
Overdraft Available Indicator variable equal to one if the user has access to a mobile overdraft in the given month.
Overdraft Amount Maximum overdraft amount granted to the user by the bank in the given month.
Savings Rate Lagged inflows minus total current outflows divided by lagged inflows.
Urban Indicator variable equal to one if the user lives in a NUTS 3 region with a population of at least
500,000 people.
User Age End of month date minus first day of user’s birth year.
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Table C.2: Survey Questions
Question Possible Answers
Do you rate yourself as a risk-taking person or are you trying
to avoid risks?
Scale from 0 (not willing to take risks) to 10 (very willing to
take risks)
Would you say that you are a person who trusts others, or
not?
Scale from 0 (I do not trust others) to 10 (I trust others fully)
When youmake savings or investment decisions for yourself,
which of the following statements describes you best?
1 - I take significant risks and want to generate high returns.
2 - I take above-average risks and want to achieve above-
average returns.
3 - I take average risks and aim for average returns.
4 - I am not willing to take any financial risk and accept not
to generate any returns.
Imagine, you get either 100 Euros immediately or a higher
amount of money in a month. What is the lowest amount
you would be willing to wait for a month?
1 - 101 Euros
2 - 103 Euros
3 - 108 Euros
4 - 117 Euros
5 - 125 Euros
6 - 133 Euros
7 - 150 Euros
8 - 167 Euros
9 - 183 Euros
10 - 200 Euros
11 - 233 Euros
How likely is it that you will face large, unexpected expenses
over the next 12 months?
Scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
How likely is it that you will face large medical expenses for
yourself or a family member over the next 12 months, includ-
ing hospitalization and nursing care?
Scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
How likely are you to lose your job in the next 12 months? Scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely)
How satisfied are you with your health at the moment? Scale from 0 (not satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
What do you usually think of when saving? 1 - I usually save for very specific expenses, such as a vacation
or a car.
2 - I usually save to have a small amount of money available
for unexpected expenses.
3 - I do not save much or cannot save much. Whenever I put
money aside, I do it without much thought.
4 - I am saving with the goal of building a small estate that I
may pass on to my children, nephews, nieces, or other family
members.
Suppose you have 100 Euros in your savings account and
earn 10 percent interest per year. How high will be your bal-
ance after 2 years?
1 - Lower than 120 Euros
2 - 120 Euros
3 - Higher than 120 Euros
How high do you estimate your life expectancy? Enter number
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Table C.3: Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Non-Respondents Respondents
Mean Mean SD
User Age [Years] 33.78 38.37 9.93
Female [0/1=Yes] 0.22 0.12 0.41
Urban [0/1=Yes] 0.54 0.39 0.50
Account Age [Years] 1.56 1.77 0.86
Overdraft Available [0/1=Yes] 0.91 0.91 0.29
Overdraft Amount [Euro] 1,566.51 1,484.89 1,602.05
Consumption [Euro] 742.09 561.75 949.42
Inflows [Euro] 2,236.78 1,965.94 5,948.55
Consumption / Inflows [%] 48.33 44.86 44.89
Card Consumption [Euro] 506.49 379.95 736.64
Card Consumption / Inflows [%] 33.91 32.22 37.17
Cash Withdrawals [Euro] 223.92 175.96 400.55
Cash Withdrawals / Inflows [%] 13.53 12.04 19.56
Discretionary [Euro] 212.97 139.35 419.58
Non-Discretionary [Euro] 293.53 240.60 469.75
Discretionary / Non-Discretionary [%] 81.46 69.44 102.50
User Observations 565,423 37,734 603,157
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of characteristics for users who responded to the survey
and those who did not respond. The last column reports the standard deviation of the corresponding
characteristic across all users. We limit the sample to users that activate the overdraft facility in our
main sample.
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Table C.4: User Characteristics around Rounding Thresholds
Rounded Up Rounded Down Difference in Means
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Diff. t-Stat.
User Age [Years] 32.32 9.34 29.91 33.02 10.12 30.37 0.70 1.13
Female [0/1=Yes] 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 -0.01 -0.35
Account Age [Years] 0.87 0.38 0.83 0.85 0.41 0.79 -0.01 -0.53
Inflowst−3:t−1 [Euro] 1,405.64 1,530.10 1,101.67 1,458.92 1,454.29 1,069.67 53.28 0.56
Consumptiont−3:t−1 [Euro] 558.89 522.39 427.17 620.04 597.38 482.83 61.14
∗ 1.70
Users 500 474 974
Notes: This table reports non-parametric estimates for the RD treatment effect of a 250 Euros higher
overdraft amount on several user characteristics. The dependent variables are the user’s age, gender,
and time since account opening at the treatment date. We only use polynomials of order 1 and 2 to
avoid overfitting issues (Gelman and Imbens, 2018), apply weights from a triangular kernel because it
is the mean squared error (MSE) minimizing choice (Cheng et al., 1997), and employ the MSE-optimal
bandwidth selection procedure recommended by Calonico et al. (2014). We report both conventional
and robust RD estimates (Calonico et al., 2014, 2019). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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C.2 Supplementing Figures
Figure C.1: Savings Rate Pattern by Deposit-to-Income Quintile
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Notes: This figure shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for OLS regressions esti-
mating the heterogeneous effect of mobile overdrafts on the savings behavior of users with different
ex-ante liquidity. To generate this plot, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment date and
assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile) based on
the deposits-to-inflows ratio in the month before treatment. We estimate model (1) from Table 3.2 but
replace the Overdraft Available indicator with separate time dummies, which we further interact with
our quintile indicators. Each time dummy marks a one-month period (except for event period t − 1).
Coefficients are normalized by subtracting the pre-treatment mean for each quintile. We double cluster
standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
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Figure C.2: Big Ticket Expenditure Response by Deposits-to-Inflows Quintile
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Notes: This figure illustrates the cross-sectional heterogeneity in users’ big ticket expenditure response
after accessing the mobile overdraft. To generate this plot, we take the cross-section of users at their
treatment date and assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th
quintile) based on the underlying user characteristic. We then interact each of the 5 quintile indicators
with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the user has access to a mobile overdraft in the given month.
Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates of each quintile. We double
cluster standard errors at the NUTS 2 and year-month level.
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Figure C.3: Subjective Beliefs by Deposits-to-Inflows Quintile
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Notes: This figure plots a set of preferences and beliefs dimensions we elicited from users through an
ad-hoc survey intervention. To generate these plots, we take the cross-section of users at their treatment
date and assign them into non-overlapping quintiles from lowest (1st quintile) to highest (5th quintile)
based on the ratio of deposited amount over income. We limit the sample to users that activate the
overdraft facility in our main sample. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point
estimates of each quintile.
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Figure C.4: Distribution of Forcing Variable around Rounding Thresholds
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Notes: This figure provides graphical evidence for our treatment manipulation tests in Section 3.6.3.
Panel A plots the number of users and Panel B reports the local polynomial density estimate by Cattaneo
et al. (2017) for different values of our forcing variable Xi around the rounding threshold.
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Figure C.5: Robustness Analyses for Treatment Manipulation Tests
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Notes: This figure reports t-statistics for the treatment manipulation test by Cattaneo et al. (2017) for
different polynomial orders and bandwidth choices. The vertical horizontal lines indicate the critical
10% significance levels at which the test rejects the null hypothesis that our running variable is locally
continuous around the rounding threshold.
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Figure C.6: Sensitivity of RDD Effects to Bandwidth Choice
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Notes: This figure shows convetional regression discontinuity (RD) estimates (solid line) and corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals (shaded area) for varying bandwidth choices. The figure demon-
strates that different bandwidth choices neither substantially affect the magnitude nor the significance
of our main RD consumption effect. Varying the bandwidth is only meaningful over small intervals
around the mean-squared-error (MSE) optimal choice (Cattaneo et al., 2020). Bandwidths much larger
than the MSE-optimal bandwidth bias the RD estimator, while substantially smaller bandwidths inflate
its variance.
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Figure C.7: Sensitivity of RDD Effects to Observations around Rounding
Thresholds
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Notes: This figure shows robust regression discontinuity (RD) estimates (solid line) and corresponding
95% confidence intervals (shaded area) for varying donut hole radius choices. This figure demonstrates
that our main RD consumption effect is robust to excluding data close to the rounding threshold (e.g.,
Barreca et al., 2011, 2016). We drop users located within the radius r > 0 of the rounding cutoff. Specifi-
cally, we exclude observations for which |Xi| ≤ r (Cattaneo et al., 2020) and illustrate that observations
close to the rounding threshold do not drive our results.
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